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Abstract
Promoting the best interests of children and protecting their 
safety and well-being in the context of a divorce or parentage case 
where domestic violence has been alleged has become highly 
politicized and highly gendered. There are claims by fathers’
rights groups that mothers often falsely accuse fathers of domestic 
violence to alienate the fathers from their children and to 
improve their financial position. They also claim that children 
do better when fathers are equally involved in their children’s
lives, but that judges favor mothers over fathers in custody cases. 
As a consequence, fathers’ rights groups have engaged in a 
nationwide effort to reform the custody laws to create a 
presumption of equal parenting time, with no exception when 
one of the parents has engaged in domestic violence. Domestic 
violence survivors and their advocates, however, claim that the 
needs of survivors of domestic violence and their children to be 
* Professor of Law, The John Marshall Law School (JMLS) and founder and director 
of the JMLS Family Law & Domestic Violence Clinic. Professor Stark’s development 
of this article was supported by a summer grant from JMLS, and she thanks Dean 
Darby Dickerson for this support. She also thanks the following students in the 
JMLS Family Law & Domestic Violence Clinic for their invaluable research assis-
tance on this Article: Hannah Aztlan, Sarah Flosi, Madison Hynes, Joseph Pesa, and 
Mariana Jacobo, as well as David Rutter, J.D., a former student at JMLS. Finally, she 
thanks the following attorneys for their helpful feedback on this article: Nicole Cen-
tracchio, a family law attorney, child representative, and supervising attorney in the 
Clinic, and Professor Joan S. Meier, Professor of Clinical Law at George Washington 
University Law School.
** Associate Professor of Psychological Science, DePaul University Department of Psy-
chology. Dr. Choplin thanks the Chicago Foundation for Women for their financial 
support for the literature review performed for this article.
*** Attorney and graduate student in Psychological Science, DePaul University Depart-
ment of Psychology.
1
2 michigan  jo urn al  o f  g ender & la w [Vol. 26:1
safe and free from further abuse are not being met in custody 
cases, that their claims of abuse are not being believed, and that 
the harm when a parent commits domestic violence against the 
other parent is not being recognized and addressed by judges and 
the family law professional upon whom they rely.
This Article first presents a literature review, with articulat-
ed scientific standards applied to each of the pieces of research cit-
ed in this review, on what is happening outside of court and in 
court relating to domestic violence and best practices for taking 
domestic violence into account in these child custody cases. 
Among the key findings from this literature review are: (1) when 
a parent commits domestic violence against the other parent, this
can cause serious long-term harm to children, (2) custody judg-
ments tend to favor fathers over mothers because greater weight is 
placed on claims of alienation than on domestic violence claims, 
(3) long-term harms can be mitigated by evidence-based best 
practices, most notably, supporting non-abusive parents in their 
efforts to protect themselves and their children from further do-
mestic violence, (4) family law judges and professionals must be 
trained on domestic violence and its nuances, as well as how to 
screen for domestic violence, to adequately support them, and (5) 
a component of this training is learning how to distinguish mu-
tual “situational couple violence” for which “parallel parenting”
custody arrangements might be feasible, from a pattern of “coer-
cive abuse,” where sole decision-making and primary parenting 
time should be ordered to the non-abusive parent, and protective 
restrictions on parenting time should be ordered to the abusive 
parent. 
The Article then reports on a fifty-state review of custody-
related laws (laws determining which parent makes major deci-
sions relating to the child, who is allocated primary parenting 
time, and whether protective restrictions shall be placed on the 
parenting time of a parent who has engaged in domestic vio-
lence). This review found serious gaps between what evidence-
based best practices suggest, and what is currently required by 
law in many states. These gaps in the law, including the failure 
of the law to require domestic violence screening and training for 
judges and other family law professionals, contribute to poor cus-
tody decision-making by them that compromises the safety and 
welfare of domestic violence survivors and their children. 
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The Article then proposes nuanced law reforms that would 
align custody-related laws with evidence-based best practices for 
taking domestic violence into account in custody cases, including 
creating rebuttable presumptions, burdens of proof, and defini-
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There is substantial evidence that family law judges, child repre-
sentatives, guardians ad litem, and other family law professionals are not 
adequately taking domestic violence into account in child custody de-
terminations.1 Survivors of domestic violence are often either not be-
lieved or are viewed as being alienating rather than protective of their 
children.2 When a father claims that the mother is alienating him from 
his children, that father is much more likely to obtain the custody order 
they are seeking (joint or sole custody of their children), even when the 
courts are aware that the father has committed domestic violence or di-
1. See infra Section I.
2. Joan S. Meier & Sean Dickson, Mapping Gender: Shedding Empirical Light on Family 
Courts’ Treatment of Cases Involving Abuse and Alienation, 35 LAW & INEQ. 311, 332 
(2017).
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rect abuse of the children.3 Mothers are much less likely to obtain the 
custody order they are seeking (sole custody and protective restrictions 
on the parenting time of the other parent) when they allege domestic 
violence or direct abuse of their children and the father alleges aliena-
tion.4 An estimated 58,000 children a year in the United States are 
court ordered into unsupervised contact with physically or sexually abu-
sive parents following divorce.5 The failure to protect children and do-
mestic violence survivors continues even when one parent has been con-
victed beyond a reasonable doubt of domestic violence against the other 
parent. According to one study, joint legal custody orders (for shared 
decision-making by the parents) are the most common custody out-
come—primary physical custody (physical placement) is given to the 
domestic abuse victim in only 60 percent of the cases.6 There are no ex-
plicit provisions for the safety of the victim or children (such as ordering 
that placement exchange occur in a protected setting) in 70 percent of 
these cases.7 These results are particularly problematic since there is 
strong evidence that exposure to domestic violence often causes long-
term, serious harm to children, but can be mitigated when protective 
factors are present or pursued.8
As discussed in Section I, to reduce the harms to children from fur-
ther exposure to domestic violence, courts need to grant custody orders 
that empower the non-abusive parent to protect their children from fur-
ther harm. As explained in Sections I and II, when the domestic vio-
lence is based upon a pattern of coercive abuse, the custody orders 
should provide sole legal custody (i.e., decision-making) and primary 
physical custody (i.e., parenting time) to the non-abusive parent, unless 
that parent is not fit to parent. In addition, the custody orders should 
contain other protective measures, such as supervised exchanges of the 
children, attending and completing partner abuse intervention pro-
grams, and, in some cases, supervision or suspension of parenting time.9
3. Id. at 320.
4. Id. at 328.
5. Id. at 313.
6. See Adrienne Roach, Will Data Drive Change? Research Shines a Light on the Family 
Law System, COALITION CHRONICLES (End Domestic Abuse WI, Madison, Wis.), 
June 2018, at 9; Tony Wilkin-Gibart, Wisconsin Family Law and Domestic Abuse:
Summary of Research Findings, COALITION CHRONICLES (End Domestic Abuse WI, 
Madison, Wis.), June 2018, at 11.
7. See Wilkin-Gibart, supra note 6, at 11.
8. See infra Section I.A.
9. See infra Section I.
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So why are guardians ad litem and child representatives 
recommending, and courts ordering, sole or joint custody and 
unrestricted parenting time to parents when there is evidence those 
parents have been engaging in a pattern of coercive abuse of the other 
parent that seriously endangers their children’s health, safety, and well-
being? To what extent is this due to gender bias and a lack of training 
on the dynamics of domestic violence? To what extent are judges failing 
to order protective conditions on parenting time because they are 
unaware of the danger of serious harm to children when one parent 
engages in domestic violence against the other parent? To what extent is 
it due to a failure to screen for and make findings on domestic violence? 
How do the various custody laws among the fifty states contribute to 
judges failing to order necessary protections?
As discussed in Section II, the presence of domestic violence is a 
factor in determining the “best interests of the child” in virtually every 
state’s custody laws.10 In addition, in 21 states and the District of Co-
lumbia, there is a rebuttable presumption against sole custody or joint 
legal custody to a parent who has engaged in “domestic violence.”11
And, 34 states expressly and clearly provide that domestic violence is a 
basis to order conditions and restrictions on parenting time.12 To what 
extent are the statutory pre-conditions in these laws hindering a judge’s 
ability to grant custody orders that adequately protect children and the 
parent victim of domestic violence? This question, along with those 
above, are key questions and problems that this Article will address.
Fathers’ rights groups, on the other hand, view the situation very 
differently. They claim that courts favor mothers over fathers,13 that 
mothers routinely falsely allege domestic violence or child abuse as part 
of a “gamesmanship of divorce”14 to gain an economic advantage in the 
divorce or parentage case,15 to get custody,16 or to alienate the father 
10. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION COMMISSION ON DOMESTIC & SEXUAL VIOLENCE,
CHILD CUSTODY AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE BY STATE (hereinafter “ABA 50 STATE 
REVIEW”), http://www.ambar.org/cdsv; see also discussion infra Section II.
11. See notes 446–467 infra.
12. See notes 513–546 infra.
13. STOP ABUSIVE AND VIOLENT ENVIRONMENTS, UNEQUAL JUSTICE IN THE CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE SYSTEM 1, 2 (2013), http://www.saveservices.org/wp-content/uploads/
SAVE-Criminal-Justice-System.pdf.
14. STOP ABUSIVE AND VIOLENT ENVIRONMENTS, INCENTIVES TO MAKE FALSE 
ALLEGATIONS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 1, 2 (2010), http://www.saveservices.org/pdf/
SAVE-Incentives-for-False-Allegations.pdf [hereinafter INCENTIVES TO MAKE FALSE 
ALLEGATIONS].
15. Id. at 3.
16. Id. at 4.
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from the child.17 Fathers’ rights groups also claim that children are 
harmed when they are separated from their father.18 Furthermore, over 
the past few years, fathers’ rights groups such as the National Parents 
Organization19 and Stop Abusive and Violent Environments20 have used 
these arguments to mount a national push for law reform that would 
create rebuttable presumptions of equal or shared parenting time and 
shared decision-making, without adding an exception for situations 
where one parent has engaged in domestic violence or direct child 
abuse.21 To what extent are these claims valid and these policy proscrip-
tions prudent or reckless?
17. Richard Gardner argues that “when bona fide abuse is present, the [parental aliena-
tion syndrome] diagnosis is not applicable,” but his concept has been applied even in 
situations where there has been abuse. Compare Richard A. Gardner, Family Therapy 
of the Moderate Type of Parental Alienation Syndrome, 27 AM. J. FAM. THERAPY 195, 
201 (1999), with Meier & Dickson, supra note 2, at 316–18 (2017) (“In some cases, 
even expert validations of child abuse and comprehensive guardian ad litem confirma-
tions of the validity of the abuse claims have been insufficient to overcome the seem-
ingly irrebuttable presumption of falsity that flows from the label ‘alienator.’”).
18. STOP ABUSIVE AND VIOLENT ENVIRONMENTS, WHAT IS THE COST OF FALSE 
ALLEGATIONS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE? 1, 4 (2010), http://www.saveservices.org/
downloads/False-DV-Allegations-Cost-20-Billion.
19. About NPO: Who We Are, NATIONAL PARENTS ORGANIZATION,
https://nationalparentsorganization.org/about-npo (last visited Dec. 29, 2018).
20. About SAVE, STOP ABUSIVE AND VIOLENT ENVIRONMENTS,
http://www.saveservices.org/info/about (last visited Dec. 29, 2018).
21. Michael Alison Chandler, More Than 20 States in 2017 Considered Laws to Promote 




See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.270(2) (Westlaw through 2018 Reg. Sess.) (cre-
ating a “presumption, rebuttable by a preponderance of evidence, that joint custody 
and equally shared parenting time is in the best interest of the child,” although do-
mestic violence is still listed as one of a number of factors that the court shall consid-
er). A bill was introduced in 2017 in Illinois to create a rebuttable presumption for 
equal parenting time with no exception for domestic violence. H.R. 4113, 100th 
Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2017). Although it was adjourned sine die, another bill 
was introduced in 2019, amending the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage 
Act by “recognizing that the involvement of each parent for equal time is presump-
tively in the children’s best interests.” H.R. 185, 101st Gen Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 
2019). No definite exception is listed for domestic violence, but the bill requires the 
court to “acknowledge that the determination of children’s best interests, and the al-
location of parenting time and significant decision-making responsibilities, are among 
the paramount responsibilities of our system of justice, and to that end . . . recognize 
that, in the absence of domestic violence or any other factor that the court expressly 
finds to be relevant, proximity to, and frequent contact with, both parents promotes 
healthy development of children.” H.R. 185. In 2016, although the bill was ultimate-
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The goal of this Article is to present the highest-quality, objective, 
scientific research22 available to propose law reforms to the process of 
how child custody decisions are made. The term “child custody,” as 
used throughout this Article, refers to a court order on whether one par-
ent will be granted the primary parenting time and decision-making of 
their child, or whether instead, the court orders that the parents will 
have more of a shared arrangement on parenting time and decision-
making. The term “child custody” also sometimes refers to court orders 
on whether there should be any conditions or restrictions ordered on a 
parent’s parenting time to protect the child and other parent from the 
danger of serious harm that could occur without these protections in 
place.
Section I of this Article contains a literature review23 of the harms 
to children when one parent engages in domestic violence against the 
other parent; ways to mitigate this harm and reduce the likelihood of 
co-occurrence of domestic violence and child abuse; and other best prac-
tices for taking domestic violence into account in child custody cases. 
Section I also includes an evidence-based analysis of fathers’ rights 
groups’ claims relating to domestic violence and child custody decisions. 
Section II explores the extent to which best practices have been imple-
mented by state legislatures and state supreme courts. It also identifies 
gaps in mandating such best practices. In Section III, this Article pro-
poses specific reforms to the laws among the 50 states and the District 
of Columbia relating to child custody that implement evidence-based 
best practices to better protect children and survivors of domestic vio-
lence from the danger of further serious harm. Among these best prac-
tices would be distinguishing “situational couple violence” from a “pat-
ly vetoed by the governor and did not become law, a proposal for equal time sharing 
was approved overwhelmingly by Florida’s state legislature. S. 668, 118th Leg. (Fla. 
2016).
22. We describe, in footnotes to each cited study, the limitations of the study to put the 
conclusions into proper context. In some cases, the results have been used in mislead-
ing ways and we indicate this issue in the text or footnote citing it.
23. Various forms of research have been included: meta-analyses (which statistically com-
bine the results of many studies and are often considered to be the gold-standard in 
research), qualitative literature reviews (which describe the research that is reported in 
the literature, but do not combine results together as meta-analyses do), empirical re-
sults of original studies such as experiments (studies in which variables are manipulat-
ed to see how those manipulations affect measured outcomes), correlational research 
(studies that take data from a variety of measures and statistically parses the relation-
ships between the measures) with regression analyses (statistical analyses that look at 
the relationships between measured variables), and structural equation modeling (a 
statistical analysis technique that is used to analyze the structural relationships be-
tween measured variables and latent constructs).
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tern of coercive abuse,”24 with different kinds and levels of protections 
to be put in place for each.
I.  A Review of the Literature on “Domestic Violence” in 
Child Custody Cases
First, it is important to be clear on the definition of “domestic vio-
lence.” The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) notes 
the importance of applying a uniform definition when studying domes-
tic violence25 and taking steps to prevent it. We adopt the CDC defini-
tion:26 “The term ‘intimate partner violence’ describes physical vio-
lence,27 sexual violence,28 stalking29 and psychological aggression 
(including coercive acts)30 by a current or former intimate partner.” This 
CDC definition of intimate partner violence is gender neutral, and do-
mestic violence happens to men as well as women, but statistics reflect 
that women are primarily the victims of domestic violence and men are 
primarily the abusers.31 In addition to this precise definition of domestic 
violence, the CDC classifies domestic violence as a “serious, preventable 
24. See discussion of these terms infra Section I.
25. The CDC actually uses the term “intimate partner violence” rather than “domestic 
violence,” but in this Article we refer to the phenomenon as “domestic violence” un-
less quoting from a source that uses another phrase such as “intimate partner vio-
lence.”
26. Intimate Partner Violence: Definitions, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/intimatepartnerviolence/definitions.html
(last updated Oct. 23, 2018) [hereinafter “CDC Definition of DV/Intimate Partner 
Violence”].
27. “Physical violence includes a range of behaviors from slapping, pushing or shoving to 
severe acts that include hit with a fist or something hard, kicked, hurt by pulling hair, 
slammed against something, tried to hurt by choking or suffocating, beaten, burned 
on purpose, used a knife or gun.” Id.
28. “Sexual violence: includes rape, being made to penetrate someone else, sexual coer-
cion (non-physically pressured sex), unwanted sexual contact (such as groping), and 
noncontact unwanted sexual experiences (such as verbal harassment). Contact sexual 
violence is a combined measure that includes rape, being made to penetrate someone 
else, sexual coercion, and/or unwanted sexual contact.” Id.
29. “Stalking: victimization involves a pattern of harassing or threatening tactics used by 
a perpetrator that is both unwanted and causes fear or safety concerns in the victim.”
Id.
30. “Psychological Aggression: includes expressive aggression (such as name calling, in-
sulting or humiliating an intimate partner) and coercive control, which includes be-
haviors that are intended to monitor and control or threaten an intimate partner.” Id.
31. See infra Section I.F.
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public health problem that affects millions of Americans.”32 Legislators, 
judges, and other family law professionals need to be aware of this 
statement from a highly regarded government agency and research cen-
ter. 
Second, the scientific literature distinguishes different types or pat-
terns of domestic violence.33 Several taxonomies have been proposed, 
but we will primarily distinguish between two types: “situational couple 
violence” and “coercive abuse.” “Situational couple violence” can be a 
dangerous type of violence that happens by and between both intimate 
partners (i.e., it is mutual) that does not involve pervasive power and 
control.34 It is often used to influence or even coerce the partner to do 
something in particular situations,35 but coercion does not pervade the 
entire relationship.36 Some believe it is the type of violence most fre-
quently observed in the population at large,37 but, as explained later in 
this Article, this belief is based upon certain general surveys of the popu-
lation that have methodological flaws.38 “Coercive abuse,” by contrast, 
involves one intimate partner engaging in patterns of controlling behav-
ior that are not limited to particular situations; and instead, the coercion 
is pervasive in the relationship.39 Coercive abuse involves violence, but 
extends beyond violence to include at least some of the following behav-
iors: intimidation; emotional abuse; isolation; minimizing, denying, and 
blaming; use of children; asserting male privilege; economic abuse; and 
32. CDC Definition of DV/Intimate Partner Violence, supra note 26.
33. Joan B. Kelly & Michael P. Johnson, Differentiation Among Types of Intimate Partner 
Violence: Research Update and Implications for Interventions, 46 FAM. CT. REV. 476 
(2008) (conducting a literature review on the distinctions between different types of 
domestic violence and how differentiating among the different patterns of domestic 
violence clarifies apparent paradoxes in the field); see also GOVERNOR’S COUNCIL ON 
DOMESTIC ABUSE & END DOMESTIC ABUSE WIS., DOMESTIC ABUSE GUIDEBOOK 
FOR WISCONSIN GUARDIANS AD LITEM: ADDRESSING CUSTODY, PLACEMENT, AND 
SAFETY ISSUES (2017), https://www.wicourts.gov/publications/guides/docs/
galguidebook.pdf.
34. Kelly & Johnson, supra note 33, at 481.
35. Evan Stark, Commentary on Johnson’s ”Conflict and Control: Gender Symmetry and 
Asymmetry in Domestic Violence, 12 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 1024 (2006) [here-
inafter Stark, Commentary on Johnson] (conducting a literature review on the distinc-
tions between different types of domestic violence and how domestic violence cannot 
be viewed as simply a combination of discrete acts, but as a pattern of abuse).
36. Kelly & Johnson, supra note 33, at 479.
37. Id. at 485.
38. See infra Section I.F.
39. Kelly & Johnson, supra note 33, at 481.
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coercion and threats.40 Both situational couple violence and coercive 
abuse are harmful to children, but as we discuss in this Article, these two 
different types of domestic violence can have different implications for 
the kinds of protections courts should order in child custody cases.
A. Exposure to Domestic Violence Can Cause Serious, Long-Term Harm to 
Children, but Can Be Mitigated When Protective Factors are 
Present or Pursued
Based upon our review of the evidence-based literature, we con-
clude that the professionals involved in making “custody”41 related deci-
sions must be better educated42 as to how exposure to domestic violence 
and granting custody to abusive parents can cause serious, long-term 
40. ELLEN PENCE & MICHAEL PAYMAR, EDUCATION GROUPS FOR MEN WHO BATTER:
THE DULUTH MODEL 3 (1993).
41. We use the term “custody” to refer to parenting time and decision-making during the 
legal process of separation and divorce and thereafter.
42. See Peter G. Jaffe et al., Common Misconceptions in Addressing Domestic Violence in 
Child Custody Disputes, 60 JUV. & FAM. CT. 57, 62 (2003) [hereinafter Jaffe et al., 
Common Misconceptions] (presenting qualitative case studies of 62 adult female vic-
tims and 95 child victims of domestic violence, defined by separation from an abus-
er). Although the sample in this study was not chosen at random, it is representative 
of the population at hand and adds depth to ideas addressed in the literature; see also
MICHAEL S. DAVIS ET AL., N.Y. LEGAL ASSISTANCE GROUP, CUSTODY EVALUATIONS 
WHEN THERE ARE ALLEGATIONS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: PRACTICES, BELIEFS, AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS OF PROFESSIONAL EVALUATORS 84–85 (2010), 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/234465.pdf (describing multivariate re-
gression analysis of 69 cases). Generalizability may be an issue in that all cases were 
from one state (New York), and all individuals studied were represented by informed 
counsel specializing in domestic violence, which may exemplify best-case scenarios). 
DANIEL G. SAUNDERS ET AL., CHILD CUSTODY EVALUATORS’ BELIEFS ABOUT 
DOMESTIC ABUSE ALLEGATIONS: THEIR RELATIONSHIP TO EVALUATOR 
DEMOGRAPHICS, BACKGROUND, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE KNOWLEDGE AND CUSTODY-
VISITATION RECOMMENDATIONS 116–35 (2012), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/
nij/grants/238891.pdf [hereinafter SAUNDERS ET AL., CHILD CUSTODY EVALUATORS’
BELIEFS] (discussing a two-part study, including multivariate analysis of surveys of 
1187 professionals in fields related to custody cases—for example, judges, attorneys, 
and custody evaluators—and qualitative, semi-structured case-study interviews of 24 
domestic violence survivors). Extensive analysis of findings showed robust statistical 
power and strong validity of measures used. ELLEN PENCE ET AL., BATTERED 
WOMEN’S JUSTICE PROJECT, MIND THE GAP: ACCOUNTING FOR DOMESTIC ABUSE 
IN CHILD CUSTODY EVALUATIONS 37 (2012), http://www.bwjp.org/resourcecenter/
resource-results/mind-the-gap-accounting-for-domestic-abuse-in-childcustody-
evaluations.html (detailing qualitative case analysis of 18 domestic violence-related 
custody evaluation reports from five states). Although sample size may limit generali-
zability of findings, the inquiry nevertheless provides useful insight.
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harm to children.43 Common misconceptions include the notions (1) 
that domestic violence is typically not an issue for couples who are in 
the process of divorce and are disputing child custody because once they 
are separated the violence will not continue; (2) that amongst women 
who are victims, domestic violence results in eventual separation; (3) 
that children exposed to domestic violence are not harmed so long as 
they are not directly injured; (4) that domestic violence is exclusively be-
tween adults and should not play a role in deciding child custody; (5) 
that assessment of needs of abused women and their children, and the 
effects caused by the perpetrator, can be satisfactorily conducted by fam-
ily courts, attorneys, and mediation or other court services; (6) that legal 
and mental health services for female victims and their children who are 
separating from the perpetrator are readily available; and (7) that solu-
tions and community assistance when separating from the perpetrator 
are limited for victims of domestic violence and their children.44
A thorough understanding of domestic violence and an apprecia-
tion for its importance in child custody determinations are necessary to 
produce better and safer determinations for children’s welfare.45 Addi-
tionally, professionals need better education on the protective factors 
43. See generally AMERICAN ACADEMY OF PEDIATRICS, ADVERSE CHILDHOOD 
EXPERIENCES AND THE LIFELONG CONSEQUENCES OF TRAUMA (2014), 
https://www.aap.org/en-us/Documents/ttb_aces_consequences.pdf (analyzing re-
search supporting conclusions from a 1998 study by the Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention documenting the negative long-term physiological and psychological 
effects of adverse childhood experiences on more than 17,000 middle-class Ameri-
cans). Analysis suggests that adverse childhood experiences can “contribute signifi-
cantly to negative adult physical and mental health outcomes and affect more than 60 
[percent] of adults.” Id. at 1.
44. Jaffe et al., Common Misconceptions, supra note 42, at 58–64.
45. See Megan L. Haselschwerdt et al., Custody Evaluators’ Beliefs about Domestic Violence 
Allegations During Divorce: Feminist and Family Violence Perspectives, 26 J.
INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 1694, 1695–97 (2011) (discussing an experiment in 
which 23 custody evaluators were interviewed, and answers were coded for analysis to 
determine potential variables related to outcomes of evaluations and recommenda-
tions). Although the study is insightful, concerns arise based on ambiguous opera-
tional definitions, unclear criteria, and unexplored, potentially confounding, third 
variables; see also Nancy S. Erickson & Chris S. O’Sullivan, Doing Our Best for New 
York’s Children: Custody Evaluations When Domestic Violence is Alleged, 23 N.Y. ST.
PSYCHOLOGIST 9, 10–11 (2011) (analyzing a meta-analysis of three recent studies, 
each of which found to a reasonable degree of scientific certainty that an evaluator’s
lack of knowledge can lead to harm of the child or children involved in the dispute, 
and that domestic violence training is essential for custody evaluators to prevent this 
kind of lasting damage); SAUNDERS ET AL., CHILD CUSTODY EVALUATORS’ BELIEFS,
supra note 42, at 116–25.
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that can mitigate these harms.46 Having a protective parent is particular-
ly important,47 but too often protective parents lose custody,48 while 
46. See, e.g., Norman Garmezy & Ann Masten, Chronic Adversities, in CHILD &
ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 191, 194 (Michael Rutter et al. eds., 1994); Sandra A. 
Graham-Bermann et al., Factors Discriminating Among Profiles of Resilience and Psy-
chopathology in Children Exposed to Intimate Partner Violence (IPV), 33 CHILD ABUSE 
& NEGLECT 648 (2009) (presenting findings from multivariate cluster analysis of 
scores obtained from a sample of 219 children exposed to intimate partner violence
within the last year). The study used validated measures of functioning and demon-
strated statistical reliability. Ashley E. Owen et al., Family Variables that Mediate the 
Relation Between Intimate Partner Violence (IPV) and Child Adjustment, 24 J. FAM.
VIOLENCE 433, 434 (2009) (detailing results of a study of 129 low-income, African-
American mothers and children). While valuable, findings should be considered in 
limited context as data were collected from a single demographic group, results have 
an unclear direction of causality, and study authors warn of the potential for an in-
flated Type I Error rate; Emmy E. Werner, High-Risk Children in Young Adulthood: A 
Longitudinal Study from Birth to 32 Years, 59 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 72 (1989) 
(discussing longitudinal case studies of 698 individuals born on the island of Kauai, 
Hawaii in 1955.) Findings may be limited in terms of generalizability outside of this 
cohort. EMMY E. WERNER & RUTH S. SMITH, OVERCOMING THE ODDS: HIGH RISK 
CHILDREN FROM BIRTH TO ADULTHOOD 173–87 (1992) (further analyzing Werner, 
supra).
47. Jack P. Shonkoff & Andrew S. Garner, The Lifelong Effects of Early Childhood Adver-
sity and Toxic Stress, 129 PEDIATRICS e236 (2012),
http://pediatrics.aappublications.org/content/pediatrics/early/2011/12/21/peds.2011-
2663.full.pdf (exploring a review of the literature, drawing conclusions from 99 
sources regarding the long-term consequences of psychological and physiological 
wellbeing).
48. Family courts are too often denying custody to protective mothers. See INTER-AM.
COMM’N ON HUMAN RIGHTS, PETITION IN ACCORDANCE WITH INTER-AMERICAN 
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS at ¶¶ 6–33, 444 (2007), 
http://www.protectiveparents.com/Petition-on-Human-Rights.pdf (petitioning for 
consideration based on reviews of academic literature and research studies finding 
that current child-custody practices are inherently biased against women/mothers to 
the extent that they constitute violation of the Charter of the Organization of
American States, a Pan-American treaty); AMY NEUSTEIN & MICHAEL LESHER,
FROM MADNESS TO MUTINY: WHY WOMEN ARE RUNNING FROM THE FAMILY 
COURTS-AND WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT (2005) (examining cases in which 
mothers who believed that their children had experienced sexual abuse at the hands 
of their fathers were doubted, distrusted, or punished for reporting their concerns to 
the court); NEUSTEIN & LESHER, supra, at xiii–xix; Joan S. Meier, Getting Real about 
Abuse and Alienation: A Critique of Drozd and Olesen’s Decision Tree, 7 J. CHILD 
CUSTODY 219, 228–29 (2010) (presenting anecdotes from five cases in different state 
court systems in which mothers and children were not believed by the courts, with
the children being removed in three of the five cases); Joan S. Meier, A Historical 
Perspective on Parental Alienation Syndrome and Parental Alienation, 6 J. CHILD 
CUSTODY 232, 244 (2009) [hereinafter Meier, A Historical Perspective] (presenting 
criticisms of both Parental Alienation Syndrome and non-syndrome feelings of 
alienation in light of historical evidence of the resilient nature of parent-child 
14 michigan  jo urn al  o f  g ender & la w [Vol. 26:1
abusive parents receive custody,49 because courts do a poor job of evalu-
ating evidence.50 In this section, we review and assess the scientific rigor 
relationships and studies showing a lack of empirical basis for alienation claims);
Joaquin Sapien, Call in Congress for Family Court Reform, PROPUBLICA (Sept. 13, 
2016), https://www.propublica.org/article/call-in-congress-for-family-court-reform
(calling for family court reform after court-appointed psychologist failed to recognize 
a father’s potential for dangerousness and failed to limit unsupervised visitation, 
despite the mother’s pleas to the contrary and allegations of abuse, and the father 
drowned all three children during an unsupervised custody visit); Joaquin Sapien, For 
New York Families in Custody Fights, a ‘Black Hole’ of Oversight, PROPUBLICA (Mar. 
17, 2017), https://www.propublica.org/article/for-new-york-families-in-custody-
fights-a-black-hole-of-oversight (detailing an individual case study example in which 
injustice and a destructive aftermath arose from a court-appointed evaluator’s lack of 
professional oversight or established professional standards for making custody 
determinations); Laurie Udesky, Custody in Crisis: How Family Courts Nationwide Put 
Children in Danger, 100REPORTERS (Dec. 1, 2016), https://100r.org/2016/12/
custody-2 (describing three cases wherein abusers gained custody over mothers 
despite objective evidence of child sexual and child abuse); GERALDINE B. STAHLY ET 
AL., ABUSE ALLEGATIONS IN CUSTODY DISPUTES: THE EXPERIENCE OF PROTECTIVE
MOTHERS (2011), https://www.caprotectiveparents.org/research (follow hyperlink 
under “California Protective Parents Association” section) (last visited Apr. 28, 2017) 
(examining survey of 66 mothers and one father, self-selected as “protective parents,”
of whom 98 [percent] felt discredited for trying to protect their children, and over 60
[percent] lost custody); Jennifer Backer, The Strange Advocacy for “Parental Alienation 
Syndrome,” PSYCHOL. TODAY: FOR THE LOVE OF WISDOM (Dec. 17, 2015), 
https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/the-love-wisdom/201512/the-strange-
advocacy-parental-alienation-syndrome (expounding on the idea that courts’
consideration of so-called Parental Alienation Syndrome poses a risk to children as it 
lacks sufficient basis for reliability and there are “no studies that test the effectiveness 
of their recommended treatments”).
49. See Joan S. Meier, Domestic Violence, Child Custody, and Child Protection: 
Understanding Judicial Resistance and Imagining the Solutions, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER 
SOC. POL. & L. 657, 668–71 (2002) [hereinafter Meier, Domestic Violence]
(examining two case studies in the context of current literature). Courts are too often 
awarding custody to abusive fathers. See Sharon K. Araji & Rebecca L. Bosek, 
Domestic Violence, Contested Child Custody and the Courts: Findings from Five Studies,
in DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, ABUSE, AND CHILD CUSTODY: LEGAL STRATEGIES AND 
POLICY ISSUES 6-2 to 6-31 (Mo Therese Hannah & Barry Goldstein eds., 2010) 
(exploring ideas garnered from small-scale survey experiment involving 34 victims of 
domestic violence from the Alaska court systems and meta-analysis of similar, related 
studies conducted in other states; alone, each study’s generalizability may be limited, 
but in considered in conjunction they provide useful qualitative insight); SALLY F.
GOLDFARB, UNITED NATIONS DIV. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF WOMEN, THE 
LEGAL RESPONSE TO VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN IN THE UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA: RECENT REFORMS AND CONTINUING CHALLENGES 9 (2008), 
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/egm/vaw_legislation_2008/expertpapers/
EGMGPLVAW%20Paper%20(Sally%20Goldfarb).pdf (“[I]t remains extremely rare 
for a court to deny a father access to his children, even when he has committed 
domestic violence.”); LUNDY BANCROFT ET AL., THE BATTERER AS PARENT:
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of the studies and data and discuss how to implement measures that 
protect children.
The American Academy of Pediatrics has documented that a parent 
committing domestic violence against the other parent in front of the 
child is a form of child abuse51 that significantly contributes to negative 
physical and mental health outcomes in adulthood.52 A home with daily 
violence wherein one partner (most commonly a man in cases of coer-
cive abuse)53 physically or verbally assaults the other partner (most 
commonly a woman)54 in front of his or her children turns those chil-
dren into victims of that violence as well.55 Such environments negative-
ly affect children who grow up in them,56 and children who witness 
more family violence tend to suffer as a result.57 However, child adjust-
ment to domestic violence depends on factors associated with the child, 
ADDRESSING THE IMPACT OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ON FAMILY DYNAMICS 189–90
(2nd ed. 2012); Evan Stark, Rethinking Custody Evaluation in Cases Involving 
Domestic Violence, 6 J. CHILD CUSTODY 287, 296–99 (2009) [hereinafter Stark, 
Rethinking Custody] (reviewing literature analyzing outcomes and responses of family 
courts in domestic violence cases).
50. See Stark, Rethinking Custody, supra note 49, at 290 (noting that victims and children 
are not believed, even when police corroborate abuse).
51. See generally AMERICAN ACADEMY OF PEDIATRICS, supra note 43, at 1–5.
52. Id.
53. See infra Section I.F. for analyses of this gender difference.
54. According to statistics from 2015, in the United States, one out of every four women 
and one out of every ten men experienced “sexual violence, physical violence, and/or 
stalking by an intimate partner and reported an intimate partner violence-related im-
pact during their lifetime.” CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
NATIONAL INTIMATE PARTNER AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE SURVEY: 2015 DATA BRIEF -
UPDATED RELEASE 7 (2018), https://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/pdf/2015data-
brief508.pdf (detailing findings from the National Intimate Partner and Sexual Vio-
lence Survey (NISVS) obtained from 10,081 completed random-digit-dial telephone 
surveys conducted in 2015). Although statistical validity analyses were performed to 
evaluate findings and reported data were found to be reliable, the findings should be 
considered in light of the self-selective nature of telephone surveys and the likelihood 
of a lowered response-rate or non-response bias due to factors such as stigma, current 
or continuing instances of abuse and trauma, and/or extant concerns related to safety. 
Id. at 12–14. Approximately 36.4 percent of women, or 43.6 million women, have 
experienced some type of intimate partner violence in their lifetime, with physical vi-
olence by an intimate partner being the most common type. Id. at 8. More than 36.4
percent of women reported “experienc[ing] psychological aggression by an intimate 
partner during their lifetime.” Id. at 7.
55. See AMERICAN ACADEMY OF PEDIATRICS, supra note 43.
56. See Roberta Hibbard et al., Psychological Maltreatment, 130 PEDIATRICS 372, 373–74
(2012) (reviewing the literature from 49 sources, placing emphasis on the recognition 
and identification of psychological maltreatment as a form of ACE, and the potential 
negative consequences it can have on child development).
57. Graham-Bermann et al., supra note 46.
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the mother, and the family as a whole, as parental functioning is critical 
to the child’s well-being.58 Children who are more resilient tend to expe-
rience less violence, have fewer worries and fears, and tend to have 
mothers with more stable emotional health and better parenting skills.59
At the other extreme, devastatingly, sometimes these children are mur-
dered by the abusive parent.60 As a result, contrary to current practices,61
reducing children’s exposure to domestic violence within a home needs 
to be one of the most important goals in determining custody. In de-
termining what is in the best interests of the child, this should come first 
when considering whether to require protective measures that restrict or 
deny parenting time based upon a judgment that it would cause “serious 
endangerment” to the child’s welfare. Courts are not doing this well 
within the United States62 or internationally.63 These circumstances 
58. Id.
59. See id.
60. See R. Dianne Bartlow, Judicial Response to Court-Assisted Child Murders, in
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, ABUSE, AND CHILD CUSTODY: LEGAL STRATEGIES AND 
POLICY ISSUES 12-1 to 12-42 (Mo Therese Hannah & Barry Goldstein eds., 2016) 
(presenting interviews with family court judges across 21 states, with emphasis on ju-
risdictions that had experienced child homicide at the hand of a parent who had been 
accused of domestic violence); Barry Goldstein, What Can Be Learned From Court-
Assisted Murder Cases?, 5 FAM. & INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE 369, 370 (2013) 
(analyzing errors in management and consideration of family court cases and the po-
tential for this mishandling to have devastating consequences for the children whom 
the process is intended to protect); U.S. Divorce Child Murder Data, CTR. FOR 
JUDICIAL EXCELLENCE, http://www.centerforjudicialexcellence.org/cje-projects-
initiatives/child-murder-data (last visited Jan. 12, 2019) (reviewing archival data col-
lected by the Center for Judicial Excellence, finding that at least 665 children have 
been murdered by a parent since 2008). Cases were included based on news coverage 
mention of “divorce,” “separation,” “custody,” “visitation,” and/or “child support.” 
Id; see also 12/5/16 Press Release: 58 Children Murdered by a Parent Who Could Have 
Been Saved, CTR. FOR JUD. EXCELLENCE (Dec. 5, 2016), 
http://www.centerforjudicialexcellence.org/2016/12/05/12516-press-release-58-
children-murdered-by-a-parent-who-could-have-been-saved (recounting 44 cases, in-
cluding 58 children from across the United States between 2008 and 2016 in which 
the children were killed during court-ordered unsupervised contact with a parent, 
when the court had been made aware of allegations of that parent’s dangerousness).
61. How Many Children are Court-Ordered into Unsupervised Contact with an Abusive 
Parent after Divorce?, LEADERSHIP COUNCIL ON CHILD ABUSE & INTERPERSONAL 
VIOLENCE (Sept. 22, 2008), http://www.leadershipcouncil.org/1/med/PR3.html (es-
timating that each year, 58,500 children are put at risk of physical or psychological 
harm during court-ordered unsupervised visitation with an abusive parent). While 
useful for illustrative purposes, the report uses a formula of estimations to reach a 
best-guess. STAHLY, supra note 48.
62. Jaffe et al., Common Misconceptions, supra note 42, at 57–58.
63. International Association of Victims of Parental Alienation, FACEBOOK (last visited 
Apr. 3, 2017), https://www.facebook.com/groups/249283921943335.
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highlight the dire need to support parents who are making efforts to 
protect their children.64
In addition to seeking to reduce future domestic violence, courts 
need to consider protective factors that can reduce the harm to children 
who have already been exposed to domestic violence. Children tend to 
be harmed less when they are protected by a supportive, non-abusive 
parent65 or have parents with good parenting skills.66 Other factors such 
as family support; secure attachment to other caregivers; living in a sup-
portive, safe, and close community;67 and not experiencing other forms 
of trauma68 contribute to children enduring less harm. These protective 
factors need to be considered in custody evaluations and evaluator rec-
ommendations.
Judges and other professionals (child representatives, guardians ad 
litem, or custody evaluators) cannot rely on intuition in these cases, as 
many aspects of domestic violence are counterintuitive.69 Instead, those 
64. See Stark, Rethinking Custody, supra note 49, at 297–98; Lundy Bancroft, Organizing 
in Defense of Protective Mothers: The Custody Rights Movement, in DOMESTIC 
VIOLENCE, ABUSE, AND CHILD CUSTODY: LEGAL STRATEGIES AND POLICY ISSUES 17-
1 to 17-13 (Mo Therese Hannah & Barry Goldstein eds., 2010) (qualitatively inves-
tigating the underpinnings of the parents’ rights/custody rights movement which un-
dermine women’s success in obtaining favorable outcomes in family court determina-
tions).
65. Shonkoff & Garner, supra note 47.
66. Abigail H. Gewirtz, David S. DeGarmo & Amanuel Medhanie, Effects of Mother’s
Parenting Practices on Child Internalizing Trajectories Following Partner Violence, 25 J.
FAM. PSYCHOL. 29 (2011) (detailing correlational research with regression analyses of 
findings from a short-term, longitudinal study of 35 mother-child pairs—with eligi-
bility defined as mother’s exposure to physical intimate partner violence within the 
past one to three weeks, where her child witnessed the incident—including interviews 
and parent-child observational task). Constructs were measured with validated in-
struments and results of prediction models use estimates with robust standard errors 
giving confidence to the reliability of findings. Graham-Bermann et al., supra note 
46.
67. Garmezy & Masten, supra note 46; Graham-Bermann et al., supra note 46; Owen et 
al., supra note 46; Werner, supra note 46; Werner & Smith, supra note 46.
68. Graham-Bermann et al., supra note 46.
69. See Alana Bowman, A Matter of Justice: Overcoming Juror Bias in Prosecutions of 
Batterers through Expert Witness Testimony of the Common Experiences of Battered 
Women, 2 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 219, 242–50 (1992); see generally
Laurie S. Kohn, Barriers to Reliable Credibility Assessments: Domestic Violence Victim-
Witnesses, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 733 (2002) (documenting 
situations in which incorrect intuitions on the dynamics of domestic violence, its 
causes, and impacts, affect judicial decisions on orders of protection and other legal 
decisions involving domestic violence); Debra Pogrund Stark & Jessica M. Choplin,
Seeing the Wrecking Ball in Motion: Ex Parte Protection Orders and the Realities of 
Domestic Violence, 32 WIS. J.L. GENDER & SOC’Y 13 (2017) (review of how incorrect 
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in charge of making custody decisions need to rely upon well-designed, 
validated research. They need to be educated and trained on practices 
informed by this greater depth of validated understanding, rather than 
practices from poor intuition.70 Thus, these professionals must be able 
to determine whether studies have been well-designed. For example, 
professionals should understand how science accumulates knowledge 
over time and give particular attention to meta-analyses that synopsize 
and assemble evidence accumulated by many scientific studies. They 
should also examine the definitions used in studies and how those defi-
nitions can impact policy implications; they must be aware when previ-
ous research has been invalidated (i.e., Parent Alienation Syndrome)71
and must reject incorrect assumptions that are often held by the public 
at large (such as the belief that courts favor mothers).72 Finally, they 
intuitions about domestic violence affect decisions on whether to grant emergency 
orders of protection and the cognitive psychology behind this).
70. There are many misconceptualizations and misunderstandings of domestic violence 
that lead to poor decision-making by courts. See Jaffe et al., Common Misconceptions,
supra note 42 (finding that domestic violence is often overlooked by family courts in 
the decision-making process); Stark, Rethinking Custody, supra note 49, at 290.
71. DIANE M. PRANZO, CHILD CUSTODY AND VISITATION DISPUTES IN SWEDEN AND 
THE UNITED STATES: A STUDY OF LOVE, JUSTICE, AND KNOWLEDGE 67–83 (2013) 
(comparing the effects of cultural and social settings of the U.S. and Sweden, which 
use comparable legal standards in contested family court cases, on the perception of 
cases involving child custody and/or visitation rights); Rita Berg, Parental Alienation 
Analysis, Domestic Violence, and Gender Bias in Minnesota Courts, 29 L. & INEQ. 5, 
24–25 (2011) (exploring archival data from Minnesota courts to determine the effect 
of consideration of the concept of Parental Alienation Syndrome on family court cas-
es decided by Minnesota court systems). Analysis of data reflects an “anti-mother 
gender bias.” However, it appears that the sample size is low, and data have not been 
analyzed to determine validity, reliability, or general applicability. Meier & Dickson, 
supra note 2, at 311 (reviewing literature on the concept of “Parental Alienation,”
and exploring a multivariate empirical-mapping analysis of the ways in which family 
court systems have used it in custody determination cases). Study authors caution, 
however, that cases analyzed were selected because they had all progressed to the ap-
peals process, which often does not occur in child custody cases, and thus the research 
may not be representative of the majority of family court cases (for example, these 
cases tend to skew towards the party with the financial resources to mount appeals 
and thus favor men). Additionally, findings were derived from coding of variables 
and conclusions completed by a single researcher rather than from a composite of 
scores by two or more independent researchers, potentially skewing results towards 
that lone researcher’s inevitable biases.
72. In fact, courts tend to favor fathers. See BATTERED MOTHERS’ TESTIMONY PROJECT,
WELLESLEY CENTERS FOR WOMEN, BATTERED MOTHERS SPEAK OUT: A HUMAN 
RIGHTS REPORT ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND CHILD CUSTODY IN THE 
MASSACHUSETTS FAMILY COURTS 3 (2002), https://www.wcwonline.org/vmfiles/
execsumm4.pdf. This report discusses a four-part study of one-to-one interviews of 
40 battered mothers who had experienced family court litigation; analysis of written 
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must look beyond veneers of friendliness.73 Knowing how to correctly 
evaluate studies ensures that professionals are relying on validated bodies 
of knowledge. There have been a great number of previous psychologi-
cal research studies on the effects of domestic violence, child well-being, 
and child custody; however, not all of that research has equal validity. 
For instance, retrospective self-report studies are often conducted in this 
field of research, but findings must be taken in light of concerns about 
surveys completed by 31 advocates for battered women; five focus groups, comprising
a total of 23 advocates and survivors of domestic violence, exploring the possible ef-
fects of demographic considerations on outcomes; and one-hour interviews of 16 in-
dividual state actors selected based on either identification by the women and/or ad-
vocates, or on the fact that they possessed specific knowledge of the family court 
system. Id. at 4. The study examined incidents in which the Massachusetts family 
courts violated basic human rights standards, and found that fathers who seek custo-
dy are favored over women because “mothers are held to a different and higher stand-
ard than fathers.” Id. at 3. Although the study is valuable, its authors note that the re-
sults are not corroborated for statistical validity, and also may not be generalizable 
outside of the state of Massachusetts. Id. at 5. Mary A. Kernic et al., Children in the 
Crossfire: Child Custody Determinations among Couples with a History of Intimate Part-
ner Violence, 11 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 991, 1017 (2005) (detailing a retro-
spective cohort study of 324 cases with intimate partner violence and 532 cases with-
out intimate partner violence that examined the effects of a history of intimate 
partner violence and determination of child custody agreements, as moderated by 
substantiation of the history of intimate partner violence (defined by a history of po-
lice reports, court records related to protection orders filed prior to the dissolution, 
and/or a notation of allegations or substantiation in the dissolution case file)). The 
ability to generalize findings, however, may be limited based on the fact that the 
study population consisted of individuals specifically from Seattle, where the male 
partner was the perpetrator of intimate partner violence and the female partner was 
the victim. MASS. SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT, GENDER BIAS STUDY OF THE COURT 
SYSTEM IN MASSACHUSETTS, reprinted in 24 NEW ENG. L. REV. 745, 748, 825 (1990) 
(reporting on The Gender Bias Study of the Court System in Massachusetts, an offi-
cial report from the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, which found that, despite 
the pervasive belief that mothers are favored in custody disputes, “[f]athers who ac-
tively seek custody obtain either primary or joint physical custody over 70 [percent]
of the time”) (emphasis in original).
73. Allison C. Morrill et al., Child Custody and Visitation Decisions When the Father has 
Perpetrated Violence Against the Mother, 11 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 1076, 1092, 
1101 (2005) (discussing correlational research with regression analysis, finding that 
the presumption against custody to batterers was superseded by a heuristic in favor of 
the “friendly parent”). Scores were obtained from examination of 393 custody and
visitation orders across six states in situations where the father had perpetrated inti-
mate partner violence against the mother, as well as from a survey of 60 judges select-
ed for having entered those orders. Id. at 1076. Extensive analysis of the relationships 
suggests statistical significance, although several of the measures used to survey the 
judges in this study have yet to be empirically validated.
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the accuracy of the individual’s report.74 The goal of this Section is to 
identify the best available information about issues related to custody in 
cases that involve domestic violence, and analyze the policy implications 
and best practices for professionals suggested by that research.
1. Scientific Standards for Inclusion of Articles in this 
Literature Review
This Article presents the highest-quality objective, scientific re-
search available. There are a few instances, however, where there are in-
sufficient objective scientific studies on a topic, and we rely on prelimi-
nary scientific evidence or expert opinion gained over many years of 
working in the field. To address concerns over the robustness of the re-
search, we have included notes on its quality in our footnotes. The best 
evidence for conclusions comes from meta-analyses that mathematically 
capture the results of many experiments and represent the gold standard 
in the field of psychology. This is followed by qualitative literature re-
views.75
We also cite the empirical results of original studies such as exper-
iments,76 correlational research77 with regression analyses,78 and structur-
al equation modeling.79 For every study cited, we note whether it is (1) a 
meta-analysis; (2) a qualitative literature review; (3) an experiment; (4) 
74. Retrospective study designs are those in which “participants are required to evaluate 
exposure variables retrospectively using a self-reporting method, such as self-
administered questionnaires.” Alaa Althubaiti, Information Bias in Health Research: 
Definition, Pitfalls, and Adjustment Methods, 9 J. MULTIDISCIPLINARY HEALTHCARE
211, 213 (2016).
75. Anthony Petrosino & Julia Lavenberg, Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses: Best Ev-
idence on “What Works” for Criminal Justice Decision Makers, 8 W. CRIMINOLOGY 
REV. 1 (2007).
76. Experiments are studies in which variables are manipulated to see how those manipu-
lations affect measured outcomes. See C. JAMES GOODWIN, RESEARCH IN 
PSYCHOLOGY: METHODS AND DESIGN 522 (4th ed. 2005).
77. Correlational research involves taking two or more variables and statistically parsing 
the relationships between them. KENNETH BORDENS & BRUCE ABBOTT, RESEARCH 
DESIGN AND METHODS: A PROCESS APPROACH 28 (8th ed. 2013).
78. Regression analysis is a statistical analysis that looks at the relationships between 
measured variables. GOODWIN, supra note 76, at 527.
79. Structural equation modeling is a method of multivariate statistical analysis which 
uses multiple regression analyses and factor analyses to analyze structural relationships 
between measured and latent variables, and to evaluate the dependencies between, 
and independent of, the factors. See TENKO RAYKOV & GEORGE A. MARCOULIDES, A
FIRST COURSE IN STRUCTURAL EQUATION MODELING 1–2 (2000).
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correlational research with regression analyses or structural equation 
modeling;80 or (5) a case study.81
For literature reviews, we identify the number of studies evaluated. 
For original research such as experiments, correlational research, and 
case studies, we note the sample size and characteristics of the sample. 
We assess whether the sample is appropriate for the research question. 
We note operational definitions where appropriate. For example, if our 
analysis relied upon a study of victims/survivors, we note whether this 
classification was based upon self-identification or was there external 
verification (i.e., police calls to 911). If our analysis relied upon correla-
tional research with all of the well-known shortcomings of correlational 
research, we note these shortcomings and whether the researchers col-
lected the data themselves or whether it was archival,82 as well as the 
source of the archival information (i.e., court cases). We note odd oper-
ational definitions, especially if they might have biased the conclusions. 
For example, we would be particularly skeptical of research that would 
classify cases where accusations of abuse could not be verified by inde-
pendent, objective evidence as instances where the accused abuser was 
exonerated. We note any violations of established research design stand-
ards, confounding variables in experiments, obvious third variable issues 
in correlational research for which the researchers did not control, and 
validity issues (internal validity,83 external validity,84 face validity,85 con-
struct validity,86 study mortality issues,87 etc.). Lastly, we note any con-
cerns over statistical significance and reliability.88
80. Structural equation modeling is a statistical analysis technique used to analyze the 
structural relationships between measured variables and latent constructs. Id. at 1.
81. A case study discusses a specific instance of something or a small subset. These studies 
often serve to demonstrate the existence of a phenomenon without necessarily gener-
alizing that phenomenon to the broader population. GOODWIN, supra note 76, at 
520.
82. Both researcher-collected and archival data have benefits. When researchers collect 
their own data, often more is known and reported about the data collection processes, 
which can affect how data are interpreted. Archival data sets are often larger, which 
by the law of large numbers should produce more accurate means. Id. at 336–39.
83. Internal validity is a measure indicating that an experiment successfully isolated the 
factor of interest, meaning that no other variables could have created the observed ef-
fects on the dependent measures. Id. at 524.
84. External validity means that the study results apply broadly to the general population 
of interest, not just to the particular circumstances of that study. Id. at 522.
85. Face validity “occurs when a measure appears to be a reasonable measure of some 
trait.” Id.
86. Construct validity “occurs when the measure being used accurately assesses some hy-
pothetical construct” and “refers to whether the operational definition used for inde-
pendent and dependent variables are valid.” Id. at 520–21.
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2. The Effects of Child Exposure to Domestic Violence
Emotional effects. A common myth associated with domestic vio-
lence is that if children are merely exposed to domestic violence, and not 
physically harmed, there will be no serious, long-term adverse effects on 
these children. This notion is false. Children who witness domestic vio-
lence can suffer serious emotional symptoms including internalizing 
symptoms (e.g., anxiety, depression, fear, shame, social withdrawal, so-
matic complaints, bedwetting, poor concentration) and externalizing 
symptoms (e.g., aggression, impulsivity, bullying, criminal behaviors).89
Several meta-analyses have been conducted that discuss the effects on 
children who witness domestic violence between parents.90 Two studies 
led by CDC researchers found long-term negative effects on people who 
had adverse childhood experiences. The first, a study by Shanta R. 
Dube, found that there is a greater likelihood of adolescent substance 
use.91 The second, a study led by Daniel P. Chapman, found a greater 
87. Sometimes participants leave a study early, and results can be explained by which par-
ticipants left rather than any differences in independent or predictor variables.
KENNETH S. BORDENS & BRUCE B. ABBOTT, RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS: A
PROCESS APPROACH 265–66 (4th ed. 1999).
88. Sometimes results can happen by chance. Statistical analyses measure the likelihood 
that the obtained results were due to chance; if it is unlikely that the results are due to 
chance, then it is likely that they were due to differences in the independent or pre-
dictor variables. Id. at 442–44.
89. Jacquelyn C. Campbell & Linda A. Lewandowski, Mental and Physical Health Effects 
of Intimate Partner Violence on Women and Children, 20 PSYCHIATRIC CLINICS N.
AM. 353, 361–62 (1997), https://doi.org/10.1016/S0193-953X(05)70317-8.
90. See, e.g., Sarah E. Evans et al., Exposure to Domestic Violence: A Meta-Analysis of Child 
and Adolescent Outcomes, 13 AGGRESSION & VIOLENT BEHAV. 131, 131 (2008) (ana-
lyzing the results of six studies demonstrating a significant relationship between a 
child’s exposure to domestic violence and his or her internalizing and externalizing of 
trauma symptoms); Stephanie Holt et al., The Impact of Exposure to Domestic Violence 
on Children and Young People: A Review of the Literature, 32 CHILD ABUSE &
NEGLECT 797, 797 (2008) (reviewing findings from 11 years of studies indicating 
that children exposed to domestic violence in the home are at greater risk for behav-
ioral and emotional problems); Katherine M. Kitzmann et al., Child Witnesses to Do-
mestic Violence: A Meta-Analytic Review, 71 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL.
339, 339 (2003) (discussing findings from 118 studies demonstrating a significant re-
lationship between exposure to domestic violence and harm to children); David A. 
Wolfe et al., The Effects of Children’s Exposure to Domestic Violence: A Meta-Analysis 
and Critique, 6 CLINICAL CHILD & FAM. PSYCHOL. REV. 171, 171 (2003) (detailing 
indications from 41 studies finding that children’s exposure to domestic violence is 
significantly correlated with emotional and behavioral problems).
91. Shanta R. Dube et al., Adverse Childhood Experiences and the Association with Ever 
Using Alcohol and Initiating Alcohol Use during Adolescence, 38 J. ADOLESCENT 
HEALTH 444, 444 (2006) (examining a retrospective self-report cohort-study of 
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risk of depression among adults who reported witnessing their mother 
being abused as children.92
Studies have found a relationship between adverse childhood expe-
riences and emotional and physical health problems in adulthood.93 Ad-
verse childhood experiences include events such as children witnessing 
their mother being treated violently. This can result in physical and 
emotional consequences for the child when the body’s stress response is 
repeatedly triggered by such events, and there is an absence of availabil-
ity of adult protection.94 For example, adverse childhood experiences
have been associated with health concerns and lower life satisfaction, 
more frequent symptoms of depression and anxiety, tobacco product 
use, problematic alcohol use,95 behaviors that place adults at risk for 
HIV infection, disabilities caused by health problems, as well as diabe-
tes, heart attack, stroke, and heart disease.96
Physiological effects. Biological responses to stress caused by do-
mestic violence are not only immediately harmful to the child’s health, 
8,417 adults across California who completed surveys about adverse childhood expe-
riences). While the results seem to indicate a negative correlation between the num-
ber of adverse childhood experiences experienced and the age at which the individual 
first consumed alcohol, the study fails to account for confounding third variables out-
side of the family environment which may influence early introduction to alcohol.
92. Daniel P. Chapman et al., Adverse Childhood Experiences and the Risk of Depressive 
Disorders in Adulthood, 82 J. OF AFFECTIVE DISORDERS 217, 221 (2004) (examining
a retrospective self-report cohort-study of 9,508 adults in California and found an in-
creased risk of depressive disorders among those whose mothers had been battered).
93. Jennifer A. Campbell et al., Associations Between Adverse Childhood Experiences, High-
Risk Behaviors, and Morbidity in Adulthood, 50 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. 344, 344–
46 (2016) (analyzing data from the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System, a tel-
ephone survey of 48,526 adults across five states, conducted by the CDC). Relation-
ships between scores measuring ACE and risky behavior or comorbidity in adulthood 
were analyzed using multiple logistic regression analysis, controlling for covariates 
and relevant confounding variables. Id. at 344. Joshua Patrick Mersky et al., Impacts 
of Adverse Childhood Experiences on Health, Mental Health, and Substance Use in Early 
Adulthood: A Cohort Study of an Urban, Minority Sample in the U.S., 37 CHILD 
ABUSE & NEGLECT 917, 917–20, 923 (2013) (reviewing adult survey data obtained 
from 1,142 participants (74.2% of all participants) from the Chicago Longitudinal 
Study, which tracks development of a cohort of individuals from low-income, urban 
families, born between 1979-1980). The main effects were analyzed with multivariate 
logistic regression and OLS regression, and the findings are statistically robust. Id. at 
917. However, despite the longitudinal nature of the CLS study, adverse childhood 
experiences and outcomes were measured cross-sectionally for each individual, which 
means that results are “more safely interpreted as correlational than as causal.” Id. at 
923.
94. Campbell et al., supra note 93 at 344; Mersky et al., supra note 93, at 917.
95. Mersky et al., supra note 93, at 917.
96. Campbell et al., supra note 93, at 345.
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but the effects can also become chronic.97 Adult health conditions, such 
as heart disease, obesity, and substance use disorders have been linked to 
adverse childhood experiences.98 The release of the stress hormone, cor-
tisol, is associated with adverse health effects among children who wit-
ness domestic violence.99 The “fight or flight” response can be activated 
97. Shonkoff & Garner, supra note 47, at 235.
98. Id. at 237.
99. See Leah C. Hibel et al., Maternal Sensitivity Buffers the Adrenocortical Implications of 
Intimate Partner Violence Exposure During Early Childhood, 23 DEV. & PSYCHOL. 689 
(2011) (detailing a longitudinal study of 1,102 mother-infant pairs to examine chil-
dren’s levels of cortisol (measured from saliva samples collected after an activity in-
tended to stimulate an emotional response) between infancy and early childhood, 
with relation to intimate partner violence exposure). Findings indicate that children 
exposed to domestic violence did not have a normal decrease in cortisol reactivity af-
ter exposure to a stressful event and were not able to recover as quickly as compared 
to children who had not been exposed to violence in the home. Id. at 689. Limita-
tions include the fact that this study examines only the epidemiological impact with-
out relation to other potential extant psychobiological or psychological factors, and 
therefore many not afford a look at the whole picture. Id. at 698–99. On the other 
hand, the sample used in this study was representative of the population from which 
it was drawn, a lack of which presents a concern for generalizability in similar studies.
Id. at 691. Melissa Sturge-Apple et al., Interparental Violence, Maternal Emotional 
Unavailability, and Children’s Cortisol Functioning in Family Contexts, 48 DEV.
PSYCHOL. 237 (2012) (discussing findings from a study of 201 sets of mother-toddler 
dyads who had been exposed to domestic violence, in order to explore the relation-
ships between the child’s adrenocortical response stimulated by emotional stress (as 
measured by salivary tests on three separate occasions), domestic violence (as meas-
ured by maternal report), and the mother’s emotional availability to the child (as 
measured by maternal report and objective observer evaluation)). Findings indicate 
that domestic violence and maternal emotional unavailability are both correlated with 
a child’s experienced adrenocortical response. Id. at 237. However, since the present 
inquiry only examined the mother-child relationship and does not take into account 
mediating or moderating effects of the child’s relationship with his or her father, con-
clusions cannot be generalized to instances where the father is the victim of domestic 
violence. Jennifer H. Suor et al., Tracing Differential Pathways of Risk: Associations 
Among Family, Adversity, Cortisol, and Cognitive Functioning in Childhood, 86 CHILD 
DEV. 1142 (2015) (discussing continued assessment of Sturge-Apple et al., supra, in 
the context of a prospective longitudinal study of 201 mother-child pairs where data 
were collected at 3 annual intervals). Findings suggest that exposure to greater 
amounts of domestic violence and maternal emotional unavailability are both predic-
tive factors of cortisol reactivity, which is in turn correlated with lower levels of cog-
nitive functioning by the time the child reaches the age of four. Id. at 1142. Nissa R. 
Towe-Goodman et al., Interparental Aggression and Infant Patterns of Adrenocortical 
and Behavioral Stress Responses, 54 DEV. PSYCHOL. 685 (2012) (examining a study 
and latent profile analysis of 735 infants from low socioeconomic status circumstanc-
es (selected from an already ongoing longitudinal research study of family dynamics 
and child development in low-income communities) exploring the relationships be-
tween physiological cortical stress responses and domestic violence from both physio-
logical and behavioral perspectives). Statistical analysis using a latent profile model 
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as the child experiences stressors throughout his or her life, causing the 
nervous system to overreact to any future stressful event.100 This inhibits 
the child’s ability to process their environment clearly and respond 
adaptively to minor, everyday stressors, as any environmental stressor is 
likely to trigger the child’s stress response.101
Transmission of Domestic Violence Trauma. Childhood exposure 
to domestic violence can result in the transmission of trauma- and 
stress-related symptoms. Several reviews and meta-analyses102 have 
discussed the fact that domestic violence can become normalized and 
lead to intergenerational transmission of domestic violence as the child 
grows into adulthood and has a family of his or her own.103 Behavioral 
showed that children who had been exposed to greater levels of domestic violence 
were more likely to have a greater cortical stress response. Id. at 685. Nevertheless, 
study authors caution that methods used were both “exploratory and sample depend-
ent.” Id. at 695.
100. See Hibel et al., supra note 99; Sturge-Apple et al., supra note 99; Suor et al., supra
note 99; Towe-Goodman et al., supra note 99.
101. See Hibel et al., supra note 99; Sturge-Apple et al., supra note 99; Suor et al., supra
note 99; Towe-Goodman et al., supra note 99.
102. See generally Constance L. Chapple, Examining Intergenerational Violence: Violent Role 
Modeling or Weak Parental Controls?, 18 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 143 (2003) (examin-
ing data from a 200-question self-report survey of 980 students in grades nine 
through eleven in Southerntown, Arkansas, who reported prior dating experience). 
Multivariate and bivariate analyses were performed to evaluate the relationships be-
tween parental violence, parental control, and dating violence. Id. at 151. See also 
Amy R. Murrell et al., Characteristic of Domestic Violence Offenders: Associations with 
Childhood Exposure to Violence, 22 J. FAM. VIOLENCE 523 (2007) (detailing a study of 
1,099 adult male batterers ordered for assessment at a center for domestic violence to 
assess the correlation between type, severity, frequency of violent behavior perpetrat-
ed, and the amount of exposure to violence experiences during childhood (measured 
through retrospective self-report)). Although the results obtained in this study are 
congruent with findings from previous studies (positive correlation between experi-
encing violence as a child and perpetrating domestic violence as an adult), a short-
coming of this study is a lack of comparison/control group of non-violent individuals 
who had been exposed to violence as a child. Id. at 528–29. See also Kimberly A. 
Rhoades, Children’s Responses to Interparental Conflict: A Meta-Analysis of Their Asso-
ciations with Child Adjustment, 79 CHILD DEV. 1942 (2008) (expounding upon a 
meta-analysis of 71 studies coded to examine the relationship between scores ob-
tained from measures of children’s responses to interparental conflict and scores from 
measures of children’s adjustment). Study authors note, however, that interpretation 
of the results is constrained by unclear direction of causality, and some methods of 
data collection used have not been empirically evaluated for accuracy. Id. at 11.
103. See generally Sandra M. Stith et al., The Intergenerational Transmission of Spouse 
Abuse: A Meta-Analysis, 62 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 640 (2000) (detailing meta-analysis 
of 39 studies, totaling 12,981 individuals, examining the relationship between grow-
ing up in a home with violence and becoming part of a violent heterosexual marital 
relationship as an adult).
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modeling is a type of intergenerational transmission whereby children 
who witness or experience violence engage in abusive behaviors 
themselves and may develop future psychopathology.104 A study led by 
Amy R. Murrell, a member of the Clinical Psychology faculty at the 
University of North Texas in Denton, Texas, found that males who 
witness domestic violence in childhood tend to commit domestic 
violence later on in their lives in the same way that males who were 
abused during their own childhoods tend to abuse children in 
adulthood and commit more acts of general violence.105 Similarly, 
offenders of dating violence tend to have a history of witnessing parental 
violence.106
These issues affect juvenile delinquency. Female juvenile delin-
quents are more frequently victims of physical and sexual abuse, neglect, 
and maltreatment as compared to males.107 Male juvenile offenders, 
however, tend to commit more sexual and felony offenses against others, 
and the association between childhood victimization and later offending 
was found to be stronger among males.108
B. Professionals Involved in Child Custody Decision-Making Need Special 
Training to Recognize, Understand, and Properly Evaluate Evidence of 
Domestic Violence and Claims of Alienation
The counterintuitive aspects of domestic violence not only make it 
critical that scientific evidence—rather than intuition—is used in these 
child custody cases, but also that professionals use well-designed scien-
tific research to set policy and to identify and follow best practices. 
Thus, professionals need to be educated and trained on topics related to 
domestic violence because untrained evaluators often make unwarranted 
104. Murrell et al., supra note 102, at 525.
105. Id.
106. Chapple, supra note 102, at 151–52.
107. Jessica J. Asscher et al., Gender Differences in the Impact of Abuse and Neglect Victimi-
zation on Adolescent Offending Behavior, 30 J. FAM. VIOLENCE 215, 215 (2015) (ex-
amining hierarchical logistic regression analysis of scores obtained on the Washington 
State Juvenile Court Assessment instrument by 10,111 minors ages 12 to 18 who had 
been found guilty of a criminal act by a juvenile court and were self-reported victims 
of abuse). Based on the nature of the study, findings must be considered in light of 
the fact that each individual in the sample was selected based on having committed a 
criminal offense, which may result in inflated apparent strength of the relationship 
between having experienced abuse and engaging in criminal behavior. Id. at 216.
108. Id. at 215.
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assumptions, misinterpret evidence, and make poor decisions.109 For ex-
ample, untrained evaluators often assume that divorce will solve the 
domestic violence problem when, in fact, the purpose of domestic vio-
lence is often a desire for control, and separation from the abuser can 
actually exacerbate the problem.110 Not understanding the long-term ef-
fects of exposure to domestic violence, these untrained evaluators as-
sume that an abuser’s relationship with children is separate from the re-
lationship with the spouse and that domestic violence should not play a 
role in deciding child custody.111 They may be unaware of the complexi-
ties of domestic violence that make family court, attorneys, and media-
tion or other court services inadequate assessors of the needs of abused 
women and their children.112
Untrained evaluators will also often overlook evidence due to erro-
neous beliefs about the nature of domestic violence incidences and their 
underlying causes.113 Evaluators and judges tend to believe that survivors 
of domestic violence make false allegations, and this belief is correlated 
with these professionals holding other erroneous beliefs.114 For example, 
a belief in false allegations of child abuse and/or domestic violence tends 
to vary based on a person’s professional role. Judges, private attorneys, 
and custody evaluators are inclined to believe that mothers make false 
allegations, while professionals such as domestic violence workers and 
legal aid attorneys tend to believe that fathers make false allegations.115
Likewise, Michael S. Davis, Ph.D., Chris S. O’Sullivan, Ph.D.,
Kim Susser, JD, and Hon. Marjory D. Fields, JD, investigated the be-
liefs, the custody assessment process, and the recommendations of 
court-appointed psychologists, psychiatrists, and social workers who 
evaluated cases where allegations of domestic violence were present.116
109. Erickson & O’Sullivan, supra note 45, at 10–11 (stating evaluators in the latter cate-
gory tend to have “patriarchal” beliefs, which dictate their interpretations of the in-
formation they acquire); Haselschwerdt et al., supra note 45, at 1695–97; see also
SAUNDERS ET AL., CHILD CUSTODY EVALUATORS’ BELIEFS, supra note 42.
110. Haselschwerdt et al., supra note 45, at 1712.
111. Id. at 1708–09.
112. See Jaffe et al., Common Misconceptions, supra note 42, at 62.
113. Id. at 59–62.
114. See SAUNDERS ET AL., CHILD CUSTODY EVALUATORS’ BELIEFS, supra note 42, at 8 
(finding that examples of these inaccurate beliefs include the ideas that survivors of 
domestic violence wish to alienate children from the other parent; that domestic vio-
lence is not important in custody decisions; and that the child is affected when do-
mestic violence survivors do not wish to co-parent).
115. LEORA N. ROSEN & MICHELLE ETLIN, THE HOSTAGE CHILD: SEX ABUSE 
ALLEGATIONS IN CUSTODY DISPUTES 99–119 (1996).
116. DAVIS ET AL., supra note 42, at iii.
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The Davis et al. study found that evaluators’ assessments were predicted 
by knowledge of domestic violence, and the parenting plans developed 
by evaluators did not reflect greater safety in cases where there was more 
severe physical, emotional, and social abuse between the couple.117 Cus-
tody and visitation conclusions were influenced more by the evaluator’s 
knowledge of domestic violence than the facts of the individual cases.
This indicated that the outcome in court is largely dependent upon the 
evaluator rather than the circumstances of the case.118
Other investigations found that custody evaluators fail to deter-
mine whether domestic violence occurs as a result of a pattern of inflict-
ing control and abuse by the perpetrator.119 Custody evaluators then
minimize the effects of domestic violence on children and are unable to 
gauge whether the perpetrator had the ability to engage in a parenting 
or co-parenting role.120 This context can contribute to scenarios in 
which the best interests of the child are not adequately assessed. Instead,
custody is recommended based on the presence of domestic violence, 
rather than on how children were affected by the violence.121 All of these 
unwarranted assumptions, misinterpretations, poor decisions, and over-
looked evidence can cause untrained evaluators to fail to believe victims.
Perhaps the most problematic of these erroneous beliefs is the now-
invalidated Parental Alienation Syndrome framework, which posits that 
mothers invent allegations of abuse for the purpose of alienating chil-
dren from their fathers and gaining custody.122 This theory has been re-
117. Id. at vii.
118. See id. at vii–viii.
119. See id. at vii.
120. PENCE ET AL., supra note 42, at 33.
121. See id. A number of studies have found that many custody evaluators lack meaningful 
expertise in domestic violence and child abuse, and often make recommendations 
that fail to fully take the abuse into account. See DAVIS ET AL., supra note 42, at i; 
PENCE ET AL., supra note 42, at 6; SAUNDERS ET AL., CHILD CUSTODY EVALUATORS’
BELIEFS supra note 42, at 120–21. Several other studies have found that custody eval-
uators tend to fall into two distinct groups: those who understand domestic violence 
and believe it is important in the custody context, and those who lack such under-
standing, are skeptical of abuse allegations, and believe the allegations are evidence of 
alienation. See also SAUNDERS ET AL., CHILD CUSTODY EVALUATORS’ BELIEFS, supra
note 42, at 6 (finding that professional roles affected these judgments); Ha-
selschwerdt et al., supra note 45, at 1967–69 (finding a difference between feminist 
custody evaluators and family violence custody evaluators); Erickson & O’Sullivan, 
supra note 45, at 10–11 (presenting evidence for the importance of expertise among 
custody evaluators).
122. See PRANZO, supra note 71, at 67, 69; Meier & Dickson, supra note 2, at 311; Berg, 
supra note 71, at 5.
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peatedly discredited,123 yet it continues to affect judicial decision-
making.124 An analysis of the outcomes of 238 cases of custody disputes 
that involved allegations of domestic violence and child abuse found 
that alienation claims were more likely to be raised by fathers than by 
mothers.125 Proof of domestic violence and child abuse by the father did 
not improve a mother’s chances of winning.126 Claims of alienation were 
much more likely to lead to successful outcomes for fathers than proof 
of domestic violence and child abuse were likely to lead to successful 
outcomes for mothers.127 Even today, the discredited Parental Alienation 
Syndrome framework causes courts to label the survivor parent as unco-
operative or emotionally unstable.128 As a result, the evaluator may erro-
neously conclude that the survivor will not establish a positive relation-
ship with the other parent (i.e., the perpetrator) and may recommend 
that the abusive parent obtain custody or unsupervised visitation with 
the children despite a known history of violence.129 These circumstances 
can occur particularly in situations where the evaluator minimizes the 
effect that violence can have on the children involved or believes that 
the survivor’s behaviors and responses during the evaluation are a result 
of psychopathology, rather than an expected response by a person who 
has endured domestic violence.130 There appears to be a heuristic bias in 
favor of the “nice,” “friendly” parent who cooperates and does not “bad 
mouth” the other parent, even when the facts presented in such “bad 
mouthing” are demonstrated to be true.131
In addition to this heuristic bias, other counterintuitive features of 
domestic violence create situations wherein courts fail to recognize the 
dangers that victims experience and the dangers that persist even after 
separation. Courts also fail to see how children are harmed by exposure 
to domestic violence. Examples of the counterintuitive aspects of do-
mestic violence include that domestic violence can happen to anyone 
123. CLARE DALTON ET AL., NAT’L COUNCIL OF JUVENILE & FAMILY COURT JUDGES,
NAVIGATING CUSTODY & VISITATION EVALUATIONS IN CASES WITH DOMESTIC 
VIOLENCE: A JUDGE’S GUIDE 14 n.28 (2006), http://www.ncjfcj.org/sites/default/
files/navigating_cust.pdf; see also Meier, A Historical Perspective, supra note 48, at 
239; Meier & Dickson, supra note 2, at 317.
124. Meier & Dickson, supra note 2, at 317.
125. Id. at 321, 323.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. DALTON ET AL., supra note 123, at 25.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. See Morrill et al., supra note 73, at 1101 (finding that the presumption against custo-
dy to batterers was superseded by a provision that favors the “friendly parent”).
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from any socioeconomic status and is often not due to the perpetrator 
having anger management problems, but rather a need for coercive con-
trol.132 Not all domestic violence is physical, as there are several forms of 
abuse. A typical pattern of violence occurs in a cyclical trend where ten-
sion builds, abuse takes place, and the perpetrator makes apolo-
gies/excuses or amends to the victim.133 The passage of time between in-
stances of domestic violence does not indicate an end to danger for the 
victim and the notion that the victim has the choice to leave his/her 
spouse/partner or to call the police is a common misconception.134
Counterintuitively, victims of domestic violence often have nu-
merous barriers that prevent them from fleeing abuse or ending the rela-
tionship, even when it is in order to ensure their safety. Women who 
have recently separated from an intimate partner report experiencing vi-
olent episodes at a rate 40 times greater than those who are still mar-
ried.135 Separation assault is a threat that keeps many victims from seek-
ing safety.
Also counterintuitively, in addition to direct harms inflicted on vic-
tims, children can be severely harmed from exposure to domestic vio-
lence. It is unfortunately common for people to be uninformed about 
the numerous counterintuitive facts about domestic violence, which can 
cause them to fail to believe victims; underestimate the danger that vic-
tims endure, especially after having separated from their spouse/partner; 
and fail to understand the ways in which children can be harmed by ex-
posure to domestic violence.
Untrained evaluators are also at risk of misinterpreting self-defense 
on the part of the victim as mutual fighting. Women in domestic vio-
lence situations tend to use violence as a form of self-defense more often 
than men need to use violence in self-defense.136 Women report primary 
132. See Shannon Catalano, Intimate Partner Violence in the United States, U.S. BUREAU
OF JUSTICE STATISTICS (2007), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ipvus.pdf
(demonstrating that domestic violence can happen to anyone by presenting infor-
mation compiled by the U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, in-
cluding data from the National Crime Victimization Survey interviews with victims 
of crimes and the FBI’s Supplementary Homicide Reports on the income of victims); 
see also GOVERNOR’S COUNCIL ON DOMESTIC ABUSE & END DOMESTIC ABUSE WIS.,
supra note 33, at 27.
133. See Catalano, supra note 132.
134. Catalano, supra note 132.
135. Id.
136. L. Kevin Hamberger & Sadie E. Larsen, Men’s and Women’s Experience of Intimate 
Partner Violence: A Review of Ten Years of Comparative Studies in Clinical Samples: 
Part I, 30 J. FAM. VIOLENCE 699 (2015) (discussing a systematic qualitative review of 
literature from 2002-2013 related to gender differences in intimate partner violence
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reasons for intimate partner violence as being for the purposes of self-
defense and retaliation, while both genders report emotional deregula-
tion as a reason for intimate partner violence.137 Many female perpetra-
tors of domestic violence have experienced violence by their male part-
ner in the past.138 In domestic violence situations, women have a greater 
likelihood of being injured even if the male partner uses violence that 
contributes to a lesser likelihood for injury, such as slapping or push-
ing.139 Female perpetrators are not necessarily more violent than male 
domestic violence perpetrators, but one study found that female perpe-
trators tend to use weapons against male victims more so than do male 
perpetrators.140 Evaluators must be careful not to misinterpret self-
defense on the part of the victim as mutual fighting.
Gender bias often takes place in custody dispute resolutions due to 
the belief that women are more likely to make false allegations of child 
abuse and domestic violence in order to alienate children from their 
fathers. These stereotypes are associated with sexist beliefs,141 the notion 
that the world is a just place,142 and the tendency to disbelieve, 
as measured in clinical samples). Study authors note that, since their research focused 
only on clinical samples, the findings may not be generalizable to the overall, non-
clinical population. Id. at 715.
137. Jody M. Ross, Personality and Situational Correlates of Self-Reported Reasons for Inti-
mate Partner Violence Among Women Versus Men Referred for Batterers’ Intervention,
29 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 711 (2011) (examining results from a study of 30 women and 
56 men referred for intervention after having committed an intimate partner violence
offense). Results were obtained from a 45-minute computer survey and individual in-
terview regarding relationship conflict. Id. at 714. Although findings afford useful in-
sight, authors of this study warn that, because the sample of individuals studied were 
selected based on involvement in the criminal legal system, they may not be general-
izable to the greater population of intimate partner violence offenders. Id. at 725.
138. Caroletta A. Shuler, Male Victims of Intimate Partner Violence in the United States: An 
Examination of the Review of Literature Through the Critical Perspective, 5 INT’L J.
CRIM. JUST. 163, 166 (2010) (recounting a review of literature related to male vic-
tims of intimate partner violence perpetrated by female partners).
139. Id. at 166.
140. Id. at 169.
141. Daniel G. Saunders et al., The Inventory of Beliefs About Wife-Beating: The Construc-
tion and Initial Validation of a Measure of Beliefs and Attitudes, 2 VIOLENCE &
VICTIMS 39 (1987) (reporting on stages of development and evaluation of validity, 
reliability, and scale dimensionality of an assessment measuring attitudes about “wife 
beating” (intimate partner violence) using data from 675 participants). Although five 
of the subscales constructed had sufficient internal reliability, three scales did not 
demonstrate robust internal reliability. Id. at 52.
142. Zick Rubin & Letitia Anne Peplau, Who Believes in a Just World?, 31 J. SOC. ISSUES
65 (1975) (reflecting on the concept of “Belief in a Just World” and findings which 
suggest that subscribers to the idea of a Just World are more likely to admire fortu-
nate persons and disparage victims to preserve the internal consistency of the belief in 
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minimize, or disregard evidence of abuse.143 As a result of these beliefs, 
evaluators often recommend that abusive fathers be given sole or joint 
custody or unsupervised visits with the children.144 Mothers are often 
punished for reporting abuse and are held to stricter standards than are 
fathers.145
To accurately perform assessments to evaluate the best interests of 
the child and potential serious endangerment, evaluators must be aware
of several factors: gender bias and domestic violence is an important is-
sue in custody evaluations; post-separation violence occurs; screening 
and assessment can be dangerous; false allegations by a parent are rare;
gender and personal biases can exist when investigating false allegations 
or when making recommendations; children’s safety must be a priority 
emphasized over co-parenting; and coercive-controlling violence is a 
form of domestic violence.146 It is critical to utilize evaluators that satisfy 
a representative sample of professionals to reduce any effects of bias.147
Naïve evaluators of child custody tend to believe that parents falsely 
claim abuse. To avoid this error, evaluators need to be knowledgeable 
about domestic violence, and they need to be selected by appropriate 
that Just World); Janet K. Swim, Wayne S. Hall & Barbara A. Hunter, Sexism and 
Racism: Old-Fashioned and Modern Prejudices, 68 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
199 (1995) (discussing confirmatory factor analyses and subsequent replication study 
evaluating measures of gender and racial prejudice). Generalizability may be limited,
as study participants were 683 and 788 (respectively) individuals who received extra
credit in college courses for their participation in the study, and therefore their atti-
tudes may not accurately reflect those of the general population. Id. at 201, 205.
143. Daniel G. Saunders, Richard M. Tolman & Kathleen C. Faller, Factors Associated 
with Child Custody Evaluators’ Recommendations in Cases of Intimate Partner Violence,
27 J. FAM. PSYCHOL. 473, 477 (2013) (detailing a multivariate statistical analysis of 
responses to surveys completed by 465 child custody evaluators, used to assess the re-
lationships between evaluators’ background, beliefs, knowledge, and custody recom-
mendations). Limitations of generalizability should be noted in terms of the fact that 
it is not known whether the sample provides a reasonable estimate of representative-
ness, and as a result of uncertainties regarding the direction of causality of results.
144. Meier & Dickson, supra note 2, at 313.
145. Rosen & Etlin, supra note 115 (detailing information on 206 cases (with a focus on 
five representative examples) of child maltreatment after courts acted with bias 
against the mother); Molly Dragiewicz, A Left Realist Approach to Antifeminist Fathers’
Rights Groups, 54 CRIME L. & SOC. CHANGE 197, 201 (2010) (reviewing the Left 
Realist Approach to criminology, feminist criticisms of the approach, and Left Realist 
responses to those criticisms); Meier, Domestic Violence, supra note 49; SAUNDERS, ET 
AL., CHILD CUSTODY EVALUATORS’ BELIEFS, supra note 42.
146. Haselschwerdt et al., supra note 45; SAUNDERS ET AL., CHILD CUSTODY 
EVALUATORS’ BELIEFS, supra note 42; see also GOVERNOR’S COUNCIL ON DOMESTIC 
ABUSE & END DOMESTIC ABUSE WIS., supra note 33.
147. SAUNDERS ET AL., CHILD CUSTODY EVALUATORS’ BELIEFS, supra note 42.
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means.148 Evaluators should also understand the concept of the two 
types of violence (controlling and conflict-based) in order to make ade-
quate recommendations, since they can often vary depending on the 
perspective of the evaluator.149 Awareness can increase an assessor’s focus 
on safety or can minimize the evaluator’s perspective of the danger of 
domestic violence in custody cases.150 Abuse allegations during custody 
evaluations should be investigated thoroughly. If credible testimony or 
other credible evidence supports allegations—taking into account the 
dynamics of domestic violence—the allegations should be afforded sub-
stantial weight in determining and pursuing the best interests of the 
child.
While it appears that many family law practitioners and custody 
evaluators falsely believe that fabricated allegations of domestic violence 
are common,151 it is estimated that 35 percent of fathers and 18 percent 
of mothers make false allegations of domestic violence during custody 
cases.152 In addition, evaluators often confuse an unsubstantiated allega-
tion with a false allegation. An unsubstantiated allegation occurs when 
an accusing party cannot provide documentation of domestic violence 
as required by courts,153 and there is evidence to believe that the child 
has not been abused or mistreated.154 False allegations, on the other 
hand, include alleging domestic violence in order to gain an unfair ad-
vantage in a custody case or to alienate the other parent from the 
child/children.155 In these cases, the person making the false claim does 
so maliciously and knowingly.156 Regardless of the distinction, a re-
quirement for substantiation of an abuse claim is contrary to the dy-
namics of domestic violence.157 Survivors of domestic violence, specifi-
cally women, often do not report domestic violence to law enforcement 
148. Id.
149. Haselschwerdt et al., supra note 45, at 1712.
150. Id. at 1707.
151. See id.; SAUNDERS ET AL., CHILD CUSTODY EVALUATORS’ BELIEFS, supra note 42, at 
14.
152. Id.
153. Haselschwerdt et al., supra note 45.
154. Nico M. Trocmé, Major Findings from the Canadian Incidence Study of Reported Child 
Abuse and Neglect, 27 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 1427, 1430 (2003) (presenting 
findings from the Canadian Incidence Study of Reported Maltreatment, focusing on 
a subsample of 3,786 cases in which maltreatment was substantiated). The study pro-
vides enormous insight, but it should be noted that information was gathered from 
administrative reports, which, though they constitute records kept in the regular 
course of business, cannot be independently substantiated. Id. at 1433.
155. See Haselschwerdt et al., supra note 45, at 1698.
156. See Trocmé et al., supra note 154, at 1430.
157. See Haselschwerdt et al., supra note 45, at 1698.
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or healthcare professionals before separating from their partner,158 as 
they correctly fear that the report could be used against them.159
It is also important for the evaluator to be educated in the ways 
that coercively abusive intimate partners can often project a non-abusive 
image, can express denial, deflect blame, or minimize the abuse, and can 
resort to making false allegations (i.e., Parental Alienation Syndrome or 
child abuse/neglect)160 in order to undermine the victim’s credibility. 
Evaluators should also be cautious to not make unwarranted assump-
tions regarding a survivor’s presentation, as not all victims will appear as 
scared or weak. Instead, they may demonstrate characteristics such as 
anger, irritability, strength of character, or even impassivity.161 In cases 
where a couple reports to the evaluator that there has been fighting by 
both partners, the evaluator should assess for patterns of abuse from the 
interview and from legal records. Additionally, the evaluator should 
look for evidence of “defensive wounds,” which are injuries sustained by 
a victim of a violent attack due to attempts at defending themselves 
against a perpetrator and are often found on the hands and forearms.162
The evaluator should determine each partner’s level of fear as well as any 
presence of post-traumatic stress symptoms.163
158. Id.
159. SAUNDERS ET AL., CHILD CUSTODY EVALUATORS’ BELIEFS, supra note 42, at 21.
160. Meier, Getting Real About Abuse and Alienation, supra note 48, at 228–30.
161. LEIGH S. GOODMARK, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, PROMOTING COMMUNITY 
CHILD PROTECTION: A LEGISLATIVE AGENDA (2002); Meier, Domestic Violence, supra
note 49; Morrill et al., supra note 73; SAUNDERS ET AL., CHILD CUSTODY 
EVALUATORS’ BELIEFS, supra note 42, at 1, 116–35; BATTERED MOTHERS’
TESTIMONY PROJECT, supra note 72.
162. LESTER ADELSON, THE PATHOLOGY OF HOMICIDE: A VADE MECUM FOR 
PATHOLOGIST, PROSECUTOR AND DEFENSE COUNSEL 490 (1974); KATHLEEN M.
BROWN & MARY E. MUSCARI, QUICK REFERENCE TO ADULT AND OLDER ADULT 
FORENSICS: A GUIDE FOR NURSES AND OTHER HEALTH CARE PROFESSIONALS 28 
(2010); BARRY A. J. FISHER & DAVID R. FISHER, TECHNIQUES OF CRIME SCENE 
INVESTIGATION 387 (2004); JOHN J. MILETICH & TIA LAURA LINDSTROM, AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE WORK OF A MEDICAL EXAMINER: FROM DEATH SCENE TO 
AUTOPSY SUITE 26 (2010).
163. See Daniel G. Saunders, Evaluating the Evaluators: Research-Based Guidance for Attor-
neys Regarding Custody Evaluations in Cases Involving Domestic Abuse, 47 MICH. FAM.
L.J. 8, 10 (2017).
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C. Proper Screening for Domestic Violence Is Necessary to Prevent Children 
from Continued Exposure to Domestic Violence or 
Direct Abuse and Neglect
The first step toward protecting children who have been exposed to 
domestic violence is to identify when it has occurred. To identify these 
cases, allegations must be taken seriously. Statistics have demonstrated 
that a parent making intentionally false allegations of child maltreat-
ment is a rare occurrence.164 Based on countrywide data compiled annu-
ally by the Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, there were an estimat-
ed 135,573 investigations into child maltreatment conducted in Canada 
in 1998.165 In this study, information about alleged mistreatment was 
gathered from a random sample of child welfare service jurisdictions 
across Canada. Of the 7,672 cases analyzed, only four percent were 
judged by child welfare service workers to be intentionally false 
claims.166
In addition, allegations of domestic violence should be carefully 
evaluated and considered since there is a strong co-occurrence of child 
abuse/neglect and domestic violence; it has been found that among ap-
proximately 30 percent to 60 percent of families where domestic vio-
lence or child maltreatment has been identified, there is a significant 
likelihood that both forms of abuse occur.167 Taking allegations seriously 
is critical to reducing harm to both the children and the non-abusive 
parent. Due to the dynamics of domestic violence, however, victims 
may not report incidences of abuse and violence even when they are 
questioned during an evaluation.168
164. Trocmé et al., supra note 154, at 1435.
165. Id. at 1430.
166. Id. It is important to note that statistics on marital status and divorce rates were not 
considered in this study.
167. H. LIEN BRAGG, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CHILD PROTECTION IN 
FAMILIES EXPERIENCING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE (2003), 
https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/domesticviolence.pdf.
168. Chris O’Sullivan, Estimating the Population at Risk for Violence During Child Visita-
tion, 5 DOMESTIC VIOLENCE REP. 65 (2000) (reporting findings from a study of ar-
chival custody (n=1692) and visitation cases (n=222), counselors’ case records in fel-
ony domestic violence cases (n=97), and interviews with attorneys (n=20) who 
represented victims of domestic violence in the same jurisdictions); RICHARD B.
FELSON & PAUL-PHILIPPE PARÉ, THE REPORTING OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND 
SEXUAL ASSAULT BY NONSTRANGERS TO THE POLICE 15 (2005) (examining trends of 
survey data from the National Violence Against Women Survey conducted by com-
puter-assisted telephone interview, with a sample of 6,291 persons who had experi-
enced physical assaults and 1,787 who had experienced sexual assaults, to examine the 
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Domestic violence survivors often correctly fear that they will not 
be believed and will be seen as alienating parents.169 As in cases of child-
hood sexual assault, many children are hesitant to report or refrain from 
reporting altogether, but when asked directly about any abuse, children 
are more likely to disclose this information.170 Often, reporting domestic 
violence can be dangerous, harmful, or used against the victim. At times 
the victim’s attorney or mediator may advise him or her to refrain from 
disclosing domestic violence.171 It is also common for victims to lack in-
sight into how damaging child exposure to domestic violence is and be-
lieve that family separation is more damaging.172 Thus, routine screening 
should be conducted. Appropriate screening for domestic violence in 
custody cases can help prevent further harm to the child, as intimate 
partners may use parenting time to abuse, neglect, or otherwise adverse-
ly affect the child and use the time spent in the exchange of the children 
as an opportunity to abuse their ex-spouse/partner.
According to recent findings, households in which domestic vio-
lence occurs have a 41 percent correlation with households also experi-
encing critical injuries or deaths due to child abuse and neglect.173 To 
screen for domestic violence and assess the risk of future domestic vio-
lence, it is often necessary to employ diverse methods.174 Interviews and 
observations can be conducted with children, parents, and other signifi-
effects that the genders of perpetrator and victim, as well as their relationship to one 
another, have on likelihood of reporting the incident to the police); see also Michael 
A. Rodriguez et al., Implications for Health Care Professionals, 169, 337, 339 W.J.
MED. (1998) (detailing results from a qualitative study of 51 women, divided into 
eight focus groups, who had been victims of domestic violence within the prior two 
years, where information about attitudes was elicited in the form of semi-structured, 
open-ended discussion questions posed to focus groups).
169. See Meier & Dickson, supra note 2, at 328–32.
170. Kamala London et al., Disclosure of Child Sexual Abuse: What Does the Research Tell 
Us About the Ways That Children Tell?, 11 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 194, 197
(2005) (reviewing recent empirical data and literature related to patterns of abuse dis-
closure among adults, as compared to children’s abuse disclosure patterns).
171. Meier & Dickson, supra note 2, at 328–32.
172. Rodriguez et al., supra note 168, at 339.
173. SUSAN SCHECHTER & JEFFREY L. EDLESTON, IN THE BEST INTEREST OF WOMEN 
AND CHILDREN: A CALL FOR COLLABORATION BETWEEN CHILD WELFARE AND 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CONSTITUENCIES 5 (1994); WASH. STATE SUPREME COURT 
GENDER & JUSTICE COMM’N., DOMESTIC VIOLENCE MANUAL FOR JUDGES 2-49 
(rev. ed. 2016), https://www.courts.wa.gov/index.cfm?fa=home.contentDisplay&
location=manuals/domViol/index (follow the hyperlink for Chapter 2).
174. American Psychological Association, Guidelines for Child Custody Evaluations in Fam-
ily Law Proceedings, 65 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 863, 866 (2010).
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cant figures in the children’s lives.175 In addition, screening and assess-
ment should involve reviewing criminal and civil court records, examin-
ing child protective service records, and using validated screening tools 
to determine risk.176 Reports of abuse are significantly more likely in 
court settings where self-report intake questionnaires are adminis-
tered.177 Professionals in healthcare settings only need information from 
a few screening questions to detect domestic violence,178 and normaliz-
ing statements are often effective in helping patients disclose any prob-
lems with domestic violence.179 For example, healthcare professionals 
can ask a normalizing question in the following way: “I don’t know if 
this is (or ever has been) a problem for you, but many of the clients I see 
are dealing with abusive relationships. Some are too afraid or uncom-
fortable to bring it up themselves, so I’ve started asking about it routine-
ly.”180 These questions can lower an interviewee’s defenses and allow the 
individual to tell evaluators what is really taking place.
Validated screening instruments should also be regularly and sys-
tematically employed to help detect domestic violence. The Spouse As-
sault Risk Assessment181 and the Danger Assessment182 are assessment 
175. See KATHLEEN C. BASILE ET AL., CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE VICTIMIZATION ASSESSMENT 
INSTRUMENTS FOR USE IN HEALTHCARE SETTINGS: VERSION 1.0 (2007), 
https://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/pdf/ipv/ipvandsvscreening.pdf (detailing 
available instruments and tools for assessing intimate partner violence and sexual vio-
lence victimization in clinical and healthcare settings); but see Miriam K. Ehrensaft & 
Dina Vivian, Is Partner Aggression Related to Appraisals of Coercive Control by a Part-
ner?, 14 J. FAM. VIOLENCE 251 (1999) (addressing the idea that asking questions 
about coercive control, rather than physical assault, may produce inconsistent results 
based on the subjective nature of the perception of coercion and relationship con-
trol). While this study is useful, concerns about the external validity/generalizability 
of its results arise based on the fact that its sample exclusively included young college 
students in dating relationships, and findings may not apply to different demographic 
populations. Id. at 251.
176. SAUNDERS ET AL., CHILD CUSTODY EVALUATORS’ BELIEFS, supra note 42, at 107–10.
177. See Robin H. Ballard, Amy Holtzworth-Munroe, Amy G. Applegate, and Connie J. 
A. Beck, Detecting Intimate Partner Violence in Family and Divorce Mediation: A Ran-
domized Trial of Intimate Partner Violence Screening, 17 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y L. 1, 
20 (2011).
178. See, e.g., BASILE, supra note 175, at 66, 108.
179. See Daniel G. Saunders, Research Based Recommendations for Child Custody Evaluation 
Practices and Policies in Cases of Intimate Partner Violence, 12 J. CHILD CUSTODY 71, 
73 (2015) [hereinafter Saunders, Research Based Recommendations].
180. Id.
181. P. Randall Kropp, Intimate Partner Risk Assessment, in VIOLENT AND SEXUAL 
OFFENDERS: ASSESSMENT, TREATMENT AND MANAGEMENT 36, 44 (Jane L. Ireland 
et al., eds., 2009) (reviewing literature on measures of Intimate Partner Violence risk 
assessments).
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protocols developed for front-line workers and provide specific, stand-
ardized questions to detect past occurrences of domestic violence or de-
gree of risk for future abuse. Lethality potential is measured with the 
validated Danger Risk Assessment,183 while the validated Ontario Do-
mestic Assault Risk Assessment (ODARA) measures non-lethal domes-
tic violence184 and the Spousal Assault Risk Assessment is a validated in-
strument used to measure assault risk.185
Coercive control can be evaluated by asking questions such as:
What happens when you try to make decisions that seem like 
your personal/private matters (like what to wear, how to 
handle something at work)? How does your spouse re-
act? . . . What kind of freedom does your husband/wife give 
you to decide for yourself the things that you want to do, or 
places you want to go? . . . [and] in general, do you feel your 
husband/wife tries to control you? Please explain.186
Non-validated measures should not be used to screen for domestic 
violence. An example of such a non-validated measure includes the “5
P” model, which can incorrectly find that victims were making false 
statements or were too pathological to care for their own children. Us-
ing non-validated measures can lead to sole or joint custody being 
granted to abusers.187 Certain questions on this measure (i.e., questions 
182. Jacquelyn C. Campbell et al., Assessing Risk Factors for Intimate Partner Homicide,
NAT’L INST. JUST. J., NOV. 2003 at 14, 15, https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/
jr000250e.pdf (discussing the Danger Assessment Tool and its abilities and limita-
tions). Scores should be interpreted with caution: “83 percent of the women who 
were killed had scores of 4 or higher, but so did almost 40 percent of the women who 
were not killed. This finding indicates that practitioners can use the Danger Assess-
ment (like all intimate partner violence risk assessment tools) as a guide in the process 
rather than as a precise actuarial tool.” Id. at 16.
183. Id.
184. See N. Zoe Hilton & Grant T. Harris, How Nonrecidivism Affects Predictive Accuracy: 
Evidence from a Cross-Validation of the Ontario Domestic Assault Risk Assessment 
(ODARA), 24 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 326, 330–35 (2008) (detailing methods 
and measures of accuracy for the ODARA, as re-tested on a sample of 391 individu-
als drawn from police incident archives in Canada). Results from this study demon-
strate statistically significant cross-validation of the ability for results to differentiate 
domestic violence recidivists from non-recidivists. Id. at 334.
185. Kropp, supra note 180, at 44.
186. Saunders, Research Based Recommendations, supra note 179, at 75.
187. JANET JOHNSTON, VIVIENNE ROSEBY & KATHRYN KUEHNLE, IN THE NAME OF THE 
CHILD: A DEVELOPMENTAL APPROACH TO UNDERSTANDING AND HELPING 
CHILDREN OF CONFLICTED AND VIOLENT DIVORCE 317 (2009); see also SAUNDERS 
ET AL., CHILD CUSTODY EVALUATORS’ BELIEFS, supra note 42.
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relating to being followed) have improperly led evaluators to conclude 
that victims were suffering from personality disorders or other psycho-
pathology (i.e., paranoia that someone is following her) when she is, in 
fact, not pathological, but is instead dealing with the reality and trauma 
of the abuse (i.e., abuser actually is stalking her).188 Thus, because the 
results can make it appear as if the victim is suffering from pathology 
when she is not,189 it may give her abuser an inappropriate advantage in 
court.190
As another important evidence-based recommendation in assessing 
whether a family suffers from domestic violence, evaluators should look 
for patterns of controlling and coercive behavior, rather than emphasiz-
ing isolated incidences of physical violence.191 Studies have documented 
the fact that when evaluators conduct assessments that place particular 
focus on coercive-controlling violence, the parenting plans that result 
from those assessments provide a higher level of safety against domestic 
violence.192 In addition, such emphasis typically results in a grant of cus-
tody to domestic violence-surviving mothers.193
188. See KENNETH S. POPE, JAMES N. BUTCHER & JOYCE SEELEN, THE MMPI, MMPI-2,
& MMPI-A IN COURT: A PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR EXPERT WITNESSES AND 
ATTORNEYS (3d ed. 2006).
189. See Fariha I. Khan, Toni L. Welch & Eric A. Zillmer, MMPI-2 Profiles of Battered 
Women in Transition, 60 J. PERSONALITY ASSESSMENT 100, 100 (1993) (examining a 
study in which the scores of 31 women residing in a domestic violence shelter in 
Pennsylvania obtained on an MMPI-2 protocol were compared and found to be sig-
nificantly elevated on a number of particular scales). This may provide a good indica-
tion of psychological distress related to intimate partner violence, but may also pro-
vide the basis for misdiagnosis of pathology. The study authors caution that the
sample size was too small to conduct meaningful statistical analysis on results and did 
not control for all considered confounding variables. Id. at 109–10. See also Lynne 
Bravo Rosewater, A Critical Analysis of the Proposed Self-Defeating Personality Disorder,
J. PERSONALITY DISORDERS 190 (1987) (reviewing literature as to the importance of 
differentiating between the experience of situational distress and the existence of an 
enduring personality disorder).
190. Kay Bathurst, et al., Normative Data for the MMPI-2 in Child Custody Litigation, 9
PSYCHOL. ASSESSMENT 205, 209-10 (1997) (examining a study in which normative 
data were derived from archival records of child custody litigants in California to 
whom the MMPI-2 had been administered during the course of child custody deter-
minations); POPE ET AL., supra note 188.
191. SAUNDERS ET AL., CHILD CUSTODY EVALUATORS’ BELIEFS, supra note 42, at 8–11.
192. DAVIS ET AL., supra note 42.
193. SAUNDERS ET AL., CHILD CUSTODY EVALUATORS’ BELIEFS, supra note 42.
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Experts in the field recommend that evaluators meet with each par-
ent separately on different interview days and times.194 They recommend 
that parents should be asked pointed questions, including:
1) whether they would feel safe if the other parent was in the 
room;
2) whether they can recall the last time they and their part-
ner were able to sit down together and have a conversa-
tion about the children;
3) how the relationship ended;
4) how well the child gets along with the other parent;
5) the types of activities in which the child enjoys participat-
ing with the other parent;
6) whether they would feel comfortable participating in a 
joint meeting at the child’s school;
7) whether there have been any incidences of physical or 
verbal abuse;
8) whether there has ever been an order of protection filed; 
and
9) whether there are any restrictions from access to joint 
money/finances.195
Additionally, these experts recommend that the evaluator begin by
developing a rapport with the child by discussing issues unrelated to the 
family discord.196 After establishing a rapport with the child, the evalua-
tor should explain to the child the evaluator’s role and extent of confi-
dentiality and emphasize that his or her main role is to help the child 
feel safe and protected.197 In addition, the evaluator should ask the child 
several open-ended questions to gauge certain behavior patterns of the 
parents including: (1) what the child’s favorite aspects are of going to 
their mom/dad’s house; (2) how the child would feel if they were in the 
same room with their mom and dad; and, (3) if the child could have 
three wishes, what they would be.198 It is also important for the evalua-
tor to assess the child for any obvious signs of abuse, such as visible 
194. E-mail from Nicole Centracchio, Owner & Managing Partner, Reed Centracchio & 
Associates, LLC (Feb. 12, 2018) (on file with author). This information should be 
considered expert opinion without scientific verification. Future research should sci-
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bruises, torn clothing, or presenting as withdrawn and refusing to 
speak.199 Research indicates that drawing may facilitate young children’s 
ability to talk about emotional experiences in clinical and legal con-
texts.200 Drawings can help the child to communicate with the evaluator, 
meaning that having paper and crayons available can be helpful during 
the interview process.201
While screening children for domestic violence, child representa-
tives must obtain the child’s permission to share specifics of what is dis-
closed;202 in the event that the evaluator is unable to obtain consent 
from the child, the evaluator must still advocate on the child’s behalf 
and present a report to the court regarding ways to keep the child safe.203
The only exceptions to this are cases that involve Rule 1.6.204 In such 
cases, if a child representative reasonably believes that disclosure could 
prevent death or substantial bodily harm, disclosure is thereby neces-
sary.205 If the evaluator is a guardian ad litem, then he or she has an ab-
solute right to tell attorneys and the court exactly what the child has 
stated during the evaluation. However, as a child representative or 
guardian ad litem, the evaluator has no duty of confidentiality for what 
is said by the parents during an evaluation.206
199. Amy Swerdlin, Carol Berkowitz & Noah Craft, Cutaneous Signs of Child Abuse, 57 J.
AM. ACAD. DERMATOLOGY 371, 373, 383 (2007) (reviewing literature relevant to 
“differentiating cutaneous signs of child abuse, including physical and sexual abuse, 
from mimickers of inflicted injury”); Centracchio, supra note 194.
200. Centracchio, supra note 194. See generally CATHY A. MALCHIODI, BREAKING THE 
SILENCE: ART THERAPY WITH CHILDREN FROM VIOLENT HOMES (2d. ed. 2004) 
(presenting art therapy techniques for children who have witnessed violence in their 
homes); Julien Gross & Harlene Hayne, Drawing Facilitates Children’s Verbal Reports 
of Emotionally Laden Events, 4 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: APPLIED 163 (1998). The 
work details a two-part study of New Zealanders of European descent, results of 
which indicated that engaging in the act of drawing increases a child’s tendency to 
verbalize and facilitates communication of information about their own past experi-
ences. Id. at 174–76. However, as authors note, subjects in the present study were 
from a non-clinical population. Id. Therefore, the findings cannot be generalized to 
situations in which a child has experienced or witnessed a traumatic event.
201. Id.
202. Centracchio, supra note 194.
203. Id.
204. Id.; see also Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 1.6 (Am. Bar Ass’n, 1983).
205. Id.
206. Id.
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D. Evidence of Domestic Violence Requires Protective Features 
Relating to Custody
Well-designed research on domestic violence also has important 
implications for best practices that judges and other professionals should 
follow in how they react to allegations of domestic violence in child 
custody cases. When allegations of domestic violence or other evidence 
of domestic violence exist that are consistent with the dynamics of 
domestic violence, custody evaluators should determine the extent to 
which children have already been harmed by exposure to domestic 
violence or harmed by direct abuse and neglect by the abusive parent, 
the likelihood of it continuing, and which of the following protective 
custody-related measures to recommend: (i) allocation of primary 
parenting time to the non-abusive parent; (ii) allocation of sole decision-
making to the non-abusive parent; (iii) supervised parenting time and 
payment for supervision; (iv) supervised exchanges; (v) requiring 
exchanges to occur in protected settings; (vi) treatment programs, 
possibly including substance abuse programs, and requiring parents to 
not be under the influence of drugs or alcohol when children are placed 
with them; (vii) prohibitions on overnight physical placement of the 
child with the abusive parent; and (viii) requiring abusers to post bond 
for the safe return of the child, and other conditions the court 
determines necessary for the safety and well-being of the child and the 
victim.207
Using these protective measures is critical because of the strong ev-
idence that coercively abusive intimate partners often use court proceed-
ings over parenting time and decision-making, not to look out for the 
welfare of their children, but rather to further abuse or punish the other 
parent, or to induce their ex-spouse/partner to return to the relation-
ship. As Brittany E. Hayes, an Associate Professor in the Department of 
Criminal Justice and Present Criminology at Sam Houston State Uni-
versity, pointed out, “in relationships where the abusive partner has 
children with his victim, the children can serve as tools for the abuser to 
continue his abusive behavior.”208 Because the goal is to control and 
207. GOVERNOR’S COUNCIL ON DOMESTIC ABUSE & END DOMESTIC ABUSE WIS., supra 
note 33, at 91, 98, 131, 137, 140.
208. Brittany E. Hayes, Abusive Men’s Indirect Control of Their Partner During the Process 
of Separation, 27 J. FAM. VIOLENCE 333, 333 (2012) (reviewing a study and logistical 
regression analysis of 168 women in New York City who were involved in the family 
court system and had at least one child with a person against whom she had obtained 
an order of protection).
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manipulate the mother, rather than to parent, abusers will use legal 
means to harass and manipulate. This starts as a bid for parenting time 
and involvement in decisions that they often ignore during the relation-
ship. An example of this was pointed out by Rita Smith and Pamela 
Coukos in an article they co-authored while at the National Coalition 
Against Domestic Violence: “An abusive partner will often threaten to 
take the children in order to keep the mother in the relationship. If she 
leaves, he may continue efforts to harass and control her by manipulat-
ing custody litigation.”209 This is why coercively abusive fathers are sig-
nificantly more likely to seek sole custody of their children than non-
coercively abusive fathers. They seek joint custody and more parenting 
time, not because they want to spend more time with the children, but 
rather, to perpetuate contact with the mother, monitor the mother’s ac-
tions, and exert control over. Thus, as Smith and Coukos reported, “Fa-
thers who batter the mother are twice as likely to seek sole custody of 
their children than are nonviolent fathers.”210 And they are often suc-
cessful, because as Smith and Coukos also noted, “Despite a perception 
that the courts disproportionately favor mothers, one study has shown 
that fathers who fight for custody win sole or joint custody in 70 per-
cent of these contests.”211
The manipulative behavior does not end with the court battle for 
the order of custody. Joint decision-making power gives the abuser a 
never-ending means to further the abuse and harassment. Both parents 
cannot provide authentic input into decisions under such circumstances, 
because equality between them is rare.212 As Dana Harrington Conner,
Associate Professor of Law and Director of the Delaware Civil Law 
Clinic, Widener University School of Law, noted, “The rarity of equali-
ty in decision-making between an abuser and his victim renders joint 
decision-making [on behalf of the child] unworkable.”213 Under such 
conditions, the decision-making process is shaped more by the abuser’s 
209. Rita Smith & Pamela Coukos, Fairness and Accuracy in Evaluations of Domestic Vio-
lence and Child Abuse in Custody Determinations, 36 JUDGES’ J. 38, 40 (1997) (re-
viewing the literature on this phenomenon, including government reports and reports 
from the American Psychological Association).
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Dana Harrington Conner, Back to the Drawing Board: Barriers to Joint Decision-
Making in Custody Cases Involving Intimate Partner Violence, 18 DUKE J. GENDER L.
& POL’Y 223, 227 (2011).
213. Id. at 227.
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attempts at control than by the welfare of the child, because abusers can 
use decisions as leverage.214 As Conner noted:
When that joint custodian craves control, as batterers often 
do, the non-residential batterer may use his legal custodial 
power to exert control over the most ordinary decisions. Fur-
ther, if he is not consulted about these commonplace issues a 
batterer may intimidate the victim, threaten her with legal ac-
tion, or file with the court in an attempt to harass her 
through the legal process.215
Thus, an abuser may withhold consent for the child to receive 
counseling or medical procedures or for the child to participate in extra-
curricular school activities until the victim concedes to his demands. 
And the manipulative behavior does not end with the mother, because 
as experts Lundy Bancroft, Jay G. Silverman, and Daniel Ritchie noted,
batterers tend to be controlling and coercive in their direct interactions 
with children.216 Likewise, abusers will frequently seek modifications to 
custody arrangements, and often fail to comply with court orders just to 
get at the mother.217 As Smith and Coukos noted, an abusive parent is 
“likely to disrupt court-ordered visitation schedules as a way to continue 
the abuse of his former partner” and is “three times as likely to be arrears 
in child support.”218 In short, when abusers are granted decision-making 
powers, decisions are not based on the child’s best interest, but are ra-
ther focused on perpetuating the abuse. Abusers can use courtroom con-
flicts over parenting decisions as a forum to do so.219
It is also a bad idea to involve abusive intimate partners in the deci-
sion-making process. As Conner pointed out:
A grant of joint legal custody assumes that both parents will 
make good choices about the welfare of their children. Such 
an assumption, however, is ill advised in cases involving bat-
terers. A parent who makes poor decisions with regard to his 
own life is also likely to make poor decisions about his chil-
dren . . . . Batterers often engage in other risky behavior, in-
cluding abuse of drugs and alcohol, criminal behavior and 
214. Id. at 227, 258.
215. Id. at 258.
216. BANCROFT ET AL., supra note 49, at 8.
217. Smith & Coukos, supra note 209, at 40.
218. Id.
219. Id.
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abuse of children. They fail to comply with court orders and 
have a general disregard for the law.220
Consequently, to protect children and the non-abusive parent from 
further harm in custody cases where one parent has been engaging in 
coercive abuse, the non-abusive parent should be granted the sole right 
to make decisions relating to their children, and courts should order ap-
propriate protective measures to be placed on the parenting time of the 
coercively abusive parent.
E. Importance of Appropriately Assessing and Addressing
Mental Health Issues and Seeking Appropriate Intervention Programs
Well-designed research has important implications for determining 
best approaches to handling mental health issues of domestic violence 
survivors and their children, as well as recommending various types of 
intervention programs for abusive parents. When domestic violence is 
detected, an evaluator should recognize that the survivor has 
experienced trauma and will be more likely to display symptoms of 
depression and anxiety.221 These symptoms may be reactions to violence 
and controlling behavior by the perpetrator.222 Survivors of domestic 
violence endure abuse, harassment, and threats of abuse, which often
continue after the couple has separated.223 In addition to the trauma 
associated with domestic violence, the survivor must also cope with the 
overwhelming stress and accompanying emotional symptoms related to 
the idea that they could potentially lose their children to the 
perpetrator.224 Many times, a survivor’s symptoms can be severe enough 
to meet criteria for complex PTSD: a severe form of PTSD 
characterized by symptoms such as difficulty regulating emotion, 
explosive anger, episodes of dissociation, negative self-perception, 
perception of the perpetrator as having total power over the survivor, 
220. Conner, supra note 212, at 256.
221. Nancy S. Erickson, Use of the MMPI-2 in Child Custody Evaluations Involving Bat-
tered Women: What Does Psychological Research Tell Us?, 39 FAM. L.Q. 87, 97 (2006) 
(finding women who have experienced intimate partner violence have elevated scores 
on the 2 and 7 scales, depression and anxiety, respectively).
222. Id. at 89 (“[R]esearch tends to support the hypothesis that a battered woman’s
MMPI-2 profile often is a result of the abuse she has suffered.”).
223. Smith & Coukos, supra note 209, at 38–40.
224. Erickson, supra note 221, at 89 (“[The MMPI-2 profile] should not be viewed by 
child custody evaluators as evidence that [the mother] has personality traits indicating 
that she would not be a fit parent.”).
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isolation and distrust of others, feelings of hopelessness, and a sense of 
despair.225 These symptoms can overlap with Borderline Personality 
Disorder and Paranoid Personality Disorder traits, which may in turn 
be triggered or exacerbated by domestic violence experiences, as well as 
the survivor’s own history of childhood abuse.226 It is common for 
survivors of domestic violence to have a childhood history of abuse and 
trauma.227 When they are able to achieve some measure of security in 
their lives, the symptoms of PTSD and depression often diminish, 
adding further support to the idea that symptoms are related to the 
trauma as opposed to underlying psychosis. 228
Recognizing that the survivor has experienced trauma will help 
professionals avoid making tragic mistakes. For example, perhaps due to 
the failure to recognize the trauma that survivors have endured, evalua-
tors are much more likely to recommend sole custody to the perpetrator 
if the survivor is portrayed as hostile and are also more likely to refer the 
survivor to counseling, parenting classes, and anger management clas-
ses.229 During evaluations, when the survivor presents as guarded and 
engages with the evaluator in a negative manner, evaluators and judges 
often interpret this behavior as personality dysfunction even when the 
behaviors are a result of the survivor’s fears and other symptoms of be-
ing victimized.230
When mothers struggle with depression, trauma symptoms, and 
other psychopathology, children also tend to have more problems them-
selves,231 but attending to mental health needs can enhance protective 
factors. Children who have been exposed to domestic violence do better 
when they are protected by a supportive, healthy, non-abusive parent232
with good parenting skills.233 Situational factors such as family support 
and secure attachment to other caregivers, living in a supportive, safe, 
225. Id. at 104–08.
226. Id. at 88.
227. See generally Stith et al., supra note 103, at 640, 648–49.
228. Saunders, Research Based Recommendations, supra note 179, at 71, 73.
229. Jennifer L. Hardesty et al., The Influence of Divorcing Mothers’ Demeanor on Custody 
Evaluators’ Assessment of Their Domestic Violence Allegations, 12 J. CHILD CUSTODY
47, 55 tbl.1 (2015).
230. PRANZO, supra note 71, at 48.
231. Gewirtz et al., supra note 66, at 36; Graham-Bermann et al., supra note 46, at 649; 
Owen et al., supra note 46, at 434.
232. Shonkoff & Garner, supra note 47, at 237.
233. Gewirtz et al., supra note 66, at 30; Graham-Bermann et al., supra note 46, at 650.
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and close community,234 and not experiencing other forms of trauma235
contribute to greater resiliency in children.
In addition to allocating primary parenting time to the non-abusive 
parent, the non-abusive parent can be referred to appropriate treatment 
if he or she is suffering from depression, PTSD, or other struggles that 
can impact parenting. Appropriate interventions can also be recom-
mended for the children and the abusive parent; therapies such as 
Trauma-Focused Cognitive Behavioral Therapy (TF-CBT) appear to be 
the most effective.236
It is also important for evaluators to assess the typologies of 
perpetrators who commit intimate partner violence in order to identify 
appropriate interventions.237 For example, an evaluator should examine 
234. Garmezy & Masten, supra note 46, at 194; Gewirtz et al., supra note 66, at 36; Owen 
et al., supra note 46, at 438; Werner, supra note 46, at 74.
235. Graham-Bermann et al., supra note 46, at 658.
236. Colleen E. Cary & J. Curtis McMillen, The Data behind the Dissemination: A System-
atic Review of Trauma-Focused Cognitive Behavioral Therapy for Use with Children and 
Youth, 34 CHILD & SERVS. REV. 748 (2012) (detailing findings of three meta-
analyses of 10 studies to determine if Trauma-Focused Cognitive Behavioral Therapy 
(TF-CBT) was effective in reducing symptoms of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder 
(PTSD), depression, and behavioral problems). Findings were consistent amongst 
meta-analyses: although immediately after the completion of treatment it appeared 
that TF-CBT was efficacious for reducing symptoms of all three conditions, only 
symptoms of PTSD continued to be ameliorated a year after treatment completion. 
Study authors caution that limitations include the fact that both the number of stud-
ies included in the meta-analysis and number of subjects in each study sample were 
relatively small, as well as the fact that none of the studies examined the effect of the 
length of time spent in treatment, on treatment outcome. Id.; Judith A. Cohen, An-
thony P. Mannarino & Satish Iyengar, Community Treatment of Posttraumatic Stress 
Disorder for Children Exposed to Intimate Partner Violence: A Randomized Controlled 
Trial, 165 ARCHIVES PEDIATRIC & ADOLESCENT MED. 16, (2011) (reviewing ran-
domized double-blind control trial of 124 7-14 year-old children with five or more 
intimate partner violence-related PTSD symptoms and whose mother was the victim 
of intimate partner violence, in order to evaluate the effectiveness of TF-CBT as 
compared to standard treatment for children with intimate partner violence-related 
PTSD). Although the findings indicate that TF-CBT is more effective in reducing 
symptoms, they are limited in terms of internal validity as a result of a significantly 
high (39.5 percent) rate of attrition. Id.
237. Amy Holtzworth-Munroe & Gregory L. Stuart, Typologies of Male Batterers: Three 
Subtypes and the Differences Among Them, 116 PSYCHOL. BULL. 476 (1994) 
(reviewing available literature and studies on domestic violence to determine via 
factor analysis if batterers can be typified). Although corroboration exists to support 
the notion that there are three main batterer typologies, these findings cannot be 
empirically validated, and their value lies primarily in the qualitative analysis they 
provide. Id. Olga Cunha & Rui Abrunhosa Gonçalves, Intimate Partner Violence 
Offenders: Generating A Data-Based Typology of Batterers and Implications for 
Treatment, 5 EUR. J. PSYCHOL. APPLIED TO LEGAL CONTEXT 131 (2013) (discussing 
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whether an abusing parent is only committing the abuse within the 
family or whether he or she is violent in all of their relationships, 
including those outside of the home (i.e., engaging in road rage).238
Abuse of an intimate partner is often correlated with alcohol or 
substance abuse behaviors and disorders, and is also associated with an 
escalation of violence.239 By knowing the typology of the abuser, an 
a study in which data were obtained from the self-reports of 187 adult males 
criminally sentenced for intimate partner violence-related offenses.) Concurrent with 
Holtzworth-Munroe & Stuart, supra, cluster analysis (Ward’s method) indicated the 
presence of three empirical subtypes; nevertheless, as with the imprecise nature of 
cluster analysis conclusions are subject to the clustering methods used. Id. Charlie 
Stoops et al., Development and Predictive Ability of a Behavior-Based Typology of Men 
Who Batter, 25 J. FAM. VIOLENCE 325, (2009) (examining a study in which 
information was gathered from a biopsychosocial assessment and from archival 
records from offender databases maintained by both the county and the state for 671 
men who had been convicted of crimes related to battering their female partners). 
Similarly, and in accord with Holtzworth-Munroe & Stuart, supra, cluster analysis 
signaled the existence of three typologies of batterers; however, authors note that the 
sample examined is not typical of the intimate partner violence perpetrator, and that 
data were collected by a number of different probation officers, and a lack of 
uniformity of and/or control over the process may have influenced the results. Id.
238. Holtzworth-Munroe & Stuart, supra note 237, at 481–93.
239. Kenneth E. Leonard, Domestic Violence and Alcohol: What is Known and What Do We 
Need to Know to Encourage Environmental Interventions?, 6 J. SUBSTANCE USE 235 
(2001) at 235 (reviewing a comprehensive analysis of available literature, surveys, and 
research studies related to the effect of alcohol on domestic violence). While this 
study makes a compelling case for the positive correlation between alcohol use and 
domestic violence, conclusions rest on the premise that there is a causal or even facili-
tative relationship. Id. The study’s author concedes that it is not actually established 
by stating “[t]he case for this rests on whether alcohol has any causal of facilitative ef-
fects on domestic violence.” Id. Additionally, operational definitions are somewhat 
muddled in that differentiation is not made between alcohol use, amount of alcohol 
consumed, the presence of alcohol abuse disorders, intoxication, and/or other poten-
tially confounding factors. Id. Nevertheless, the analysis provides significant benefit 
in identifying critical areas for future research. Id. See also Gregory L. Stuart et al., 
Examining a Conceptual Framework of Intimate Partner Violence in Men and Women 
Arrested for Domestic Violence, 67 J. STUD. ON ALCOHOL 102 (2006) at 102 (discuss-
ing a survey study of 409 men and women referred to batterer intervention pro-
grams). Structural equation modeling was used to analyze interrelationships between 
the perpetrator’s gender and a number of measured characteristics; although findings 
strongly suggest that problematic alcohol use contributes to the perpetration of do-
mestic violence, authors note that they did not corroborate participants self-reports of 
either their own alcohol use and intimate partner violence or their partner’s use of al-
cohol. Id. See also Gregory L. Stuart et al., The Role of Drug Use in a Conceptual Mod-
el of Intimate Partner Violence in Men and Women Arrested for Domestic Violence, 22 
PSYCHOL. ADDICTIVE BEHAV. 12–24 (2008) at 12 (discussing results from further 
analysis of Stuart et al., Examining a Conceptual Framework, supra, to determine if 
problematic drug use is likewise statistically correlated with perpetration of intimate 
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evaluator can better recommend appropriate interventions. In
particular, evidence has been found to support the notion that there are 
three types of batterers: (1) Family-Only batterers, (2) 
Dysphoric/Borderline batterers, and (3) Generally Violent/Antisocial 
batterers.240 Family-Only batterers are found in up to 50 percent of 
domestic violence cases,241 and are primarily violent within the family.242
They have few, if any, pathologies, and they are the least likely of all 
domestic violence perpetrators to have witnessed or been victimized 
during their own childhood.243 They perpetrate the least severe forms of 
violence/abuse and are described as “normal” by others.244
Dysphoric/Borderline batterers are found in approximately 25 percent 
of cases and are typically violent within the family, but may also commit 
general violence.245 This type of batterer also is likely to have psychiatric
problems, is emotionally volatile, and is likely psychologically distressed, 
often with depression or anger issues.246 These batterers may have 
substance abuse issues and may have been victims or witnesses of 
domestic violence during their own childhoods.247 For these individuals, 
batterer intervention programs may need to be combined with 
additional mental health services and substance abuse programs to 
increase the likelihood of change, improve future behavior patterns, and 
decrease the rate of recidivism.248 Generally Violent/Antisocial batterers 
are present in approximately 25 percent of cases of domestic violence, 
with family violence being only part of the general violence that is 
committed by these individuals.249 Antisocial batterers often have 
criminal records, have significant psychiatric problems, abuse 
substances, are the most likely to have been victimized or witnessed 
domestic violence in childhood, and perpetrate the most severe and 
chronic violence/abuse.250 These individuals require criminal justice 
partner violence for both male and female offenders). Interpretation of conclusions 
should take into consideration that measured variables were based on the “perpetra-
tors’ perceptions of partner behavior.” [emphasis in original]. Id.
240. Holtzworth-Munroe & Stuart, supra note 237, at 481.







248. Mike Feinerman, Working with People Who Batter (Feb. 15, 2012) (unpublished 
PowerPoint presentation).
249. Holtzworth-Munroe & Stuart, supra note 237, at 482.
250. Id.
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intervention and intense mental health and substance abuse services, as 
they are often very dangerous to others.251
Partner Abuse Intervention programs seek to change the attitudes 
and behaviors of abusive intimate partners. Some studies have suggested 
that these programs are helpful in reducing incidences of domestic 
violence,252 while other studies question the utility of these programs.253
251. Feinerman, supra note 248.
252. See, e.g., Julia C. Babcock, et al., Does Batterers’ Treatment Work? A Meta-Analytic 
Review of Domestic Violence Treatment, 23 CLINICAL PSYCHOL. REV. 1023 (2004); 
Martha Coulter & Carla VandeWeerd, Reducing Domestic Violence and Other Crimi-
nal Recidivism: Effectiveness of a Multilevel Batterer’s Intervention Program, 24 
VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 139 (2009) (expounding on a nine-year analysis of recidivism 
(as measured by re-arrest rates) of 17,999 batterers assigned to one of six batterers’ in-
tervention programs). Although findings strongly suggest that these Batterer Inter-
vention Programs (BIPs) are correlated with lower rates of re-offense than for indi-
viduals who had not completed treatment, this must be considered in light of the 
potential confounding fact that the type of individuals who are not diligent with pro-
gram completion are also the type more likely to reoffend, as well as the consideration 
that re-arrest rates are not tantamount to re-offense rates, and may instead reflect a 
better ability to avoid detection. Id.; Christopher Eckhardt et al., The Effectiveness of 
Intervention Programs for Perpetrators and Victims of Intimate Partner Violence, 4
PARTNER ABUSE 196 (2013) (discussing meta-analysis of 39 randomized or quasi-
experimental studies in which the research design compared a particular BIP to a per-
tinent comparison group). Study authors found that current research in this area is 
extremely limited, and that the current available research is often fraught with meth-
odological problems, implementation problems, and other limitations. Id.; Lynette 
Feder & David B. Wilson, A Meta-Analytic Review of Court-Mandated Batterer Inter-
vention Programs: Can Courts Affect Abusers’ Behavior?, 1 J. EXPERIMENTAL 
CRIMINOLOGY 239 (2005) (examining meta-analysis of 15 research studies (repre-
senting four experimental and six quasi-experimental studies) evaluating the effec-
tiveness of post-arrest mandated BIPs (each of which had a rigorous experimental or 
quasi-experimental design, as well as a sufficient amount of data to conduct statistical 
analysis of effect size); results were mixed, but study authors express concern over 
generalizability, bias, and validity of the findings); Nicola McConnell, et al., Caring 
Dads Safer Children: Families’ Perspectives on an Intervention for Maltreating Fathers, 7 
PSYCHOL. VIOLENCE 406 (2017) (reviewing results of the Caring Dads Safer Chil-
dren (CDSC) (a weekly intervention program designed to change behavior of abusive 
fathers in order to protect partners and children] and data obtained from 121 part-
ners and 26 children of abusive men in England, Northern Ireland and Wales, as well 
reports of those men’s attitudes and behavior towards their children). Although the 
inferences of this analysis provide evidence to support the notion that CDSC may re-
duce risks to the family, limitations include the facts that findings are based on a 
small sample of children, and that one of the measures used to evaluate fathers’ atti-
tudes has not been evaluated for statistical validity or reliability. Id. Daniel G. Saun-
ders, Group Interventions for Men Who Batter: A Summary of Program Descriptions and 
Research, 23 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 156 (2008) (reviewing recent research related to 
components, methods, effectiveness, and cultural sensitivity of BIPs). The study’s au-
thor concludes that there are few available studies which provide reliable conclusions, 
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The reasons behind the small effects in some studies of partner abuse 
intervention programs include factors such as: (i) unidentified and 
untreated substance abuse,254 (ii) lack of full time employment and 
income,255 (iii) ethnicity and culture,256 and (iv) a lack of a “stake in 
conformity” wherein individuals who have less to lose and are not in 
danger of losing a job, a marriage, or a stable home, are less motivated 
to conform to the expectations of intervention programs.257 Whether 
although the concepts of matching offender-type to treatment-type, as well as increas-
ing cultural appropriateness, have shown promising results. Id. Katreena L. Scott & 
Vicky Lishak, Intervention for Maltreating Fathers: Statistically and Clinically Signifi-
cant Change, 36 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 9 (2012) (discussing a study of 98 fathers 
who had neglected or abused their children or who had exposed their children to 
domestic violence in the Caring Dads (CDSC) batterers’ intervention program in 
Ontario, Canada, to determine the efficacy of community-based group-treatment for 
this population). The amount of change from pre-intervention to post-intervention 
was analyzed for statistical significance; although results from this study are encourag-
ing in that they suggest the possibility of effective treatment. Id. Nevertheless, find-
ings need to be interpreted in light of the fact that data obtained came from the fa-
thers’ own unsubstantiated reports. Id. Gabrielle Davis, Custody Evaluators’ Beliefs 
About Domestic Violence, BATTERED WOMEN’S JUST. PROJECT (2011) (reviewing me-
ta-analysis of 22 studies on the effectiveness of BIP treatment for adult male domestic 
violence perpetrators; authors note a high level of variability in the quality and validi-
ty of studies in this area of research, as well as an overall trend of small effect sizes in 
studies that have been conducted).
253. See, e.g., Babcock et al., supra note 252; Eckhardt et al., supra note 252; Feder & Wil-
son, supra note 252.
254. LARRY BENNETT ET AL., PROGRAM COMPLETION, BEHAVIORAL CHANGE, AND RE-
ARREST FOR THE BATTERER INTERVENTION SYSTEM OF COOK COUNTY ILLINOIS:
FINAL REPORT TO THE ILLINOIS CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFORMATION AUTHORITY 3
(2005), http://www.icjia.state.il.us/assets/pdf/ResearchReports/CookCounty
DVInt.pdf.
255. Id. at 35–36.
256. Id. at 36 (demonstrating more effectiveness for Latinx individuals than for whites or 
African Americans).
257. LAWRENCE W. SHERMAN ET AL., POLICING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: EXPERIMENTS AND 
DILEMMAS (1992) (analyzing studies of the efficacy of mandatory arrest in cases of 
domestic violence, demonstrating that arrest does not necessarily reduce the incidence 
of domestic violence among unemployed individuals); JEFFREY FAGAN, THE 
CRIMINALIZATION OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: PROMISES AND LIMITS (1995), 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/crimdom.pdf; Richard A. Berk et al., The Deterrent Ef-
fect of Arrest in Incidents of Domestic Violence: A Bayesian Analysis of Four Field Exper-
iments, 57 AM. SOC. REV. 698 (1992) (Overview of six studies examining whether ar-
rests for domestic violence discourage future violence and/or protect victims). 
Although the majority of data support both of the hypotheses, two of the six do not 
support these conclusions, meaning that Bayesian Analysis was conducted only on 
studies confirming a given premise. Id.
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culturally-matched intervention programs provide increased efficiency is 
controversial and more research is needed.258
A partner abuse intervention program in Cook County, Illinois, 
has demonstrated promising results.259 There has been a 73.4 percent 
completion rate in the studied programs,260 and completion of the pro-
gram has contributed to a reduction in incidences of re-arrest by 63 per-
258. See, e.g., Samuel R. Aymer, A Case for Including the “Lived Experience” of African 
American Men in Batterers’ Treatment, 15 J. AFR.-AM. STUD. 352 (2011) (reviewing 
literature on the cultural experiences that shape the beliefs and attitudes of African 
American men regarding domestic violence, how culturally-promoted chauvinistic at-
titudes contribute to perpetration of domestic violence, and how consideration of 
these societal influences should be incorporated into treatment and intervention for 
African American male batterers). Evidence of race-related stress exists to substantiate 
the idea that sociocultural influences from African American culture may impact the 
likelihood of intimate partner violence. Id. Congruent with Williams, infra, the 
study’s author notes that more studies are needed to better understand and address 
the needs of this particular population. Id. José Rubén Parra-Cardona et al., “En el 
Grupo Tomas Conciencia (In Group You Become Aware)”: Latino Immigrants’ Satisfac-
tion With a Culturally Informed Intervention for Men Who Batter, 19 VIOLENCE 
AGAINST WOMEN 107 (2013) (reviewing a qualitative study of interviews of 21 Lati-
no adult males who participated in batterer intervention programs designed to be cul-
turally informed). Findings are limited by the fact that information gathered from 
batterers’ self-reports was not corroborated, and that the study’s small sample size 
prevents generalizability of conclusions to greater populations. Id. Bernadine Waller, 
Broken Fixes: A Systematic Analysis of the Effectiveness of Modern and Postmodern Inter-
ventions Utilized to Decrease IPV Perpetration Among Black Males Remanded to Treat-
ment, 27 AGGRESSION & VIOLENT BEHAV. 42 (2016) (exploring findings from a sys-
tematic review of studies including African American male offenders’ recidivism and 
attrition rates). Although many current interventions have enormous benefit, many 
are also disproportionately ineffective for African American individuals as a result of a 
failure to properly accommodate considerations related to ethnic and racial sociocul-
tural influence. Id. Oliver J. Williams, Ethnically Sensitive Practice to Enhance Treat-
ment Participation of African American Men Who Batter, 73 FAMILIES IN SOC’Y 588 
(1992) (examining whether ethnically sensitive approaches to standard BIPs have an 
effect on the success of those interventions for African American males). As the au-
thor notes, literature in this area is lacking, but this provides a useful qualitative over-
view and direction for future research. Id. But see Edward W. Gondolf, Outcomes of 
Case Management for African-American Men in Batterer Counseling, 23 J. FAM.
VIOLENCE 173 (2008) (examining a quasi-experimental evaluation of an archival 
sample of 482 cases of African American adult males who had previously been en-
rolled in BIPs to determine whether the implementation of case management had an 
effect on outcomes of intervention). Although findings suggest that case management 
does not lead to a significant improvement on the effects of intervention, multivariate 
analysis was unable to control for the characteristics of offenders in either the case-
management or no-case-management conditions. Id.
259. BENNETT ET AL., supra note 254, at 4.
260. Id.
2019] D O M E S T I C  VI O L E N C E  I N  C H I L D  C U S T O D Y C A S E S 53
cent.261 Issues related to having a “stake in conformity” were the most 
important correlates of success in the intervention programs.262
F. An Evidence-Based Analysis of Fathers’ Rights Group Claims 
Relating to Domestic Violence and Custody Issues
The claim by fathers’ rights groups that courts favor mothers over 
fathers is based on studies that have found “gender parity” in anony-
mous surveys wherein women report committing violence against their 
partners at the same rate that men report committing violence against 
their partners.263 Thus, they reason that while only 50 percent of perpe-
trators are male, 77 percent of those who are arrested are male.264 From 
this, they claim that there is a gender bias against men.265 There is in-
deed a large scientific literature demonstrating “gender parity” including 
meta-analyses.266 The studies on which these meta-analyses and other 
literature reviews showing “gender parity” use questionnaires wherein 
women’s answers did not differ from men’s answers, apparently because 
those questions reflected situational couple violence.267 Many researchers 
have made the distinction between situational couple violence and coer-
cive abuse, finding that men are more likely to perpetrate violence in-
volving coercive abuse.268 As a counter-argument to the evidence of a 
coercive abuse distinction, fathers’ rights groups point to studies that 
asked about motivation for situational couple violence, and women as 
well as men say that they commit violence to try to get their partners to 
do something (i.e., coerce their partners).269 However, trying to get 
261. Id. at 51–52.
262. Berk et al., supra note 257; Sherman et al., supra note 257; Fagan, supra note 257.
263. See, e.g., STOP ABUSIVE AND VIOLENT ENVIRONMENTS, PREDOMINANT AGGRESSOR 
POLICIES: LEAVING THE ABUSER UNACCOUNTABLE? 6 (2013) [hereinafter PREDOMI
NANT AGGRESSOR POLICIES]. http://www.saveservices.org/pdf/SAVE-
Predominant_Aggressor.pdf.
264. MATTHEW R. DUROSE ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FAMILY VIOLENCE STATISTICS
2 (2005), http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/fvs.pdf.
265. PREDOMINANT AGGRESSOR POLICIES, supra note 263.
266. John Archer, Sex Differences in Aggression Between Heterosexual Partners: A Meta-
Analytic Review, 126 PSYCHOL. BULL. 651 (2000).
267. See generally Michael P. Johnson et al., Intimate Terrorism and Situational Couple Vio-
lence in General Surveys: Ex-Spouses Required, 20 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 186 
(2014).
268. See, e.g., Suzanne Swan, et al., A Review of Research on Women’s Use of Violence with 
Male Intimate Partners, 23 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 301 (2008).
269. Murray A. Straus, Dominance and Symmetry in Partner Violence by Male and Female 
University Students in 32 Nations, 30 CHILD. & YOUTH SERV. REV. 252, 254 (2007).
54 michigan  jo urn al  o f  g ender & la w [Vol. 26:1
partners to do something is not the same as the type of constant surveil-
lance and threats described as coercive abuse by victims of domestic vio-
lence.270 Even Murray A. Straus, a “gender parity” advocate, admitted 
that “the adverse effects of being a victim of domestic violence are much 
greater for women than for men” with greater injuries and economic 
vulnerabilities;271 that women have more reasons to be afraid;272 that cul-
tural norms sanctioning violence against women must be changed;273
and that because of women’s greater injuries and legitimate fear, police 
and hospital statistics reflect greater levels of abuse of women by men.274
Because of these factors, even if there were “gender parity” in initi-
ating violence against intimate partners, greater levels of abuse of wom-
en by men would rise to the level of violating the law. Furthermore, re-
cently-developed questionnaires have found differences in levels of 
violence perpetrated by men versus women, indicating that the ques-
tionnaires which suggested “gender parity” were not well-designed and 
missed critical ways in which violence is gendered.275 It is also notewor-
thy that the concept of “gender parity” focuses only on measuring the 
amount of abuse that men and women commit, and does not address 
whether family law courts apply the same standards to women as to 
men. Nevertheless, fathers’ rights groups allege that courts favor women 
over men in divorce and parentage cases without any valid empirical 
support, while a careful review of actual court cases (rather than the 
questionable calculations suggested by the fathers’ rights group analyses) 
demonstrate that courts are actually biased against women.276 Research 
found that raising abuse claims worked against women; that fathers were 
270. Kimberly A. Crossman & Jennifer L. Hardesty, Placing Coercive Control at the Center. 
What Are the Processes of Coercive Control and What Makes Control Coercive?, 8
PSYCHOL. VIOLENCE 196 (2018).
271. Murray A. Straus, Thirty Years of Denying the Evidence on Gender Symmetry in Partner 
Violence: Implications for Prevention and Treatment, 1 PARTNER ABUSE 332, 336 
(2010).
272. Id. at 347.
273. Id. at 348.
274. Id. at 347.
275. See Sherry Hamby, Self-Report Measures That Do Not Produce Gender Parity in Inti-
mate Partner Violence: A Multi-Study Investigation, 5 PSYCHOL. VIOLENCE (2014).
Examination of wording of items on behavioral checklists and self-report measures 
found that earlier-established methods tend to be worded in such a way that they fail 
to adequately take into account the high occurrence of false-positives that produce 
asymmetrical reflections of victimization scores based on gender. Id. By contrast, 
wording that reduces false positives (e.g., qualifiers like “not including horseplay or 
joking around”, “when my partner was angry”, or “not joking”) provides more accu-
rate results and gender parity in measurement. Id.
276. Meier & Dickson, supra note 2, at 228–31.
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more likely to win when abuse claims were raised than when no abuse 
claims were raised because abuse claims were seen as attempts by moth-
ers to “alienate” fathers from children. Claims of “alienation” trumped 
claims of abuse even when courts accepted the evidence of abuse and
were much more likely to be successful when raised by fathers than 
when raised by mothers (demonstrating a gender bias in favor of fa-
thers).277
The next problematic claim of the fathers’ rights groups is that 
mothers routinely falsely allege domestic violence or child abuse. They 
have gone so far as to claim that, “In about 70 [percent] of cases, the al-
legation is deemed to be unnecessary or false.”278 They often base claims 
like this on studies like the one conducted by experts Janet R. Johnston, 
Soyoung Lee, Nancy W. Olesen, and Marjorie G. Walters in 2005,
which looked at rates in which claims could be substantiated from court 
records.279 The unjustified inference is that 100 percent of all cases that 
could not be substantiated from court records alone were false, and not 
just false, but rather “deemed” to be false (a claim the authors never 
made).280 These unsubstantiated cases were never deemed to be false.281
A comparable methodology on the opposite side of this debate is to look 
at conviction rates for false allegations, cases where allegations were 
proven to be false. One such study from the United Kingdom found six 
convictions for false allegations out of 111,891 cases where there were 
allegations of domestic violence, or a false allegation rate of 0.005 per-
cent.282 Neither of these methods of estimating frequencies of false alle-
gations is a good estimate of the prevalence of false allegations in the 
population.283
277. Id.
278. INCENTIVES TO MAKE FALSE ALLEGATIONS, supra note 14, at 1.
279. Janet R. Johnston et al., Allegations and Substantiations of Abuse in Custody-Disputing 
Families, 43 FAM. CT. REV. 283–94 (2005).
280. Id.
281. Id. at 284–85. “Child protection workers substantiated 27 [percent] of allegations 
against fathers, suspected another 27 [percent], believed that 1.3 [percent] were false, 
and the remainder unfounded.” Id. The authors made a clear distinction here be-
tween the 73 percent of allegations that were unsubstantiated and the 1.3 percent
that were deemed to be false. Id. For the fathers’ rights groups to ignore this differ-
ence and claim that all 73 percent of allegations were false is not intellectually honest.
282. Alison Levitt, Charging Perverting the Course of Justice and Wasting Police Time in 
Cases Involving Allegedly False Rape and Domestic Violence Allegations, CROWN 
PROSECUTION SERVICE EQUALITY AND DIVERSITY UNIT 3 (2013).
283. See id. One method ignores all allegations that could not be proven true using unrea-
sonably difficult criteria and the other ignores all allegations that could not be proven 
false using unreasonably difficult criteria.
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The actual methodology used by Johnson et al. in Allegations and 
Substantiations of Abuse in Custody-Disputing Families was to have three
clinical psychologists and three clinical social workers review court doc-
uments from the divorce proceedings of highly conflicted families.284
These trained raters looked for evidence of domestic violence in court 
documents such as child protective service reports, self-admissions, eye-
witness reports taking into account the credibility of the witnesses, ex-
pert testimony, medical records, police reports, arrests, plea bargains, 
and criminal convictions.285 The researchers then looked at whether 
these ratings lined up with allegations.286 They found that there were al-
legations against the father in 55 percent of cases, and 41 percent of 
those cases were substantiated.287 By contrast, there were allegations 
against the mother in 30 percent of cases, and 15 percent of those cases 
were substantiated. The actual levels of substantiation are of secondary 
interest here because, given the private contexts in which much domes-
tic violence is perpetrated, it is not surprising that many cases could not 
be substantiated. The question was whether allegations were well-
founded.288 Not every case of actual abuse would have child protective 
service reports, self-admissions, and eyewitness reports taking into ac-
count the credibility of the witnesses, expert testimony, medical records,
police reports, arrests, plea bargains, or criminal convictions. For fathers’
rights groups to then automatically claim that 100 percent of those un-
substantiated cases are false is intellectually dishonest.
The more interesting result from the Johnson et al. study is that, 
contrary to the claims of the fathers’ rights groups, not only were there 
more allegations against fathers than against mothers, but the allegations 
against fathers were substantiated at a higher rate than the allegations 
against mothers.289 These differences were statistically significant.290 Fur-
thermore, the motivations that the fathers’ rights groups ascribe to 
women (i.e., that it is all part of a “gamesmanship of divorce,” to gain 
an economic advantage in the divorce or parentage case, or to get custo-
dy) are all based upon anecdotes and arguments that incentives are in 
284. Johnston et al., supra note 279, at 286.
285. Id. at 287.
286. Id.
287. Id. at 288–89.
288. Id. at 283.
289. Id. at 288–89.
290. Id. at 289.
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place for women to do so.291 They offer no proof that women actually 
do so.292
The fathers’ rights group claim that is most directly relevant to the 
policy prescriptions that we advocate in this Article, however, involves 
research on the well-being of children under joint versus sole custody. 
There have been many studies demonstrating that children are often 
better off in joint custody situations (defined in most of these studies as 
spending at least 25 percent of the parenting time with each parent).293
But these studies—even if they looked at the degree of conflict in the 
marriage or in the divorce, and even if they looked at violence in the re-
lationship—have not looked at the degree of abusive, coercive control in 
the relationship.294 One study published in 2015 by Swedish experts
Malin Bergström, Emma Fransson, Bitte Modin, Marie Berlin, Per A.
Gustafsson, and Anders Hjern, used a large national survey of children 
in Sweden to investigate the well-being of children in joint physical cus-
tody (“approximately equal”) compared to children living only or most-
ly with one parent and to children in nuclear families.295 They found 
that children in joint physical custody were better off than children liv-
ing only or mostly with one parent (with children in intact nuclear 
families best off).296 A key limitation with this study is that it did not 
separate out many of the variables that previous research indicated af-
fects both the viability of joint physical custody and outcomes for chil-
dren.297 They did not control for parents’ mental health, addictions, vio-
lence, or abuse.298 This study did look at socio-economic status, but the 
study measured it by asking the children to rate their satisfaction with 
291. INCENTIVES TO MAKE FALSE ALLEGATIONS, supra note 14, at 2.
292. Id.
293. Robert Bauserman, Child Adjustment in Joint-Custory Versus Sole-Custody Arrange-
ments: A Meta-Analytic Review, 16 J. FAM. PSYCHOL. 91 (2002).
294. Linda Nielsen, Re-Examining the Research on Parental Conflict, Coparenting, and Cus-
tody Arrangements, 23 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y, & L. 211, 212 (2017).
295. Malin Bergström et al., Fifty Moves a Year: Is There an Association between Joint Physi-
cal Custody and Psychosomatic Problems in Children?, 69 J. EPIDEMIOLOGY & CMTY.
HEALTH 769 (2015) (correlational study of survey results). Primary problems with 
this study include the possibility of reverse causation and third variables; of note, this 
study had an extremely large sample size (N = 147,839), increasing confidence in re-
sults. Id.
296. Id.
297. Family Law Reform Conference Gathers Leading Researchers and Practitioners,
NATIONAL PARENTS ORGANIZATION (Nov. 19, 2014), 
https://nationalparentsorganization.org/component/content/article/16-latest-news/
22067-family-law-reform-conference-gathers-leading-researchers-and-practitioners
(last visited Dec. 29, 2018).
298. See Bergström et al., supra note 295.
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their material resources, rather than using objective measures of socio-
economic status.299 Nevertheless, even using this measure to control for 
socio-economic status caused a large reduction in the effect of joint 
physical custody on positive outcomes for children.300
Notwithstanding the weaknesses in this study, fathers’ rights 
groups, such as the National Parents Organization, have pointed to 
these results to argue that courts should place children in joint physical 
custody.301 Meta-analyses of children’s well-being in joint versus sole 
custody situations are consistent with the view that children who come 
from families where joint custody is a viable option, taking into account 
all relevant factors, are better off, but the inference that courts should, 
therefore, place children with abusive parents without considering the 
abuse is not justified. Joint custody is only likely to be a viable option 
when there has not been coercive control in the relationship. Bergström 
et al. and the other studies that have looked at this topic have failed to 
look at or control for levels of coercive control. The benefits of joint 
custody have not been supported and have been shown to be contra-
indicated in these very different types of situations.302 For example, a 
large-scale study of joint physical custody (defined as 35 percent or 
more nights with each parent) versus sole physical custody arrangements 
in Australia found that children did less well in joint than in sole custo-
dy situations when mothers “expressed safety concerns.”303
A number of studies have looked at the degree of “conflict” in the 
marriage or post-divorce and how it affects the well-being of children in 
joint legal custody versus sole legal custody situations.304 Note that “con-
flict” cannot serve as a proxy for either situational couple violence or co-
ercive abuse, since the studies failed to distinguish between them. These 
studies have generally found that even controlling for such conflict, 
children are still better off in joint custody situations.305 Sometimes situ-
ational conflict can be reduced post-divorce after decisions are laid out 
299. Id. at 769.
300. Id.
301. NATIONAL PARENTS ORGANIZATION, supra note 297.
302. Linda Nielsen, Shared Physical Custody: Summary of 40 Studies on Outcomes for Chil-
dren, 55 J. DIVORCE & REMARRIAGE 613, 623 (2014).
303. JUDY CASHMORE ET AL., SOCIAL POLICY RESEARCH CENTER, SHARED CARE 
PARENTING ARRANGEMENTS SINCE THE 2006 FAMILY LAW REFORMS 52 (2010), 
https://www.sprc.unsw.edu.au/media/SPRCFile/2_AG_Shared_Care.pdf.
304. Marjorie Linder Gunnoe & Sanford L. Braver, The Effects of Joint Legal Custody on 
Mothers, Fathers, and Children Controlling for Factors that Predispose a Sole Maternal 
Versus Joint Legal Award, 25 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 25 (2001); Bauserman, supra note 
293.
305. Gunnoe & Braver, supra note 304, at 25; Bauserman, supra note 293, at 91.
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in the parenting decree and the parents have fewer issues to disagree 
over, such that children can benefit from joint legal custody arrange-
ments.306 These studies, however, did not seek to identify situational 
couple violence or coercive abuse situations, let alone to control for 
them.307 Furthermore, the studies that have tried to control for conflict 
shed no light on the benefits of joint versus sole legal custody in divorc-
es that involve coercive control, because victims of coercive control are 
often afraid to report conflict when doing so could infuriate the abusive 
intimate partner and lead to heightened abuse.308
Even situational couple violence can harm children. The interac-
tions necessary to coordinate joint custody create new, additional in-
stances where violence can occur, and individuals who resort to violence 
to resolve conflicts are more likely to be deficient or abusive parents and 
poor role models.309 In situations involving coercive abuse as we have 
defined it earlier,310 there is no way to make joint legal custody (joint 
decision-making) or joint physical custody (equal or roughly equal par-
enting time) tenable, because abusers will use continuing interactions to 
attempt to undermine the other parent and to continue the coercive 
abuse.311
In 2008 Peter G. Jaffe, Janet R. Johnston, Claire V. Crooks, and 
Nicholas Bala published a review of the scientific literature on the dif-
ferent types of domestic violence and situations in which there has been 
domestic violence and their risks.312 They then proposed different par-
enting arrangements that might be possible under these different situa-
tions.313 Per Jaffe et al., joint legal and joint physical custody is only ap-
propriate in a situation where there has been very low levels of violence, 
the violence was situational and is now in the past, the traumas have 
been resolved, and there has been a substantial history of successful co-
parenting.314 They describe another possible parenting arrangement 
306. Peter G. Jaffe et al., Custody Disputes Involving Allegations of Domestic Violence: To-
ward a Differentiated Approach to Parenting Plans, 46 FAM. CT. REV. 502, 511 (2008)
[hereinafter Jaffe et al., Custody Disputes].
307. Kelly & Johnson, supra note 33.
308. See Smith & Coukos, supra note 209.
309. Jaffe et al., Custody Disputes, supra note 306, at 502 (reviewing the most pertinent 
research on custody issues in cases involving domestic violence, paying particular at-
tention to the different subtypes of domestic violence and how each subtype affects 
custody issues).
310. See supra notes 39, 40 and accompanying text.
311. Jaffe et al., Custody Disputes, supra note 306.
312. Jaffe et al., Common Misconceptions, supra note 42.
313. Id.
314. See id. at 511 tbl.2.
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called “parallel parenting” that can be appropriate for situational couple 
violence cases (as contrasted with coercive abuse cases) where the domes-
tic violence was moderate to low on potency.315
Jaffe et al. provide numerous details on when parallel parenting is 
appropriate and how it should be structured to promote the best inter-
ests of the child and protect the parent who is a survivor of domestic vi-
olence.316 Under a parallel parenting arrangement, the parenting plan is 
drawn up by dividing decision-making responsibilities between the par-
ents, with different decision-making issues allocated to each parent. The 
basic idea is that the parenting plan should provide for clear boundaries 
and separation between the parents, and a time-sharing schedule that 
requires minimal communication between the parents and seeks to 
avoid direct parent-parent contact, but still provide stability and conti-
nuity in the child’s life.317 The parallel parenting can provide joint or 
sole legal and physical custody (if joint, the time-share schedule should 
meet all of the above described criteria).318 Each parent’s access to the 
child would include unsupervised day or overnight visits, with a range of 
time sharing between the parents as specified by the court.319 The access 
would also be structured for natural transition times and to minimize
disruption to the child’s school, social, and extra-curricular activities.320
The court order for access should explicitly detail the times, dates, places 
of exchange, holidays, etc., so that after the plan is drawn up, little 
communication is required and the parents can avoid as much direct
face-to-face contact as possible.321 The court order on parenting time 
would require adherence to the details of the order and not require flex-
ibility or compromise regarding exchanges of the children.322 The proto-
cols would be in place to avoid conflict and to prohibit threats of any 
violence and sabotage between parents. Permanent restraining orders 
would remain in place, including restraints from taking the child out of 
the area without the other parent’s consent, neutral places of exchange 
that are safe and comfortable for the child (such as a neutral relative, vis-
iting center, school, or library) and structured telephone access to the 
child.323 The court order on parenting time would also include rules for 
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communicating emergency and other necessary information between 
the parents using technology that enables the communications to be 
monitored by the court.324 Parents would not be allowed to communi-
cate through the child.325 Finally, the parenting order would include a 
procedure (such as use of a parenting coordinator) for resolving any new 
issues not addressed in the parenting order.326
The authors agree with all of these aspects of parallel parenting as 
described by Jaffe et al., but have a concern with their statement that 
parallel parenting emphasizes consistent, safe child-care practices within 
separate homes, rather than common practices. Without sufficient 
common practices within the two separate homes, the child’s life may 
become so inconsistent between two households that the child could be 
harmed by this lack of consistency. We thus recommend that the goal of 
creating adequate common practices also be emphasized under parallel 
parenting. To reflect this goal, we recommend that the term “parallel 
parenting” be revised to “structured independent parenting time” to 
emphasize that the parenting order on parenting time will include ade-
quate details and structure to promote common practices sufficient to 
safeguard the child’s emotional and physical well-being. Research has 
demonstrated that the absence of a consistent bedtime routine can nega-
tively impact child development and behavior.327 Similarly, a lack of 
uniformity in rules and explanations across settings has also shown to be 
consistent with the development of child behavioral problems.328
In other situations, Jaffe et al. argue that the best evidence to date 
on the well-being of children in cases involving domestic violence is sole 
legal and primary physical custody to the non-violent parent.329 Jaffe et 
al. also addressed how to respond to cases involving higher levels of 
situational couple violence, and concluded that in such cases, supervised 
exchange may be sufficient to reduce the likelihood of further abuse 
during the exchange of the child.330 Per Jaffe et al., there might be some 




327. Jodi A. Mindell et al., Developmental Aspects of Sleep Hygiene: Findings from the 2004 
National Sleep Foundation Sleep in America Poll, 10 SLEEP MEDICINE 771, 771–78
(2009); see also Ronald E. Dahl & Daniel S. Lewin, Pathways to Adolescent Health 
Sleep Regulation and Behavior, 31 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH 175, 175–81 (2002).
328. Alejandra Ros Pilarz & Heather D. Hill, Unstable and Multiple Child Care Arrange-
ments and Young Children’s Behavior, 29 EARLY CHILD. RES. Q. 471, 471–82 (2015).
329. Jaffe et al., Common Misconceptions, supra note 42, at 61–62.
330. Id. at 514.
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might be sufficient to protect the child, such as when there has been 
treatment for substance abuse or acute mental illness and the child 
wants contact or will gain from the parent’s continued involvement.331
In most cases where there has been coercive abuse, however, contact 
between the parents or between the abusive parent and the child should 
be suspended, until the causes for the coercive abuse have been 
addressed.332
To distinguish between situational couple violence and coercive 
abuse, it is best to look beyond singular violent episodes, as both types 
of domestic violence involve violent episodes.333 In coercive abuse, 
abusers typically blame the victim for the violence as well as the injuries, 
hospital or emergency room visits, or 9-1-1 calls; or they use jealousy to 
justify what happened.334 Coercive abuse often involves intimidation, 
such as looks, actions, or gestures to make the victim afraid, smashing 
things or destroying property to send a signal to the victim, abusing pets 
to send a signal to the victim, or displaying weapons to send a signal to 
the victim.335 Coercive abuse often involves threats: making or carrying 
out threats to do something or to hurt the victim, threats to commit 
suicide, threats to get the victim to drop charges, or threats to get the 
victim to do illegal things.336 There is also often emotional abuse,such as 
put-downs or name-calling, humiliating the victim (especially in 
public), use of insults to make the victim feel bad about herself or 
himself, mind games, and guilt trips for common behaviors.337 Coercive 
abusers also often strive to isolate the victim, limit their access and 
involvement in the outside world, control what they do, who they see or 
talk to, what they read, and where they go.338 They often treat victims as 
servants.339 The victim of coercive abuse is often afraid of the abuser.340
There is often financial abuse, such as not allowing the victim to work 
outside the home.341 Bank accounts or other financial assets may only be 
in the abuser’s name, such that the victim does not have any access to 
331. Id.
332. Id. at 515.
333. Stark, Commentary on Johnson, supra note 35 (reviewing literature on the distinctions 
between different types of domestic violence and how domestic violence should not 
be viewed as simply a combination of discrete acts, but rather as a pattern of abuse).
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money.342 Victims are sometimes kept ignorant of family income and 
denied access to that family income.343 If the victim has some income of 
her own, the abuser may take it.344 If the victim needs money, she may 
be required to ask for it, or she might be given an allowance.345
Abusers in coercive abuse cases also often abuse the judicial 
system.346 They might threaten to report the victim to child protective 
services or other government agencies when the supposed infraction 
would not have normally led to such an action.347 They might threaten 
to use the court system to get custody and take the children, not because 
they are interested in parenting, but rather to keep the victim in the 
relationship.348 They will often use court proceedings over parenting 
time and decision-making, not to look out for the welfare of their 
children, but rather to further abuse or punish the other parent, or to 
induce their ex-spouse/partner to return to the relationship.349 They 
might file court petitions that are nominally in the children’s interest,
but are better explained as an attempt to coerce the former spouse.350
They might request court motions that perpetuate contact with the 
mother, allow them to monitor the mother’s actions, and allow them to 
exert control over the mother.351 They may likewise use court-ordered 
joint decision-making as leverage to get the victim to act as the abuser 
wishes or threaten to bring legal action when the abuser is not consulted 
about commonplace parenting issues.352 They may withhold consent for 
the child to participate in activities such as extracurricular school 
activities or procedures, such as counseling or medical procedures, until 
the victim concedes to the abuser’s demands.353 They may disrupt court-
ordered visitation schedules as a way to continue coercion or abuse.354





346. Smith & Coukos, supra note 209 (reviewing the literature on this phenomenon in-
cluding government reports and reports from the American Psychological Associa-
tion).
347. PENCE & PAYMAR, supra note 40, at 3.
348. Smith & Coukos, supra note 209, at 38.
349. Id.
350. Id.
351. Jaffe et al., Custody Disputes, supra note 306, at 503.
352. Smith & Coukos, supra note 209, at 38.
353. Jaffe et al., Custody Disputes, supra note 306, at 503.
354. Smith & Coukos, supra note 209, at 38.
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disobey court orders.355 They are often controlling and coercive in their 
direct interactions with children, such as requiring children to act in 
ways that are not associated with common good parenting practices.356
Finally, coercive abuse often correlates with other behaviors, such as 
poor decision-making for him or herself and the children, drug and 
alcohol abuse, criminal behavior, abuse of children, failure to comply 
with court orders, and general disregard for the law.357 Thus, coercive 
abuse can be differentiated from situational couple violence when one 
looks at the entire pattern of the relationship and other personal traits.
II. An Examination of the Extent That Identified 
Best Practices Are Required by Law
As detailed in Section I, in order to properly take domestic violence 
into account in custody cases, professionals who work on custody cases 
(family law attorneys, judges, guardians ad litem, child representatives, 
and other custody evaluators) should be required to receive special train-
ing on the nature and dynamics of domestic violence, preferably as pro-
vided in the Wisconsin Guide358 or other evidenced-based resources.359
In addition to this mandatory training, best practices would also include 
requiring that guardians ad litem, child representatives, and other custo-
dy evaluators properly screen for domestic violence and child abuse and 
investigate any allegations of domestic violence or child abuse, per evi-
dence-based training. Finally, guardians ad litem, child representatives, 
and other custody evaluators should be required to recommend one or 
more protective measures when there is evidence that children have 
been exposed to domestic violence or child abuse. The level of protec-
tion should be tailored to address past harm experienced and to help 
prevent the danger of future serious harms to the child or non-abusive 
parent.
355. Id.
356. PENCE & PAYMAR, supra note 40, at 3.
357. Conner, supra note 212, at 223, 227.
358. See GOVERNOR’S COUNCIL ON DOMESTIC ABUSE & END DOMESTIC ABUSE WIS.,
supra note 33.
359. This includes the counter-intuitive nature of domestic violence, its impact on survi-
vors, the danger of serious harm to children from exposure to domestic violence, how 
to properly screen for and investigate claims of domestic violence and child abuse, 
and many other aspects as detailed in Wisconsin’s Domestic Abuse Guidebook. See
GOVERNOR’S COUNCIL ON DOMESTIC ABUSE & END DOMESTIC ABUSE WIS., supra
note 33.
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Previous research found that when judges received Specialized 
Domestic Violence Training and recommendations for some of the Pro-
tective Measures from family law professionals, they were more likely to 
see the need for at least some of the Protective Measures and to order 
and enforce some Protective Measures (i.e., they were more likely to 
give mothers sole physical custody, but less likely to restrict fathers’ vis-
itation).360 This result demonstrates both the benefits of training and the 
need to further educate judges on why the remaining Protective 
Measures are so important.
This Section reviews the extent to which states have enacted legisla-
tion or supreme court rules that require Specialized Domestic Violence 
Training, Domestic Violence Screening and Investigation, and Protec-
tive Measures in child custody cases. It also identifies gaps among the 
states in mandating these evidence-based best practices.
A. To What Extent Do States Require Family Law Judges to 
Receive Training on Domestic Violence?
Based upon a review of state legislation and supreme court rules, 
we have found that only the District of Columbia361 and 11 states clearly 
require, without waiver, that family law judges receive domestic violence 
training: California,362 Connecticut,363 Kentucky,364 Nevada,365 New 
360. Morrill et.al, supra note 73, at 1097.
361. D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-1104(c) (Westlaw through Jan. 11, 2019) (“The chief judge, 
in consultation with the presiding judge of the Family Court, shall carry out an ongo-
ing program to provide training in family law and related matters for judges . . . and 
shall include in the program information and instruction regarding the follow-
ing: . . . (B) Family dynamics, including domestic violence . . . . (E) Recognizing the 
risk factors for child abuse.”); D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-1732A(f) (Westlaw through 
Jan. 11, 2019) (“The chief judge, in consultation with the presiding judge of the 
Family Court of the Superior Court, shall ensure that all magistrate judges of the 
Family Court receive training to enable them to fulfill their responsibilities, including 
specialized training in family law and related matters.”).
362. CAL. R. CT. 10.464(a) (“Each judge . . . who hears criminal, family, juvenile delin-
quency, juvenile dependency, or probate matters must participate in appropriate edu-
cation on domestic violence issues as part of his or her requirements and expectations 
under rule 10.462. Each judge or subordinate judicial officer whose primary assign-
ment is in one of these areas also must participate in a periodic update on domestic 
violence as part of these requirements and expectations.”).
363. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-38c(j) (Westlaw through Jan. 1, 2019) (“The 
Judicial Department shall establish an ongoing training program for judges . . . to 
inform them about the policies and procedures of sections 46b-1, 46b-15, 46b-38a to 
46b-38f, inclusive, and 54-1g, including, but not limited to, the function of the 
family violence intervention units and the use of restraining and protective orders. 
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Jersey,366 New Mexico,367 New York,368 Oklahoma,369 South Carolina,370
Tennessee,371 and West Virginia.372 Minnesota requires that domestic 
Such training program shall include an examination of the factors that contribute to a 
family being at risk for episodes of domestic violence within the family.”).
364. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 21A.170 (Westlaw through 2018 Reg. Sess.) (“The Supreme 
Court shall provide, at least once every two (2) years, in-service training programs for 
Circuit Judges, District Judges, and domestic relations and trial commissioners 
in: . . . (2) Dynamics of domestic violence, effects of domestic violence on adult and 
child victims, legal remedies for protection, lethality and risk issues, model protocols 
for addressing domestic violence, available community resources and victims services, 
and reporting requirements.”).
365. Admin. Office of the Courts, Judicial Education Overview, NEV. JUDICIARY,
https://nvcourts.gov/AOC/Programs_and_Services/Judicial_Education/Overview 
(last visited Feb. 14, 2019) (“Continuing judicial education on the causes, effects, 
and dynamics of domestic violence for all District Court judges, Justices of the Peace, 
Municipal Court Judges, and Domestic Relations Masters”); see also JUD. EDUC.
REQUIREMENTS: ST. OF NEV. APP. A, https://nvcourts.gov/AOC/Programs_and_
Services/Judicial_Education/Documents/Important_Documents/Judicial_
Education_Requirements/ (last updated Nov. 2018) (stating that “[a]ll District Court 
Judges, Justices of the Peace, Municipal Court Judges, and Domestic relations Mas-
ters” must have as part of required training “continuing judicial education on the
causes, effects, and dynamics of domestic violence”).
366. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-20b(1) to (2) (Westlaw through L.2018, c. 169 and J.R. 
No. 14) (“The Administrative Office of the Courts shall develop and approve a train-
ing course and a curriculum on the handling, investigation and response procedures 
concerning allegations of domestic violence . . . . The Administrative Director of the 
Courts shall be responsible for ensuring that all judges and judicial personnel attend 
initial training within 90 days of appointment or transfer and annual inservice train-
ing as described in this section.”).
367. N.M.R.A. 18-204G(2) (“Annual training for metropolitan, district and appellate 
court judges, domestic violence special commissioners and domestic relations hearing 
officers shall include appropriate training in understanding domestic violence, as de-
termined by the Judicial Continuing Education Committee.”).
368. N.Y. CT. R. § 17.4 (“Each judge or justice in a court that exercises criminal jurisdic-
tion, including town and village justices, each judge of the Family Court, and each 
justice of the Supreme Court who regularly handles matrimonial matters shall attend, 
every two years, a program approved by the Chief Administrator of the Courts ad-
dressing issues relating to domestic violence.”).
369. There is a statute in place requiring the Oklahoma Supreme Court to establish a rule 
that requires training that “includes” domestic violence training. OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 10A, § 1-8-101A (Westlaw through 2d Legis. Sess. of 58th Leg.) (“The Supreme 
Court is required to establish by rule, education and training requirements for judges, 
associate judges, special judges, and referees who have juvenile docket responsibility. 
Rules shall include, but not be limited to, education and training relating to juvenile 
law, child abuse and neglect, foster care and out-of-home placement, domestic vio-
lence, behavioral health treatment, and other similar topics.”). However, the Supreme 
Court rules regarding Mandatory Judicial Continuing Legal Education do not con-
tain any specific requirements regarding domestic violence training. OKLA.
M.C.L.E.R. 1.
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violence training be provided but does not state whether family court 
judges are required to attend such training, so it is not included on the 
list.373 Texas’ requirements for the training of judges on domestic 
violence are unclear in terms of whether a judge in a divorce or 
parentage child custody case would be included in the requirement.374
370. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-25-100 (Westlaw through 2018 Reg. Sess.) (“Magistrates, 
municipal court judges, family court judges, and circuit court judges shall receive 
continuing legal education on issues concerning domestic violence. The frequency 
and content of the continuing legal education is to be determined by the South Caro-
lina Court Administration at the direction of the Chief Justice of the South Carolina 
Supreme Court.”).
371. TENN. CODE ANN. § 38-12-107 (Westlaw through 2018 Reg. Sess.) (“All state and 
local court administrators, court clerks, and judges, with personnel who are likely to 
encounter situations involving domestic violence, shall adopt a policy regarding do-
mestic violence and provide initial and continuing education concerning the dynam-
ics of domestic violence, and the handling and response procedures concerning alle-
gations of domestic violence to all judges and court personnel who are likely to 
encounter allegations of domestic violence.”); TENN. CODE ANN. § 38-12-109 
(Westlaw through 2018 Reg. Sess.) (“The administrative office of the courts shall es-
tablish a policy regarding, and a continuing education curriculum concerning, do-
mestic violence and shall provide continuing education on domestic violence to all 
judges and court personnel throughout the state who are likely to encounter situa-
tions of domestic violence. The administrative office of the courts may adopt the pol-
icy and training curriculum developed by the domestic violence state coordinating 
council, and may revise the policy and training curriculum at its discretion.” § 38-12-
109).
372. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-27-1104 (Westlaw through 2018 1st Extraordinary Sess.) 
(“All circuit court judges may and magistrates and family courts [sic] shall receive a 
minimum of three hours training each year on domestic violence which shall include 
training on the psychology of domestic violence, the battered wife and child syn-
dromes, sexual abuse, courtroom treatment of victims, offenders and witnesses, avail-
able sanctions and treatment standards for offenders, and available shelter and sup-
port services for victims.”).
373. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 480.30 (Westlaw through 2018 Reg. Sess.) (“The Supreme 
Court’s judicial education program must include ongoing training for district court 
judges on child and adolescent sexual abuse, domestic abuse, harassment, stalking, 
and related civil and criminal court issues. The program must include the following: 
(1) information about the specific needs of victims; (2) education on the causes of 
sexual abuse and family violence; (3) education on culturally responsive approaches to 
serving victims; (4) education on the impacts of domestic abuse and domestic abuse 
allegations on children and the importance of considering these impacts when mak-
ing parenting time and child custody decisions under chapter 518; and (5) infor-
mation on alleged and substantiated reports of domestic abuse, including, but not 
limited to, Department of Human Services survey data.” § 480.30).
374. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 22.110 (2017 Reg. and 1st Called Sess. of 85th Leg.) 
(“The court of criminal appeals shall assure that judicial training related to the 
problems of family violence, sexual assault, trafficking of persons, and child abuse and 
neglect is provided.”). A judge is exempt from the training requirements if the judge 
“files an affidavit stating that the judge or judicial officer does not hear any cases 
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The training statutes in the District of Columbia,375 Minnesota,376
Texas,377 and West Virginia378 combine domestic violence training with 
required training related to forms of abuse. The state of Washington has 
tested pilot programs which contain mandatory domestic violence 
training.379 Both Georgia and Idaho allow for the creation of courts 
focused on domestic violence issues and provide for certain domestic 
violence training for the judges in those courts.380 While we did not 
engage in a multi-county search within any state for any county level 
mandatory domestic violence training, we did discover one in 
Georgia.381 We assume there may be other counties in other states that 
require domestic violence training for their family law judges.
Arizona is not included in the list of 11 states with mandatory 
training of family law judges on domestic violence because there is the 
possibility of waiving it, but this waiver is only in limited circumstances 
and temporary in nature, so this approach is much better than merely 
involving family violence, sexual assault, trafficking of persons, or child abuse and 
neglect.” § 22.110. It appears this training is intended for judges in criminal cases or 
in child abuse and neglect cases.
375. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-1104(c) (Westlaw through Jan. 11, 2019); D.C. CODE 
ANN. § 11-1732A(f) (Westlaw through Jan. 11, 2019).
376. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 480.30 (Westlaw through 2018 Reg. Sess.).
377. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 22.110 (2017 Reg. and 1st Called Sess. of 85th Leg.).
378. See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-27-1104 (Westlaw through 2018 1st Extraordinary 
Sess.).
379. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.12.804 (Westlaw through 2018 Reg. Sess.) (stating 
that the judges of the superior judicial districts with unified family court pilot pro-
grams shall require initial training and continuing training for judges in unified fami-
ly court regarding “childhood development . . . and mental illness”); N.Y. JUD. LAW
§ 212.2(n) (LexisNexis through 2019) (repealed 2018) (requiring “[t]raining about 
domestic violence” for judges hearing orders of protection in family court).
380. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-1409(a) (Westlaw through 2018 2d Reg. Sess. of 64th Leg.) 
(stating that in Idaho “the district court in each county may establish a domestic vio-
lence court,” and if such a court is created, a “committee shall recommend policies 
and procedures for domestic violence courts addressing eligibility, identification and 
screening, assessment, treatment and treatment providers, case management and su-
pervision, judicial monitoring, supervision of progress and evaluation. The commit-
tee shall also solicit specific domestic violence court plans from each judicial district, 
recommend funding priorities for each judicial district and provide training to ensure 
the effective operation of domestic violence courts.” § 32-1409(a).); GA. COMM’N ON 
FAMILY VIOLENCE, GEORGIA DOMESTIC VIOLENCE COURTS BEST PRACTICES (2017).
381. SUPER. CT. FULTON CTY. FAM. DIV. R. 1000-3 (“Each Judicial Officer shall receive 
twenty (20) hours of training, including four (4) hours of domestic violence train-
ing.”).
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“recommending” domestic violence training for judges handling child 
custody cases.382
The following five states recommend that judges obtain training on 
domestic violence but do not absolutely require it: Alabama,383
Georgia,384 Idaho,385 Illinois,386 and Maryland.387 For example, the 
382. Under Arizona law, training of judges on domestic violence is required as part of 
New Judge Orientation and can only be waived under limited circumstances. ARIZ.
CODE OF JUD. ADMIN. § 1-302(F)(2) (“Upon request, the chief justice, the chief 
judge, the presiding judge of the superior court in each county, or their designees 
may grant exemptions to judges and employees of their court for temporary circum-
stances, including but not limited to: (a) Medical or other physical conditions pre-
venting active participation in educational programs; (b) Extended, approved leave of 
absence; (c) Military leave; (d) Extended jury duty; (e) Temporary medical waivers 
for defensive tactics courses, in accordance with ACJA § 6-107.”). See ARIZ. SUP. CT.,
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE TRAINING FOR JUDGES, (2007), http://azmag.gov/Portals/0/
Documents/pdf/cms.resource/RDVC_2007_08-16_DV-Training-for-Judges71064.
pdf?ver=2007-08-16-105700-000.
383. ALA. R. MANDATORY JUD. EDUC. I.1, II.2, http://judicial.alabama.gov/docs/library/
rules/ManJEd.pdf (providing that judicial training credits will be given for programs 
that address a variety of topics and domestic violence is an approved topic).
384. GA. COMM’N ON FAM. VIOLENCE, supra note 380.
385. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-1409(1) to (2) (West through 2018 2d Reg. Sess. of 64th 
Leg.) (stating that each county can establish a “domestic violence court” and that 
“[t]he committee shall also solicit specific domestic violence court plans from each 
judicial district, recommend funding priorities for each judicial district and provide 
training to ensure the effective operation of domestic violence courts”); IDAHO 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CTS., IDAHO DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CT. POLICIES &
GUIDELINES, ATTACHMENT A https://isc.idaho.gov/dv_courts/DV_Court_Policies_
and_Guidelines_revised_4.15.pdf (last updated April 2015) (“It is critical that a 
judge selected to serve on a domestic violence court be highly interested in taking on 
the job and willing to be educated on the complex issues surrounding domestic vio-
lence.”).
386. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 908(c) (“Judges who, by specific assignment or otherwise, may be 
called upon to hear child custody or allocation of parental responsibilities cases 
should participate in judicial education opportunities available on these topics, such 
as attending those sessions or portions of the Education Conference, presented bi-
annually at the direction of the Supreme Court, which address the topics described in 
paragraph (a) of this rule. Judges may also elect to participate in any other Judicial 
Conference Judicial Education Seminars addressing these topics, participate in other 
judicial education programs approved for the award of continuing judicial education 
credit by the Supreme Court, complete individual training through the Internet, 
computer training programs, video presentations, or other relevant programs. ILL.
SUP. CT. R. 908(c). The Chief Judges of the judicial circuits should make reasonable 
efforts to ensure that judges have the opportunity to attend programs approved for 
the award of continuing judicial education credit by the Supreme Court which ad-
dress the topics and issues described in paragraph (a) [allocation of child custody and 
parental responsibility] of this rule.” ILL. SUP. CT. R. 908(c).).
387. IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND: ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER ON 
CONTINUING EDUCATION OF JUDGES, MAGISTRATES, AND COMMISSIONERS (2016), 
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Illinois Supreme Court Rules state that judges hearing child custody or 
allocation of parental responsibilities cases “should” participate in 
judicial education opportunities on the topics of domestic violence 
issues and child sexual abuse issues, but does not require that such 
training sessions be provided and attended.388 Some states require 
judicial continuing education without specifying whether it includes 
domestic violence.389
The results of this research, with only 11 states clearly requiring 
family law judges to receive training on domestic violence without waiv-
er, reflect a profound failure to apply evidence-based best practices to 
achieve the goal of adequately taking domestic violence into account in 
child custody cases. Requiring such training is a major part of the law 
reform recommended in Section III.
B. To What Extent Do States Require Guardians ad litem,
Child Representatives, or Other Custody Evaluators to Receive Training on 
Domestic Violence and to Screen for Domestic Violence in Their 
Child Custody Cases?
Based primarily upon a review of the legislation and state supreme
court rules in each state, 13 states clearly require guardians ad litem,
child representatives, or other custody evaluators, without waiver, to re-
ceive domestic violence and/or child abuse and neglect training in a 
child custody case: Arkansas,390 California,391 Connecticut,392 Idaho,393
https://mdcourts.gov/sites/default/files/admin-orders/20160606continuinged
ofjudgesmagistratescommissioners.pdf (stating that the training program “shall focus”
on issues including “domestic violence”).
388. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 908.
389. For example, the state of Wisconsin requires all judges to complete continuing educa-
tion. WIS. SUP. CT. R. 33.02. There is a section named “Required programs” that on-
ly covers attending the “Wisconsin judicial college, the criminal law-sentencing insti-
tute and the prison tour.” WIS. SUP. CT. R. 32.04. Wisconsin also requires Municipal 
judges to complete training at a “municipal judge orientation institute, review insti-
tute or graduate institute developed by the judicial education office.” WIS. SUP. CT.
R. 33.04. The Maine Commission on Domestic and Sexual Abuse “may make rec-
ommendations on legislative and policy actions, including training of the various law 
enforcement officers, prosecutors and judicial officers responsible for enforcing and 
carrying out the provisions of this chapter, and may undertake research development 
and program initiatives consistent with this section.” ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, 
§ 4013 (Westlaw through 2017 2d Reg. Sess. and 2d Spec. Sess. of 128th Leg.).
390. ARK. ADMIN. ORD. § 15.1(b)(1) (2016) (Westlaw through 2016).
391. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 68555 (Westlaw through 2018 Reg. Sess.) (“The Judicial 
Council shall establish judicial training programs for individuals who perform duties 
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Indiana,394 Maine,395 Minnesota,396 Missouri397 New Hampshire,398 New 
York,399 Ohio,400 Oklahoma,401 and Virginia.402 The following states only 
recommend domestic violence and/or child abuse training: Alaska,403 Il-
linois,404 Kansas,405 Maryland,406 and Wisconsin.407
In Alaska,408 Arizona,409 Kansas,410 and Maryland, 411 the initial 
training can be waived. Among the group of 20 states with required or 
in domestic violence matters, including, but not limited to, judges, referees, commis-
sioners, mediators, and others as deemed appropriate by the Judicial Council . . . .
The training programs shall include a domestic violence session in any orientation 
session conducted for newly appointed or elected judges and an annual training ses-
sion in domestic violence.”); CAL. R. OF CT. 10.464(a) (Westlaw through Dec. 15, 
2018).
392. Conn. Gen. Stat.
393. IDAHO JUV. R. 35(e) (2018), https://isc.idaho.gov/ijr35.
394. IND. CODE ANN. § 31-9-2-50 (Westlaw through 2018 Second Regular Session and 
First Spec Session of the 120th General Assembly).
395. ME. R. GUARDIAN AD LITEM R. 2(b)(2)(A)(iv) (Westlaw through amendments re-
ceived through March 1, 2019).
396. Minn. Guardian Ad Litem Program Requirements and Guidelines, https://mn.gov/
guardian-ad-litem/assets/GALP%20PROGRAM%20REQUIREMENTS_tcm27-
364018.pdf (Last revised Dec. 19, 2018).
397. Standards with Comments for Guardians Ad Litem in Missouri Juvenile and Family 
Court Matters, (complete text of an Order entered by the Supreme Court of Mis-
souri en banc on September 17, 1996 establishing standards for GALS in Missouri 
courts) http://mija.org/images/resources/publications/GALStds.doc.
398. N.H. R. CH. GAL 303.02(b)(1)(k), http://www.gencourt.state.nh.us/rules/state_
agencies/gal300.html.
399. Become an Attorney for the Child, N.Y. App. Div. 4th Jud. Dep’t.
400. OHIO SUP. R. 48(D)(11) (Westlaw through amendments received through February 
15, 2019).
401. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43 § 1-8-101(A)(1) (LEXIS through Nov. 1, 2013); Guardian 
Ad Litem Bd. Laws and Rules §303.02(b)(1)(k) (last visited Mar. 18, 2019) 
http://www.gencourt.state.nh.us/rules/state_agencies/gal300.html.
402. Standard to Govern the Appointment of Guardians Ad Litem Pursuant to Section 
16.1-266, Code of Va., Judicial Council of Va., http://www.courts.state.va.us/
courtadmin/aoc/cip/programs/gal/children/gal_standards_children.pdf.
403. ALASKA R. CINA 11(c) (Westlaw 2006).
404. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 906(c).
405. KAN. SUP. CT. R. 110A.
406. MD. RULES ANN. tit. 9, Ch. 200, App. § 4 (Westlaw 2018).
407. WIS. SUP CT. R. 35.03.
408. ST. OF ALASKA, GUIDELINES FOR CONT. AND CT. APPOINTED GUARDIANS AD LITEM 
IN CHILD IN NEED OF AID PROC. 5–6 (2007), http://doa.alaska.gov/opa/pdfs/
07_contract_gdlines.pdf (The Office of Public Advocacy “may waive all or part of 
the initial training requirement for a new guardian ad litem depending on back-
ground or experience.”).
409. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40.1.J (West 2014) (“Attorneys shall provide the judge with 
an affidavit of completion of the six (6) hour court approved training requirement 
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recommended training on domestic violence or child abuse, the number 
of hours of initial training for these topics ranged from six to 18.412 The 
following are the 20 states413 where the guardian ad litem, child 
representative, or child’s attorney is required or recommended to receive 
training on domestic violence or child abuse (with footnotes for each 
state containing the language requiring or recommending such 
training): Alaska,414 Arizona,415 Arkansas,416 California,417 Connecticut,418
prior to or upon their first appointment as attorney or guardian ad litem for a child 
after the adoption of this rule unless a waiver of this requirement has been obtained 
from the presiding judge of the juvenile court in which the appointment is to be 
made.”).
410. KAN. SUP. CT. R. 110A (“The appointing judge may waive the prerequisite education 
when necessary to make an emergency temporary appointment. The educational re-
quirements must be completed within 6 months after appointment.”).
411. MD. RULES ANN. TIT. 9, CH. 200, APP. § 4 (West 2018) (stating that “[u]nless waived 
by the court, an attorney appointed as a Child’s Best Interest Attorney, Child’s Advo-
cate Attorney, or Child’s Privilege Attorney should have completed at least six hours 
of training that includes the following topics: . . . (e) recognizing, evaluating, and un-
derstanding evidence of child abuse and neglect; (f) family dynamics and dysfunction, 
domestic violence, and substance abuse”).
412. ARIZ. ST. JUV. CT. R. 40.1(j) (requiring 6 hours of initial guardian ad litem training); 
CAL. ST. FAM. JUV. R. 5.242(c)-(d) (initially requiring “at least 12 hours of applicable 
education and training” with an additional requirement that counsel “must complete 
during each calendar year a minimum of eight hours of applicable education and 
training”); IDAHO JUV. R. 35(e)(1) (requiring “at least 30 hours” of “pre-service train-
ing”); ILL. SUP. CT. R. 906 (stating that “[p]rior to appointment the attorney shall 
have 10 hours in the two years prior to the date the attorney qualifies for appoint-
ment”); KAN. SUP. CT. R. 110A(b)(1)(A) (requiring 6 hours of initial training); LA.
SUP. CT. R. XXXIIL, pt. 3, sub. I, §3(A)(3) (requiring 6 hours of training each year); 
OHIO SUP. CT. R. 48(E)(2) (requiring 6 hours of initial training); ME. R. FOR 
GUARDIANS AD LITEM 2(b)(2)(B) (requiring 18 hours of initial training); MD. RULES 
ANN. tit. 9, Ch. 200, App. § 4 (Westlaw 2018) (requiring 6 hours of initial training).
413. This list also includes Arizona, a state that requires training but permits waiver of that 
requirement in limited circumstances.
414. ALASKA R. CT. 11(C), (2016) https://public.courts.alaska.gov/web/rules/docs/
cina.pdf (“(2) The guardian ad litem should have an understanding of the following 
as appropriate to the case: (A) child development from infancy through adolescence; 
(B) the impact of child abuse and neglect on the child.”).
415. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40.1J (West 2014). “All attorneys and guardians ad litem 
shall complete at least eight (8) hours each year of ongoing continuing education and 
training.” § 40.1(J). The “[e]ducation and training shall be on juvenile law and relat-
ed topics, such as . . . the effects of the trauma of parental domestic violence upon 
children and other issues concerning abuse and/or neglect of children.” § 40.1(J).
However, the initial training requirement can be waived by the court. § 40.1(J).
416. ARK. ADMIN. ORDER 15.1(B)(1) (2016) (stating that “[p]rior to appointment,” to 
represent children “an attorney shall have” initial and continuing training and the 
“[i]nitial training must include: . . . Dynamics of abuse and neglect; . . . Family dy-
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Idaho,419 Illinois,420 Indiana,421 Kansas,422 Maine,423 Maryland,424
Minnesota,425 Missouri,426 New Hampshire,427 New York,428 Ohio,429
Oklahoma,430 Virginia,431 West Virginia,432 and Wisconsin.433
namics, which may include but is not limited to, the following topics: substance 
abuse, domestic violence and mental health issues”).
417. CAL. R. OF CT. ANN. § 5.242(C) (West 2018). “[B]efore being appointed as counsel 
for a child in a family law proceeding, counsel must have completed at least 12 hours 
of applicable education and training which must include all the following sub-
jects: . . . (3) Spec issues in representing a child, including the following: . . . (C) 
Recognizing, evaluating and understanding evidence of child abuse and neglect, fami-
ly violence and substance abuse, cultural and ethnic diversity, and gender-specific is-
sues; (D) The effects of domestic violence and child abuse and neglect on children.”
§ 5.242(C).
418. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. CH. 815(E) § 46B-38C(J) (West 2019). “The Judicial De-
partment shall establish an ongoing training program for . . . guardians ad li-
tem . . . to inform them about the policies and procedures of sections 46b-1, 46b-15, 
46b-38a to 46b-38f, inclusive, and 54-1g, including, but not limited to, the function 
of the family violence intervention units and the use of restraining and protective or-
ders. Such training program shall include an examination of the factors that contrib-
ute to a family being at risk for episodes of domestic violence within the family.” CH.
815(E) § 46B-38C(J).
419. GUARDIAN AD LITEM PROGRAMS, 35 IDAHO JUV. R. § (E) (2012) (“(1) Each [guardi-
an ad litem] Program shall require that volunteers complete at least 30 hours of re-
quired pre-service training and 12 hours of required in-service training per year (2) 
Pre-service training shall include the following topics: . . . (C) Dynamics of families 
including mental health, substance abuse, domestic violence, and poverty.”).
420. ILL. SUP. CT. RULE ANN. § 906(C) (West 2018) “Certification requirements may ad-
dress minimum experience requirements for attorneys appointed by the court to rep-
resent minor children.” § 906(C) “In addition, the qualifications may include one or 
all of the following which are recommended: (1) Prior to appointment the attorney 
shall have 10 hours in the two years prior to the date the attorney qualifies for ap-
pointment in approved continuing legal education courses in the following are-
as: . . . family dynamics, including substance abuse, domestic abuse, and mental 
health issues. (2) Periodic continuing education in approved child related courses 
shall be required to maintain qualification as an attorney eligible to be appointed.”
§ 906(C).
421. IND. CODE ANN. § 31-9-2-50(B) (West 2018). “‘Guardian ad litem’ . . . means an 
attorney . . . who: . . . (3) has completed training appropriate for the person’s role, in-
cluding training in: (A) the identification and treatment of child abuse and neglect.”
§ 31-9-2-50(B).
422. KAN. SUP. CT. R. ANN. 110A § (B)(1)(B) (West 2019) “Areas of education [for a 
Guardian ad litem] should include, but are not limited to: dynamics of abuse and ne-
glect . . . .” R. ANN. 110A § (B)(1)(Kansas requires initial and continuing training 
although initial training can be waived for an emergency temporary appointment. R.
ANN. 110A § (B)(2).
423. ME. CT. RULES FOR GUARDIANS AD LITEM § 2(B) (West 2018) (stating that guardian 
ad litem “must have attended” a core training program which covers the “dynamics 
of domestic abuse and its effect on children”).
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424. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 9-200, app § 4 (Westlaw through all legis. from the 
2018 Reg. Sess. of the General Assembly) (“Unless waived by the court, an attorney 
appointed as a Child’s Best Interest Attorney, Child’s Advocate Attorney, or Child’s
Privilege Attorney should have completed at least six hours of training that includes 
the following topics: . . . (e) recognizing, evaluating, and understanding evidence of 
child abuse and neglect; (f) family dynamics and dysfunction, domestic violence, and 
substance abuse.”).
425. MINN. GUARDIAN AD LITEM PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS & GUIDELINES (Non-
statutory) (2015), https://mn.gov/guardian-ad-litem/assets/GALP%20PROGRAM%
20REQUIREMENTS_tcm27-364018.pdf (requiring at least 6 hours of “training on 
domestic and family violence”).
426. See Standards supra note 395, at 16.0 (“No person shall be appointed as guardian ad 
litem without first completing twelve hours of specialized training.  Thereafter, to 
continue to be appointed as a guardian ad litem a person shall complete six hours of 
specialized training annually . . . . The specialized training shall in-
clude . . . Dynamics of child abuse and neglect issues . . . Family and Domestic Vio-
lence issues”).
427. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 490-C:6 (West 2018). “Court Appointed Special Advocates 
(CASA) of New Hampshire shall be accountable to the guardian ad litem board for 
complying with the training requirements established by the board under RSA 490-
C:5, I(d) and for the actions of its volunteer members who are appointed by the court 
as guardians ad litem.” § 490-C:6.; see also Office of Prof’l Licensure and Certifica-
tion, GUARDIAN AD LITEM BD. RULES § 302.02 (stating that training shall 
“[e]ncompass instruction in at least the following areas: . . . Domestic violence train-
ing”).
428. See N.Y. RULES OF THE CHIEF JUDGE ANN. LAW § 7.1(A) (West 2018) (“Each of the 
Appellate Divisions shall by January 1, 1980 promulgate rules pertaining to the estab-
lishment and operation of a panel of lawyers qualified for assignment as law guardians 
to represent minors in proceedings in Family Court.”); see also N. Y. App. Div., 4th 
Jud. Dep’t, Become an Attorney for the Child, https://ad4.nycourts.gov/afc/
prospective. (“When you are accepted to the training program you will be given ac-
cess to the domestic violence videos on-line. You must view four segments of domes-
tic violence training online to be eligible for designation to a county panel.”Id.).
429. OHIO ADMIN. CODE 48 (West 2018) (stating that the “pre-service course shall in-
clude training on all the following topics: . . . (c) Preventing child abuse and neglect 
including, but not limited to, assessing risk and safety; (d) Family and child issues in-
cluding, but not limited to, family dynamics, substance abuse and its effects, basic 
psychopathology for adults and children, domestic violence and its effects”).
430. OKLA. STAT. tit. 43, § 107.3(A)(4) (Westlaw through legis. of the Second Reg. Sess. 
of the 56th Legislature 2018) (“[T]he Administrative Director of the Courts shall de-
velop a standard operating manual for guardians ad litem which shall include, but 
not be limited to, legal obligations and responsibilities, information concerning child 
abuse, child development, domestic abuse, sexual abuse, and parent and child behav-
ioral health and management including best practices.”).
431. Standard to Govern the Appointment of Guardians Ad Litem Pursuant to Sec-
tion16.1-266 I.B.1.f.
432. W. VA. RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE FOR FAMILY COURT. app. § B(1)
(Guidelines for Guardians Ad Litem in Fam. Ct.) (stating that, “Every guardian ad li-
tem shall complete eight (8) hours of continuing legal education credits every two 
years provided by the West Virginia Supreme Court comprising of: understanding 
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Wisconsin is the only state where the guardian ad litem, child 
representative, or custody evaluator is clearly required by supreme court 
rule or legislation to screen for domestic violence in the divorce or 
parentage custody cases on which they are working.434 Finding only one 
state that requires screening to be performed by a professional that 
courts rely upon in making child custody decisions is shocking in light 
of the prevalence of domestic violence within society and its harmful 
impact on children. As explained in Section I, screening for domestic 
violence in child custody cases is necessary since many survivors of 
domestic violence do not self-report. In addition, it is not difficult or 
time-consuming to perform basic screening for domestic violence, 
especially when trained on how to do it. Several states suggest that 
screening should be done but do not clearly require it to be done.435
the stages of child development from early childhood through adolescence; recogniz-
ing the signs and symptoms of abuse and neglect and their effects upon children; rec-
ognizing the signs and characteristics of domestic violence and their effects upon 
children”).
433. WIS. SUP. CT. R. 35.03 (2003) (Approval of Guardian Ad Litem Education) (stating 
that “[t]he board of bar examiners shall approve, as family court guardian ad litem 
education, courses of instruction at a law school in this state and continuing legal ed-
ucation activities that the board determines to be on any of the following subject 
matters: . . . 4. The dynamics and impact of family violence”). However, the statute 
does not specifically require guardians ad litem to be trained in domestic violence. See 
WIS. STAT. § 767.407(4) (Westlaw through 2017 Act 370) (stating “[t]he guardian 
ad litem shall investigate whether there is evidence that either parent has engaged in 
interspousal battery, as described in s. 940.19 or 940.20(1m), or domestic abuse, as 
defined in s. 813.12(1)(am), and shall report to the court on the results of the inves-
tigation.”).
434. See id.
435. In Delaware, the guardian ad litem statute requires the guardian ad litem to represent 
the best interests of the child and to “[p]resent evidence to the court in support of his 
or her position” DEL. CODE tit. 29, § 9007A(c) (Westlaw through 82 Laws 2019); 
DELAWARE COURTS, CHILD ADVOCATE MANUAL 13–15 (2007), 
https://courts.delaware.gov/childadvocate/trmanual/Chapter5_073107.pdf. In Geor-
gia, a guardian ad litem is required to ascertain the child’s best interests and “[i]n de-
termining a child’s best interests, a guardian ad litem shall consider and evaluate all of 
the factors” that include “(3) Evidence of domestic violence in any current, past, or 
considered home for such child” GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-105(b) (Westlaw through 
the 2018 reg. and Spec legis. sess. 2014). In Maine, the guardian ad litem has addi-
tional powers that can be granted by a court including: “Arranging for the assessment 
of any physical, sexual, developmental, and/or emotional risks to or abuse of the child 
by utilizing risk assessment tools; evaluations, assessments, and reports; medical rec-
ords; observation; and interviews with appropriate persons” ME. CT. RULES FOR 
GUARDIANS AD LITEM, R. 4. In West Virginia, the court can appoint a [guardian ad 
litem] and “[t]he court shall specify the terms of the appointment, including the law-
yer’s role, duties and scope of authority.” W. VA. CODE § 48-9-302(a) (Westlaw 
through legis. of the 2018 First Extraordinary Sess.); If there are “substantial allega-
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Two states do not require screening but state that screening can be 
court-ordered.436 As noted in Section I, there are many reasons why 
survivors of domestic violence might not self-report but may in fact 
share this information when domestic violence screening is properly 
performed. For these reasons, it is problematic that domestic violence 
screening by a guardian ad litem does not clearly appear to be a 
requirement (and thus unlikely to be performed) in any states other 
than Wisconsin.
In summary, research found only 13 states that require guardians 
ad litem, child representatives, or other custody evaluators to receive 
domestic violence and/or child abuse and neglect training without waiv-
er in child custody cases. Only one state explicitly requires domestic vio-
lence screening. These results reflect a disturbing failure to apply evi-
dence-based best practices to achieve the goal of protecting children and 
survivors of domestic violence from further harm in child custody cases. 
It is critical that these family law professionals receive training on do-
mestic violence and screen for domestic violence in every child custody 
case. This goal cannot be achieved without at least clearly mandating 
these requirements and providing a mechanism to ensure that the man-
dated requirements are being performed.
tions of domestic abuse have been made, the court shall order an investigation under 
section 9-301 or make an appointment under subsection (a) or (b) of this section, 
unless the court is satisfied that the information necessary to evaluate the allegations 
will be adequately presented to the court without such order or appointment.” Id.; see 
also W. VA. FAM. CT. R. 47 (stating that when “the court is presented with substantial 
allegations of domestic abuse, serious allegations of abuse and neglect, serious issues 
relating to the child’s health and safety, or allegations involving disproving a child’s
paternity, a guardian ad litem shall be appointed by the court for the children” and 
that in regard to “[i]nvestigations by Guardians Ad Litem,” W. Va. Code § 48-9-
301, § 48-9-302, and the Guidelines for Guardians Ad Litem in Family Court set 
forth in Appendix B of these rules shall govern investigations by guardians ad litem”).
436. ME. CT. RULES FOR GUARDIANS AD LITEM (2015), https://mebaroverseers.org/
regulation/bar_rules.html?id=638955 (stating that one of the guardian ad litem’s
“Additional Powers” that require a court order include “(G) Arranging for the as-
sessment of any physical, sexual, developmental, and/or emotional risks to or abuse of 
the child by utilizing risk assessment tools; evaluations, assessments, and reports; 
medical records; observation; and interviews with appropriate persons); W. VA. CODE 
§ 48-9-302 (c) (Westlaw through legis. of the 2018 First Extraordinary Sess.) (stating 
that “[w]hen substantial allegations of domestic abuse have been made, the court shall 
order an investigation under section 9-301 or make an appointment under subsection 
(a) or (b) of this section, unless the court is satisfied that the information necessary to 
evaluate the allegations will be adequately presented to the court without such order 
or appointment”).
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C. To What Extent Do State Laws Relating to Child Custody Cases 
Take Domestic Violence Into Account Consistent with 
Evidence-Based Best Practices?
Requiring family law professionals involved in child custody cases 
to be trained on domestic violence and to screen for domestic violence is 
a necessary, but not sufficient, step to better protect children and parent 
survivors of domestic violence. It is also necessary to apply evidence-
based practices to the child custody laws in each state. Custody laws 
should empower family law judges to make child custody decisions that 
protect both children and their parent survivors of domestic violence.
As described in the evidence-based literature review in Section I, 
when there is a pattern of coercive abuse, it would be harmful and dan-
gerous to award primary or shared parenting time and shared parenting 
decision-making to an abusive parent. A parent who has engaged in a 
pattern of coercive abuse is likely to use the parenting time and parent-
ing decision-making as a means to further harm the parent victim of 
domestic violence, rather than act in the best interests of the child.437
There is also evidence that such parents will engage in violence or other 
forms of abuse against the other parent during their parenting time with 
their children, particularly during the exchange of the children, and in 
communicating about or with their children.438 They are also more like-
ly to neglect or directly abuse their children during their parenting time 
as a means to punish the other parent or seek to induce that parent to 
return to them.439
For these reasons, it is important that courts order primary parent-
ing time (referred to by some states as “physical custody”) and sole deci-
sion-making (referred to by some states as “legal custody”) to the parent 
survivor of domestic violence, and order protective measures relating to 
the parenting time (referred to by some states as “visitation”) of the par-
ent who has engaged in a pattern of coercive abuse.440 In this Section, we 
review the child custody laws in each state to determine to what extent 
their child custody laws recognize and adequately address these dangers 
and harms.
The key standard that judges apply in determining physical and 
legal custody in the custody statutes is the “best interests of the child.”441
437. See supra Section I.
438. See supra Section I.
439. See supra Section I.
440. See ABA 50 STATE REVIEW, supra note 10.
441. See id.
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The “best interests of the child” standard is the term used to encompass 
all of the various specific factors noted in the statutes that courts should 
consider when determining child custody, and any other factors that 
might apply to the custody case before them.442 In recognition of the 
harm to children from exposure to domestic violence, according to the 
an American Bar Association 50 State Review, domestic violence is a 
factor in determining the “best interests of the child” in virtually every 
state’s custody laws.443 But, this factor is just one factor. Other factors, 
such as the “friendly parent factor” (the extent to which a parent fosters 
a cooperative relationship with the other parent when it comes to 
making decisions on their children and parenting generally) have been 
demonstrated to override the domestic violence factor, especially when 
the person accused of domestic violence or child abuse has alleged 
parental alienation.444
1. A Survey of the States
In recognition of the importance of the impact of exposure to 
domestic violence on the “best interests of the child,” 21 states and the 
District of Columbia have created a rebuttable presumption against sole 
or joint legal or physical custody to a parent who has engaged in 
442. See id. Although Louisiana does not have domestic violence listed as a factor, it does 
have a rebuttable presumption that specifically references “family violence” and 
“domestic abuse.” LA. STAT. § 9:364(A) (Westlaw through the 2018 Third 
Extraordinary Sess.) (stating that “[t]here is created a presumption that no parent 
who has a history of perpetrating family violence, as defined in R.S. 9:362, or 
domestic abuse, as defined in R.S. 46:2132, or has subjected any of his or her 
children, stepchildren, or any household member, as defined in R.S. 46:2132, to 
sexual abuse, as defined in R.S. 14:403(A)(4)(b), or has willingly permitted another 
to abuse any of his children or stepchildren, despite having the ability to prevent the 
abuse, shall be awarded sole or joint custody of children”).
443. Minnesota does not list domestic violence as a best interest factor, but it does have a 
separate rebuttable presumption that it is not in the best interest of the child for a 
parent who has committed domestic violence to have custody. MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 518.17(b)(9) (Westlaw through the end of the 2018 Regular Sess.); South Dakota 
does not list domestic violence as a factor, but it does have a rebuttable presumption 
based on “assault” or “domestic abuse.” S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-4-45.5 (Westlaw 
through the 2018 Reg. and Spec Sess.) (stating that “[t]he conviction or history of 
domestic abuse creates a rebuttable presumption that awarding custody to the abusive 
parent is not in the best interest of the minor”).
444. Meier & Dickson, supra note 2, at 328–32.
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domestic or family violence, as defined in their statutes.445 They include:
Alabama,446 Alaska,447 Arizona,448 Arkansas,449 California,450 Delaware,451
District of Columbia,452 Florida,453 Hawaii,454 Idaho,455 Iowa,456
445. This information is based upon THE ABA 50 STATE REVIEW, supra note 10, from 
which we began our research for this information. We checked the statutes noted in 
that review and checked for accuracy and for any updates as of August 30, 2018.
446. In Alabama, there is a rebuttable presumption that applies to “sole custody, joint le-
gal custody, or joint physical custody” and as to which parent the child resides with.
ALA. CODE § 30-3-131 (Westlaw through 2018-579) (stating that “[i]n every pro-
ceeding where there is at issue a dispute as to the custody of a child, a determination 
by the court that domestic or family violence has occurred raises a rebuttable pre-
sumption by the court that it is detrimental to the child and not in the best interest 
of the child to be placed in sole custody, joint legal custody, or joint physical custody 
with the perpetrator of domestic or family violence”); § 30-3-133 (2017) (stating that 
“[i]n every proceeding where there is at issue a dispute as to the custody of a child, a 
determination by the court that domestic or family violence has occurred raises a re-
buttable presumption by the court that it is in the best interest of the child to reside 
with the parent who is not a perpetrator of domestic or family violence in the loca-
tion of that parent’s choice, within or outside the state”).
447. ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.150(g) (Westlaw through the 2018 Second Reg. Sess. of the 
30th Leg.) (stating that “[t]here is a rebuttable presumption that a parent who has a 
history of perpetrating domestic violence against the other parent, a child, or a do-
mestic living partner may not be awarded sole legal custody, sole physical custody, 
joint legal custody, or joint physical custody of a child”).
448. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-403.03 D (Westlaw through the First Spec. and Second 
Reg. Sess. of the Fifty-Third Leg. 2018) (stating that “[i]f the court determines that a 
parent who is seeking sole or joint legal decision-making has committed an act of 
domestic violence against the other parent, there is a rebuttable presumption that an 
award of sole or joint legal decision-making to the parent who committed the act of 
domestic violence is contrary to the child’s best interests”).
449. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-13-101(c)(2) (Westlaw through 2018 Fiscal Sess. and Second 
Extraordinary Sess. of the 91st Ark. General Assembly) (stating that “[t]here is a re-
buttable presumption that it is not in the best interest of the child to be placed in the 
custody of an abusive parent in cases in which there is a finding by a preponderance 
of the evidence that the parent has engaged in a pattern of domestic abuse”).
450. CAL. FAM. CODE § 3044(a) (Westlaw through Ch. 1016 if the 2018 Reg. Sess.) (stat-
ing that “[u]pon a finding by the court that a party seeking custody of a child has 
perpetrated domestic violence against the other party seeking custody of the child or 
against the child or the child’s siblings within the previous five years, there is a rebut-
table presumption that an award of sole or joint physical or legal custody of a child to 
a person who has perpetrated domestic violence is detrimental to the best interest of 
the child, pursuant to Section 3011”).
451. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13 § 705A(a)(b) (Westlaw through 82 Laws 2019) (stating that 
“there shall be a rebuttable presumption that no perpetrator of domestic violence 
shall be awarded sole or joint custody of any child” and that “there shall be a rebutta-
ble presumption that no child shall primarily reside with a perpetrator of domestic 
violence”).
452. D.C. Code Ann. § 16-914(2) (Westlaw through Jan. 11, 2019) (stating that “there 
shall be a rebuttable presumption that joint custody is not in the best interest of the 
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Louisiana,457 Massachusetts,458 Minnesota,459 Mississippi,460 Nevada,461
North Dakota,462 Oklahoma,463 Oregon,464 South Dakota,465 Texas,466
and Wisconsin.467
child or children, if a judicial officer finds by a preponderance of the evidence that an 
intrafamily offense as defined in § 16-1001(8) . . . has occurred.” “Intrafamily of-
fense” is defined as “interpersonal, intimate partner, or intrafamily violence.”) D.C. 
Code Ann. § 16-1001 (Westlaw through Jan. 11, 2019).
453. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.13(2)(c)(2) (Westlaw through the 2018 Second Reg. Sess. of 
the 25th Leg.) (stating that “[e]vidence that a parent has been convicted of a misde-
meanor of the first degree or higher involving domestic violence, as defined in s. 
741.28 and chapter 775, or meets the criteria of s. 39.806(1)(d), creates a rebuttable 
presumption of detriment to the child”).
454. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 571-46 (a)(9) (Westlaw through the end of the 2018 Sec-
ond Spec. Sess.) (stating that “[i]n every proceeding where there is at issue a dispute 
as to the custody of a child, a determination by the court that family violence has 
been committed by a parent raises a rebuttable presumption that it is detrimental to 
the child and not in the best interest of the child to be placed in sole custody, joint 
legal custody, or joint physical custody with the perpetrator of family violence”).
455. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-717B (5) (Westlaw through the 2018 Second Reg. Sess. of 
the 64th Idaho Leg.) (stating that ‘[t]here shall be a presumption that joint custody is 
not in the best interests of a minor child if one (1) of the parents is found by the 
court to be a habitual perpetrator of domestic violence as defined in section 39-6303, 
Idaho Code”).
456. IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.41(1)(b) (Westlaw through legislation from the 2018 Reg. 
Sess.) (stating that “if the court finds that a history of domestic abuse exists, a rebut-
table presumption against the awarding of joint custody exists”).
457. LA. STAT. ANN. § 9:364(A) (Westlaw through the 2018 Third Extraordinary Sess.)
(stating that “[t]here is created a presumption that no parent who has a history of 
perpetrating family violence, as defined in R.S. 9:362, or domestic abuse, as defined 
in R.S. 46:2132, or has subjected any of his or her children, stepchildren, or any 
household member, as defined in R.S. 46:2132, to sexual abuse, as defined in R.S.
14:403, or has willingly permitted another to abuse any of his children or stepchil-
dren, despite having the ability to prevent the abuse, shall be awarded sole or joint 
custody of children”).
458. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 208, § 31A (Westlaw through Act 450 of the 2018 Legis.
Sess. 2018) (stating that “[a] probate and family court’s finding, by a preponderance 
of the evidence, that a pattern or serious incident of abuse has occurred shall create a 
rebuttable presumption that it is not in the best interests of the child to be placed in 
sole custody, shared legal custody or shared physical custody with the abusive par-
ent”).
459. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.17 subdiv. 1(b)(9) (Westlaw through the end of the 2018 
Reg. Sess.) (stating that “the court shall use a rebuttable presumption that upon re-
quest of either or both parties, joint legal custody is in the best interests of the child. 
However, the court shall use a rebuttable presumption that joint legal custody or 
joint physical custody is not in the best interests of the child if domestic abuse, as de-
fined in section 518B.01, has occurred between the parents”).
460. MISS. CODE. ANN. § 93-5-24 (9)(a)(1) (Westlaw through the 2018 Reg. and First 
Extraordinary Sess.) (stating that “[i]n every proceeding where the custody of a child 
is in dispute, there shall be a rebuttable presumption that it is detrimental to the child 
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and not in the best interest of the child to be placed in sole custody, joint legal custo-
dy or joint physical custody of a parent who has a history of perpetrating family vio-
lence”).
461. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN § 125C.230(1) (Westlaw through all 608 Chapters of the Sev-
enty-Ninth Reg. Sess. 2017), (stating that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided in NRS 
125C.210 and 125C.220, a determination by the court after an evidentiary hearing 
and finding by clear and convincing evidence that either parent or any other person 
seeking custody of a child has engaged in one or more acts of domestic violence 
against the child, a parent of the child or any other person residing with the child cre-
ates a rebuttable presumption that sole or joint custody of the child by the perpetra-
tor of the domestic violence is not in the best interest of the child”).
462. N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 14-09-06.2 (1)(j) (Westlaw through the 2017 Reg. Sess.
of the 65th Legis. Assemb.) (stating that “[i]f the court finds credible evidence that 
domestic violence has occurred, and there exists one incident of domestic violence 
which resulted in serious bodily injury or involved the use of a dangerous weapon or 
there exists a pattern of domestic violence within a reasonable time proximate to the 
proceeding, this combination creates a rebuttable presumption that a parent who has 
perpetrated domestic violence may not be awarded residential responsibility for the 
child”).
463. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43 § 109.3 (Westlaw through legis. of the Second Reg. Sess. of 
the 56th Leg. 2018) (stating that “[i]n every case involving the custody of, guardian-
ship of or visitation with a child, the court shall consider evidence of domestic abuse, 
stalking and/or harassing behavior properly brought before it” and “[i]f the occur-
rence of domestic abuse, stalking or harassing behavior is established by a preponder-
ance of the evidence, there shall be a rebuttable presumption that it is not in the best 
interest of the child to have custody, guardianship, or unsupervised visitation granted 
to the person against whom domestic abuse, stalking or harassing behavior has been 
established”).
464. OR. REV. STAT. ANN § 107.137(2) (Westlaw through the emergency legis. of the 
2018 Reg. Sess. and all Legis. of the 2018 1st Spec Sess.) (stating that “if a parent has 
committed abuse as defined in ORS 107.705, other than as described in subsection 
(6) of this section, there is a rebuttable presumption that it is not in the best interests 
and welfare of the child to award sole or joint custody of the child to the parent who 
committed the abuse”).
465. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-4-45.5. (Westlaw through 2018 Reg. and Spec. Sess.)
(stating that “[t]he conviction or history of domestic abuse creates a rebuttable pre-
sumption that awarding custody to the abusive parent is not in the best interest of the 
minor”).
466. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.004(b) (Westlaw through the end of the 2017 Reg. and 
First Called Sess. of the 85th Leg.) (stating that “[i]t is a rebuttable presumption that 
the appointment of a parent as the sole managing conservator of a child or as the con-
servator who has the exclusive right to determine the primary residence of a child is 
not in the best interest of the child if credible evidence is presented of a history or 
pattern of past or present child neglect, or physical or sexual abuse by that parent di-
rected against the other parent, a spouse, or a child”).
467. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 767.41(2)(d) (Westlaw through 2017 Act 370) (stating that “if 
the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that a party has engaged in a pat-
tern or serious incident of interspousal battery, as described under s. 940.19 or 
940.20(1m), or domestic abuse, as defined in s. 813.12(1)(am), pars. (am), (b), and 
(c) do not apply and there is a rebuttable presumption that it is detrimental to the 
82 michigan  jo urn al  o f  g ender & la w [Vol. 26:1
It is important to note the varying definitions of “domestic vio-
lence,” “family violence,” or other similar terms used in the state statutes 
among the 21 states and District of Columbia that have created a rebut-
table presumption against custody to the abusive parent. Some states 
narrowly define “domestic violence,” “family violence,” or other term 
used in the child custody statute that would trigger the rebuttable pre-
sumption. For example, the statute might require a criminal conviction 
for a crime relating to domestic violence or the grounds for termination 
of parental rights, as in Florida.468 This requirement is highly problemat-
ic since, for a variety of reasons, it is very rare that domestic violence will 
lead to a criminal conviction when it occurs.469 In addition, of the 21 
states that create the rebuttable presumption that it is not in the best in-
terest of the child to grant legal or physical custody to a parent who has 
engaged in domestic violence, some only include instances of physical 
violence (or placing someone in reasonable fear of such physical vio-
lence) or sexual assault.470
child and contrary to the best interest of the child to award joint or sole legal custody 
to that party”).
468. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.13(2)(c)(2) (Westlaw through the 2018 Second Reg. Sess. of 
the 25th Leg. 2018) (stating that “[e]vidence that a parent has been convicted of a 
misdemeanor of the first degree or higher involving domestic violence, as defined in 
s. 741.28 and chapter 775, or meets the criteria of s. 39.806(1)(d), creates a rebutta-
ble presumption of detriment to the child”).
469. Many domestic violence survivors do not report or assist with the prosecution of a 
domestic violence related crime due to a variety of reasons, including economic de-
pendence on the abuser or fear of the abuser. A 2015 survey by the National Domes-
tic Violence Hotline found that a quarter of women who had called police to report 
domestic violence or sexual assault would not call again in the future, with 80 percent
reporting they feared the police would not believe them or would not do anything 
about the violence. TK Logan & Roberta Valente, Who Will Help Me? Domestic Vio-
lence Survivors Speak Out About Law Enforcement Responses, THE NATIONAL 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE HOTLINE (April 2015), http://www.thehotline.org/resources/
law-enforcement-responses. From 2006 to 2015, only 56 percent of non-fatal domes-
tic violence incidents were reported to the police according to the Bureau of Justice 
statistics. Catalano, supra note 132.
470. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-15-103(4) (Westlaw through all laws of the 2018 Fiscal Sess.
and 2018 Second Extraordinary Sess.) (stating, “‘[d]omestic abuse’ means: (A) Physi-
cal harm, bodily injury, assault, or the infliction of fear of imminent physical harm, 
bodily injury, or assault between family or household members; or (B) Any sexual 
conduct between family or household members, whether minors or adults, that con-
stitutes a crime under the laws of this state.”); IOWA CODE ANN. § 236.2(2) (Westlaw 
through legis. from the 2018 Reg. Sess. of the 87th Gen. Assemb.). “‘Domestic 
abuse’ means committing assault as defined in section 708.1 [criminal assault] under 
any of the following circumstances: (a) The assault is between family or household 
members who resided together at the time of the assault; (b) The assault is between 
separated spouses or persons divorced from each other and not residing together at 
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Indeed, the North Dakota Supreme Court in Zuraff v. Reiger af-
firmed a ruling by the lower court granting primary residential custody 
to the father, despite evidence of domestic violence, because the domes-
tic violence did not cause serious bodily injury, and, therefore, did not 
trigger a presumption against sole or joint custody to the father. 471 Nar-
rowly defining the kind of abusive conduct that triggers the rebuttable 
presumption to either physical violence or physical violence that causes 
serious bodily injury is highly problematic. It fails to take into account 
evidence of the serious harm to children and the non-abusive parent 
from the many other forms of coercive. In addition, this definition for 
domestic violence might not be met if the physical violence has not tak-
en place recently, under statutes which add a timing requirement.472
Another problem with requiring physical or sexual abuse is that 
there may be a lack of evidence of abuse that took place a long time ago. 
In addition, as explained in Section I, when there has been a pattern of 
coercive abuse, the act of separating alone can be the basis for future 
physical violence, even though no recent act of physical or sexual 
violence has occurred.473 As the authors have explained in prior articles, 
the time of the assault; (c) The assault is between persons who are parents of the same 
minor child, regardless of whether they have been married or have lived together at 
any time; (d) The assault is between persons who have been family or household 
members residing together within the past year and are not residing together at the 
time of the assault.” Id.; MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 208, § 31A (Westlaw through 
Act 450 of the 2018 Legis. Sess.). “For the purposes of this section, ‘abuse’ shall mean 
the occurrence of one or more of the following acts between a parent and the other 
parent or between a parent and child: (a) attempting to cause or causing bodily inju-
ry; or (b) placing another in reasonable fear of imminent bodily injury. ‘‘Serious inci-
dent of abuse’’ shall mean the occurrence of one or more of the following acts be-
tween a parent and the other parent or between a parent and child: (a) attempting to 
cause or causing serious bodily injury; (b) placing another in reasonable fear of immi-
nent serious bodily injury; or (c) causing another to engage involuntarily in sexual re-
lations by force, threat or duress.” Id.; OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 107.705(1) (Westlaw
through the emergency legis. of the 2018 Reg. Sess. and all Legis. of the 2018 1st 
Spec Sess.). Abuse means the occurrence of one or more of the following acts between 
family or household members: (a) Attempting to cause or intentionally, knowingly or 
recklessly causing bodily injury; (b) Intentionally, knowingly or recklessly placing an-
other in fear of imminent bodily injury.” Id.
471. Zuraff v. Reiger, 911 N.W.2d 887, 892 (N.D. 2018).
472. CAL. FAM. CODE § 3044 (a) (Westlaw through Ch. 1016 of 2018 Reg. Sess.)( stating 
that rebuttable presumption applies to “domestic violence within the previous five 
years against the other party seeking custody of the child, or against the child or the 
child’s siblings”); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 14-09-06.2 (1)(j) (Westlaw through the 
2017 Reg. Sess. of the 65th Legis. Assemb) (stating that the presumption is triggered 
when “there exists a pattern of domestic violence within a reasonable time proximate 
to the proceeding”).
473. See supra Section I.
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there is often a looming danger that will likely ignite after a domestic 
violence survivor leaves a coercively abusive intimate partner.474 Some 
states require more than one act of domestic violence, or one serious 
physical injury from the domestic violence, as a precondition to 
applying the rebuttable presumption.475 In contrast, some states pick up 
and more fully develop the concept of a pattern or history of domestic 
violence as the basis for the rebuttable presumption, or in the 
alternative, apply the presumption not only for one serious physical 
injury but also for attempts to cause serious injury.476 Some states 
474. See Stark & Choplin, supra note 69.
475. ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 25.24.150(g)(h) (Westlaw through the 2018 Second Reg. Sess. 
of the 30th Leg.) (stating that presumption only applies when a “parent has a history 
of perpetrating domestic violence,” which exists if “the court finds that, during one 
incident of domestic violence, the parent caused serious physical injury or the court 
finds that the parent has engaged in more than one incident of domestic violence”); 
LA. STAT. ANN. § 9:364 (A) (Westlaw through the 2018 Third Extraordinary Sess.)
(stating that the presumption is limited to when there is “a history of perpetrating 
family violence” which is when the court “finds that one incident of family violence 
has resulted in serious bodily injury or the court finds more than one incident of fam-
ily violence”).
476. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-403.03(D) (Westlaw through the First Spec 
and Second Reg. Sess. of the Fifty-Third Leg. 2018) (stating that the presumption 
only applies if “a person commits an act of domestic violence” which occurs “if that 
person does any of the following: (1) Intentionally, knowingly or recklessly causes or 
attempts to cause sexual assault or serious physical injury; (2) Places a person in rea-
sonable apprehension of imminent serious physical injury to any person; (3) Engages 
in a pattern of behavior for which a court may issue an ex parte order to protect the 
other parent who is seeking child custody or to protect the child and the child’s sib-
lings”); ARK. CODE § 9-13-101 (C)(1)(2) (Westlaw through law pass in the 2018 Fis-
cal Sess. and the Second Extraordinary Sess. of the 91st Ark. Gen. Assemb.) (provid-
ing for rebuttable presumption when there is a “pattern of domestic abuse”); IDAHO 
CODE ANN. § 32-717B(5) (West 2018) (limiting rebuttable presumption to when 
“one (1) of the parents is found by the court to be a habitual perpetrator of domestic 
violence”); IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.41(1)(b) (Westlaw through legislation from the 
2018 Reg. Sess.) (limiting rebuttable presumption to when there is “a history of do-
mestic abuse”); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 208 § 31A (Westlaw through Act 450 of 
the 2018 Leg. Sess. (requiring a “pattern or serious incident of abuse” for the pre-
sumption); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-5-24 (9)(A)(1) (Westlaw through the 2018 Reg.
and First Extraordinary Sess.) (limiting presumption to when there is “a parent who 
has a history of perpetrating family violence”). The court may find a history of perpe-
trating family violence if the court finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, one (1) 
incident of family violence that has resulted in serious bodily injury to, or a pattern of 
family violence against, the party making the allegation or a family household mem-
ber of either party.” Id.; TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.004(b) (Westlaw through the 
end of the 2017 Reg. and First Called Sess. of the 85th Leg.) (limiting rebuttable pre-
sumption to when there is “a history or pattern of past or present child neglect, or 
physical or sexual abuse”); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 767.41(2)(D) (Westlaw through 2017 
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exclude from the presumption situations where both parents have been 
abusive,477 but seek to distinguish true mutual fighting from a situation 
where one parent is the primary aggressor and the other parent is the 
primary victim.478 Excluding from the presumption situations where 
both parents have been abusive is appropriate when there is true mutual 
fighting. This would be in contrast to the situation where one party is 
the predominant aggressor, and the other’s use of violence is primarily 
defensive in nature or consists of occasional acts of retaliation. Even 
when there is mutual fighting, one state applies the rebuttable 
Act 370) (stating that rebuttable presumption applies only when “a party has engaged 
in a pattern or serious incident of interspousal battery”).
477. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-403.03(D) (Westlaw through the First Spec and Second 
Reg. Sess. of the Fifty-Third Leg. 2018) (stating that “this presumption does not ap-
ply if both parents have committed an act of domestic violence”); see also ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 13-3601(B) (Westlaw through the First Spec and Second Reg. Sess. of 
the Fifty-Third Leg. 2018) (stating that “an act of self-defense that is justified under 
chapter 4 of this title is not deemed to be an act of domestic violence.”).
478. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 705A(d) (Westlaw through 82 Laws 2019, ch. 2, 4). “In
those cases in which both parents are perpetrators of domestic violence, the case shall 
be referred to the Division of Family Services of the Department of Services for Chil-
dren, Youth and their Families for investigation and presentation of findings.” Id. 
“Upon consideration of such presentation, and all other relevant evidence, including 
but not limited to, evidence about the history of abuse between the parents and evi-
dence regarding whether [one] parent has been the primary aggressor in the house-
hold, the court shall decide custody and residence pursuant to the best interests of the 
child.” Id.; NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 125C.230(2) (Westlaw through all 608 Chapters 
of the Seventy-Ninth Reg. Sess.). “[I]f after an evidentiary hearing held pursuant to 
subsection 1 the court determines that more than one party has engaged in acts of 
domestic violence, it shall, if possible, determine which person was the primary phys-
ical aggressor.” Id. “[I]f it is not possible for the court to determine which party is the 
primary physical aggressor, the presumption created pursuant to subsection 1 applies 
to each of the parties.” Id. “If it is possible for the court to determine which party is 
the primary physical aggressor, the presumption created pursuant to subsection 1 ap-
plies only to the party determined by the court to be the primary physical aggressor.”
Id.; WIS. STAT. ANN. § 767.41(2) (Westlaw through 2017 Act 370). If “both parties 
engaged in a pattern or serious incident of interspousal battery, as described under s. 
940.19 or 940.20(1m), or domestic abuse, as defined in s. 813.12(1)(am), the party 
who engaged in the battery or abuse for purposes of the presumption under subd. 1. 
is the party that the court determines was the primary physical aggressor.” Id. “If the 
court must determine under subd. 2. which party was the primary physical aggressor 
and one, but not both, of the parties has been convicted of a crime that was an act of 
domestic abuse, as defined in s. 813.12(1)(am), with respect to the other party, the 
court shall find the party who was convicted of the crime to be the primary physical 
aggressor.” Id. “The presumption under subd. 1. does not apply if the court finds 
that both parties engaged in a pattern or serious incident of interspousal battery or 
domestic abuse but the court determines that neither party was the primary physical 
aggressor.” Id.
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presumption in favor of the parent who is determined to be less likely to 
commit domestic violence again.479 One state statute does not impose a 
rebuttable presumption against custody to a parent who has engaged in 
domestic violence, and instead prohibits custody (joint or sole) to a 
parent who has been convicted of murder in the first or second degree 
against the other parent or a sibling.480
A slightly larger number of states, however, do not create a 
rebuttable presumption against custody by the parent who has 
committed domestic violence, with the following 28 states providing 
that domestic violence is only a factor in determining the best interests 
of the child: Connecticut,481 Georgia,482 Illinois,483 Indiana,484 Kansas,485
479. ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 25.24.150(i) (Westlaw through the 2018 Second Reg. Sess. of 
the 30th Leg.). “If the court finds that both parents have a history of perpetrating 
domestic violence under (g) of this section, the court shall either (1) award sole legal 
and physical custody to the parent who is less likely to continue to perpetrate the vio-
lence and require that the custodial parent complete a treatment program; or (2) if 
necessary to protect the welfare of the child, award sole legal or physical custody, or 
both, to a suitable third person if the person would not allow access to a violent par-
ent except as ordered by the court.” Id.; LA. STAT. ANN. § 9:364(D) (Westlaw 
through the 2018 Third Extraordinary Sess.) (stating that “[i]f the court finds that 
both parents have a history of perpetrating family violence, custody shall be awarded 
solely to the parent who is less likely to continue to perpetrate family violence”);
MISS. CODE. ANN. § 93-5-24(9)(b)(ii) (Westlaw through the 2018 Reg. and First Ex-
traordinary Sess.) (stating that “[i]f the court finds that both parents have a history of 
perpetrating family violence, but the court finds that parental custody would be in 
the best interest of the child, custody may be awarded solely to the parent less likely 
to continue to perpetrate family violence”).
480. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 240 1-c(a) (Westlaw through 2019) (stating that “no court 
shall make an order providing for visitation or custody to a person who has been con-
victed of murder in the first or second degree in this state, or convicted of an offense 
in another jurisdiction which, if committed in this state, would constitute either 
murder in the first or second degree, of a parent, legal custodian, legal guardian, sib-
ling, half-sibling or step-sibling of any child who is the subject of the proceeding”).
481. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-56 (a),(c) (Westlaw through 2018 Reg. Sess.) (stat-
ing that in making or modifying an order for “custody or care of minor children” the 
court must consider “the effect on the child of the actions of an abuser, if any domes-
tic violence has occurred between the parents or between a parent and another indi-
vidual or the child”).
482. GA. CODE ANN. § 19-9-3 (a)(3) (Westlaw through the 2018 Extra Sess. of the Gen.
Assemb.) (listing 17 factors in determining the best interest of the child, with one fac-
tor being evidence of family violence).
483. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/602.7 (b)(11) (Westlaw through P.A. 100-1179, of the 2018 
Reg. Sess. of the 100th Gen. Assemb.) (stating that in making a decision concerning 
the “allocation of parental responsibilities: parenting time” the court must consider 
“the physical violence or threat of physical violence by the child’s parent directed 
against the child or other member of the child’s household”); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT.
5/602.7 (b)(14) (West 2018) (“the occurrence of abuse against the child or other 
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Kentucky,486 Maine,487 Maryland,488 Michigan,489 Missouri,490
Montana,491 Nebraska,492 New Hampshire,493 New Jersey,494 New 
member of the child’s household”); and 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/602.5 (13)(West 
2018) (“the occurrence of abuse against the child or other member of the child’s
household”).
484. IND. CODE ANN. § 31-17-2-8(7) (West 2018). “The court shall determine custody 
and enter a custody order in accordance with the best interests of the child. In deter-
mining the best interests of the child, there is no presumption favoring either parent.”
Id. “The court shall consider all relevant factors, including the following: . . . (7) Evi-
dence of a pattern of domestic or family violence by either parent.” Id.
485. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-3203(A) (Westlaw through the 2018 legis. sess.) (stating that 
“[i]n determining the issue of legal custody, residency and parenting time of a child, 
the court shall consider all relevant factors, including, but not limited to: . . . (9) evi-
dence of domestic abuse”); “There shall be a rebuttable presumption that it is not in 
the best interest of the child to have custody or residency granted to a parent who: (b) 
is residing with an individual who has been convicted of abuse of a child, K.S.A. 21-
3609, prior to its repeal, or K.S.A. 21-5602, and amendments thereto.” KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 23-3205 (Westlaw through the 2018 legis. sess.).
486. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.270 (2) (West 2018) http://www.lrc.ky.gov/statutes/
statute.aspx?id=48320 (stating that the court shall consider domestic violence when 
making custody decisions).
487. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 19-A, § 1653(3)(L) (Westlaw through the 2017 Second Reg. Sess.
and Second Spec Sess. of the 128th Leg.) (stating that the court must consider “do-
mestic abuse between the parents” and “child abuse”).
488. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 9-101.1(b) (Westlaw through all legis. from the 2018 
Reg. Sess. of the Gen. Assemb.) (stating that the court must consider “evidence of 
abuse by a party against: (1) the other parent of the party’s child; (2) the party’s 
spouse”).
489. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.23 (Westlaw through P.A.2018, No. 545 of the 
2018 Reg. Sess.,99th Michigan Leg.2018) (“‘[B]est interests of the child’ means the 
sum total of the following factors to be considered, evaluated, and determined by the 
court: . . . (k) Domestic violence, regardless of whether the violence was directed 
against or witnessed by the child.”).
490. MO. ANN. STAT. § 452.375(2) (Westlaw through the end of the 2018 Second Reg. 
Sess. and First Extraordinary Sess. of the 99th Gen. Assemb.). “When the parties 
have not reached an agreement on all issues related to custody, the court shall consid-
er all relevant factors and enter written findings of fact and conclusions of law, in-
cluding, but not limited to, the following: . . . (6) The mental and physical health of 
all individuals involved, including any history of abuse of any individuals involved.”
491. MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-212(1) (Westlaw through chapters effective, Oct. 1, 2017 
sess.). “The court shall determine the parenting plan in accordance with the best in-
terest of the child.” Id. “The court shall consider all relevant parenting factors, which 
may include but are not limited to: . . . (f) physical abuse or threat of physical abuse 
by one parent against the other parent or the child.” Id.
492. NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 43-2923(6) (Westlaw through the end of the 2nd Reg. Sess.
of the 105th Leg. 2018). “In determining custody and parenting arrangements, the 
court shall consider the best interests of the minor child, which shall include, but not 
be limited to, consideration of the foregoing factors and: . . . (d) Credible evidence of 
abuse inflicted on any family or household member.” Id.
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Mexico,495 New York,496 North Carolina,497 Ohio,498 Pennsylvania,499
Rhode Island,500 South Carolina,501 Tennessee,502 Utah,503 Vermont,504
493. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 461-A:6 (Westlaw through Chapter 379 of the 2018 Reg. 
Sess., 2018) (“In determining parental rights and responsibilities, the court shall be 
guided by the best interests of the child, and shall consider the following fac-
tors: . . . (j) Any evidence of abuse, as defined in RSA 173-B:1, I or RSA 169-C:3, II, 
and the impact of the abuse on the child and on the relationship between the child 
and the abusing parent.”).
494. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:2-4(C) (Westlaw through L.2018) (“In making an award of cus-
tody, the court shall consider but not be limited to the following factors: . . . the his-
tory of domestic violence, if any; the safety of the child and the safety of either parent 
from physical abuse by the other parent.”).
495. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-4-9.1 (A-B) (Westlaw through the end of the Second Reg. 
Sess. of the 53rd Leg.). “There shall be a presumption that joint custody is in the best 
interests of a child in an initial custody determination.” Id. “In determining whether 
a joint custody order is in the best interests of the child, in addition to the factors 
provided in Section 40-4-9 NMSA 1978, the court shall consider the following fac-
tors: . . . (9) whether a judicial adjudication has been made in a prior or the present 
proceeding that either parent or other person seeking custody has engaged in one or 
more acts of domestic abuse against the child, a parent of the child or other house-
hold member.” Id. Although domestic violence is only a factor, the statute does pro-
vide that “[I]f a determination is made that domestic abuse has occurred, the court 
shall set forth findings that the custody or visitation ordered by the court adequately 
protects the child, the abused parent or other household member.” Id.
496. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 240(1)(a) (Westlaw through 2019) (“Where either party to 
an action concerning custody of or a right to visitation with a child alleges in a sworn 
petition or complaint or sworn answer, cross-petition, counterclaim or other sworn 
responsive pleading that the other party has committed an act of domestic violence 
against the party making the allegation or a family or household member of either 
party . . . and such allegations are proven by a preponderance of the evidence, the 
court must consider the effect of such domestic violence upon the best interests of the 
child.”).
497. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 50-13.2(a) (Westlaw through S.L. 2018-145 of the 2018 
Reg. and Extra Sess. of the Gen. Assemb.). “An order for custody of a minor child 
entered pursuant to this section shall award the custody of such child to such person, 
agency, organization or institution as will best promote the interest and welfare of the 
child.” Id. “In making the determination, the court shall consider all relevant factors 
including acts of domestic violence between the parties, the safety of the child, and 
the safety of either party from domestic violence by the other party.” Id.
498. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3109.04(F)(2) (Westlaw through Files 115 to 117, 119, 
120, 122 to 154, 156, 158, 159, 162 to 165, 167, 169, 170 and 172 of the 132nd
Gen. Assemb. (2017-2018),) (“In determining whether shared parenting is in the 
best interest of the children, the court shall consider all relevant factors, including, 
but not limited to, the factors enumerated in division (F)(1) of this section, the fac-
tors enumerated in section 3119.23 of the Revised Code, and all of the following fac-
tors: . . . (c) Any history of, or potential for, child abuse, spouse abuse, other domes-
tic violence, or parental kidnapping by either parent.”).
499. 23 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5328(a) (Westlaw through 2018 Reg. Sess.
Act 164) (“In ordering any form of custody, the court shall determine the best inter-
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Virginia,505 Washington,506 West Virginia,507 and Wyoming.508 As 
explained earlier, a statutory approach that makes domestic violence 
est of the child by considering all relevant factors, giving weighted consideration to 
those factors which affect the safety of the child, including the following: . . . (2) The 
present and past abuse committed by a party or member of the party’s household, 
whether there is a continued risk of harm to the child or an abused party and which 
party can better provide adequate physical safeguards and supervision of the child.”).
500. 15 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 15-5-16(g) (Westlaw through Chapter 2 of the Jan. 2019 
Sess.) (“[T]he court, when making decisions regarding child custody and visitation, 
shall consider evidence of past or present domestic violence.”).
501. S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-15-40(A) (2008) (“In making a decision regarding custody of 
a minor child, in addition to other existing factors specified by law, the court must 
give weight to evidence of domestic violence.”).
502. TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-6-106(A) (Westlaw through the end of the 2018 Second 
Reg. Sess. of the 110th Tenn. Gen. Assemb.). “In a suit for annulment, divorce, sepa-
rate maintenance, or in any other proceeding requiring the court to make a custody 
determination regarding a minor child, the determination shall be made on the basis 
of the best interest of the child.” Id. “The court shall consider all relevant factors, in-
cluding the following, where applicable: . . . (11) Evidence of physical or emotional 
abuse to the child, to the other parent or to any other person.” Id.
503. UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-10.2(2) (Westlaw through the 2018 Second Spec Sess.)
(“In determining whether the best interest of a child will be served by ordering joint 
legal or physical custody, the court shall consider the following factors: . . . (i) any 
history of, or potential for, child abuse, spouse abuse, or kidnaping.”).
504. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 665 (Westlaw through the end of the 2017 adjourned sess. 
and the first Spec. sess. 2018) (stating that in entering “an order concerning parental 
rights and responsibilities of any minor child of the parties . . . the court shall be 
guided by the best interests of the child and shall consider at least the following fac-
tors: . . . (9) evidence of abuse, as defined in section 1101 of this title, and the impact 
of the abuse on the child and on the relationship between the child and the abusing 
parent.”).
505. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-124.3 (Westlaw through the end of the 2018 Reg. Sess. and 
2018 Sp. Sess. I) (“In determining best interests of a child for purposes of determin-
ing custody or visitation arrangements including any pendente lite orders pursuant to 
§ 20-103, the court shall consider the following: . . . (9) Any history of family abuse 
as that term is defined in § 16.1-228 or sexual abuse.”).
506. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.09.191(1) (West 2017) (stating that “[t]he permanent 
parenting plan shall not require mutual decision-making or designation of a dispute
resolution process other than court action if it is found that a parent has engaged in 
any of the following conduct: . . . (c) a history of acts of domestic violence as defined 
in RCW 26.50.010(3)”).
507. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-9-209(a) (West 2005) (stating that “[i]f either of the par-
ents so requests, or upon receipt of credible information thereof, the court shall de-
termine whether a parent who would otherwise be allocated responsibility under a 
parenting plan: . . . (3) Has committed domestic violence, as defined in section 27-
202.”).
508. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 20-2-201(c) (Westlaw through chapters effective March 15 of 
the 2019 Gen. Sess. of the Wyo. Leg.). “The court shall consider evidence of spousal 
abuse or child abuse as being contrary to the best interest of the children.” Id. “If the 
90 michigan  jo urn al  o f  g ender & la w [Vol. 26:1
only a factor in determining the best interests of the child, versus 
creating a rebuttable presumption about what is in the best interest of 
the child, fails to adequately take domestic violence into account,
particularly in situations where the domestic violence includes a pattern 
of coercive abuse.509 Colorado takes a position in between creating a 
rebuttable presumption and providing for domestic violence to be just a 
factor in determining the best interests of the child. Colorado’s statute 
requires the court to consider as its “primary concern” the safety and 
well-being of the child and the abused party when the other party has 
committed domestic violence.510
In addition to a rebuttable presumption to grant sole decision-
making and primary parenting time to the survivor of domestic vio-
lence, courts should also consider whether to order further protective 
measures relating to the parenting time of parents who have engaged in 
domestic violence. This is due to the large body of evidence that chil-
dren exposed to domestic violence are in danger of serious and long-
term harm when a protective parent is not being supported.511 As de-
tailed and documented in Section I, there is a likelihood of further do-
mestic violence if the parents continue to have significant contact with 
each other in situational couple violence situations. There is also a like-
lihood that abuse will escalate after the couple separates when there has 
been a pattern of coercive abuse.
To what extent do states, in their child custody laws, require courts 
to order restrictions or conditions on parenting time to protect children 
and the parent survivor of domestic violence from further harm? Based 
on a review of the Resource Center on Domestic Violence: Child Pro-
tection and Custody, a Project of the Family Violence and Domestic 
Relations Program of the National Council of Juvenile and Family 
Court Judges (2013) (hereinafter the “NCJFCJ Chart”), and a review of 
state legislation,512 the following 34 states expressly and clearly refer to 
court finds that family violence has occurred, the court shall make arrangements for 
visitation that best protects the children and the abused spouse from further harm.”
Id.
509. See supra Section I.D.
510. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-10-124 (West 2017).
511. See supra Section I.
512. DALTON ET AL., supra note 123. The NCJFCJ Chart is labeled “CONDITIONS ON 
VISITATION IN CASES INVOLVING DOMESTIC AND FAMILY 
VIOLENCE” and lists 42 states and the District of Columbia with statutory cites 
and statutory language. It appears to have excluded states that did not contain the 
subject matter of the chart. We have independently researched the laws in the chart 
and the additional eight states not in the chart, and the results of this research are in-
cluded in this article. In some cases, the laws reflected in the chart have been repealed 
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domestic violence, domestic abuse, or family violence (including abuse 
of the other parent) as a basis to restrict or provide conditions on par-
enting time to protect the child or parent victim of domestic violence: 
Alabama,513 Alaska,514 Arizona,515 California,516 Colorado,517 Florida,518
or the statutory language has been modified. In some cases, the statutory language is 
from a state’s order of protection/domestic violence statute rather than from their 
domestic relations/divorce statute. Thus, the list of states we present for providing 
domestic violence as a basis to restrict or provide conditions on visitation/parenting 
time is less than the 42 states listed in the chart. We also found some examples of 
states not in the list that provide for domestic violence as a basis to restrict or provide 
conditions on visitation/parenting time.
513. ALA. CODE § 30-3-135 (Westlaw through Act 2018-579) (“A court may award visita-
tion by a parent who committed domestic or family violence only if the court finds 
that adequate provision for the safety of the child and the parent who is a victim of 
domestic or family violence can be made.”).
514. ALASKA STAT. ANN § 25.20.061 (Westlaw through the 2018 Second Reg. Sess. of the 
30th Leg.). “If visitation is awarded to a parent who has committed a crime involving 
domestic violence, against the other parent or a child of the two parents, within the 
five years preceding the award of visitation the court may set conditions for the visita-
tion, including: (1) the transfer of the child for visitation must occur in a protected 
setting; (2) visitation shall be supervised by another person or agency and under spec-
ified conditions as ordered by the court; (3) the perpetrator shall attend and com-
plete, to the satisfaction of the court, a program for the rehabilitation of perpetrators 
of domestic violence that meets the standards set by the Department of Corrections, 
or other counseling; the perpetrator shall be required to pay the costs of the program 
or other counseling; (4) the perpetrator shall abstain from possession or consumption 
of alcohol or controlled substances during the visitation and for 24 hours before visit-
ation; (5) the perpetrator shall pay costs of supervised visitation as set by the court; 
(6) the prohibition of overnight visitation; (7) the perpetrator shall post a bond to the 
court for the return and safety of the child; and (8) any other condition necessary for 
the safety of the child, the other parent, or other household member.” Id.
515. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-403.03(F) (Westlaw through the First Spec and Second 
Reg. Sess. of the Fifty-Third Leg. 2018). “If the court finds that a parent has commit-
ted an act of domestic violence, that parent has the burden of proving to the court’s
satisfaction that parenting time will not endanger the child or significantly impair the 
child’s emotional development.” Id. “If the parent meets this burden to the court’s
satisfaction, the court shall place conditions on parenting time that best protect the 
child and the other parent from further harm.” Id. “The court may: (1) Order that an 
exchange of the child must occur in a protected setting as specified by the court; (2)
Order that an agency specified by the court must supervise parenting time. If the 
court allows a family or household member to supervise parenting time, the court 
shall establish conditions that this person must follow during parenting time; (3) Or-
der the parent who committed the act of domestic violence to attend and complete, 
to the court’s satisfaction, a program of intervention for perpetrators of domestic vio-
lence and any other counseling the court orders; (4) Order the parent who commit-
ted the act of domestic violence to abstain from possessing or consuming alcohol or 
controlled substances during parenting time and for 24 hours before parenting time; 
(5) Order the parent who committed the act of domestic violence to pay a fee for the 
costs of supervised parenting time; (6) Prohibit overnight parenting time; (7) Require 
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Georgia,519 Hawaii,520 Indiana521 Kentucky,522 Louisiana,523 Maine,524
Maryland,525 Massachusetts,526 Michigan,527 Minnesota,528Mississippi,529
a bond from the parent who committed the act of domestic violence for the child’s
safe return; (8) Order that the address of the child and the other parent remain con-
fidential; (9) Impose any other condition that the court determines is necessary to 
protect the child, the other parent and any other family or household member.” Id.
516. CAL. FAM. CODE § 3100(c) (Westlaw through all laws through Ch. 1016 of 2018 
Reg.Sess.) (“If visitation is ordered in a case in which domestic violence is alleged and 
an emergency protective order, protective order, or other restraining order has been 
issued, the visitation order shall specify the time, day, place, and manner of transfer 
of the child so as to limit the child’s exposure to potential domestic conflict or vio-
lence and to ensure the safety to all family members.”).
517. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-10-124(4)(IV)(e) (Westlaw through laws effective Sept. 
1, 2018 of the Second Reg. Sess. of the 71st Gen. Assemb.) (“When the court finds 
by a preponderance of the evidence that one of the parties has committed child abuse 
or neglect or domestic violence, in formulating or approving a parenting plan, the 
court shall consider conditions on parenting time that ensure the safety of the child 
and of the abused party.”).
518. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.13(C)(2) (Westlaw through the 2018 Second Reg. Sess. of the 
25th Leg.) (“If the court determines that shared parental responsibility would be det-
rimental to the child, it may order sole parental responsibility and makes such ar-
rangements for time sharing as specified in the parenting plan as will best protected 
the child or abused spouse from further harm. Whether or not there is a conviction of 
any offense of domestic violence or child abuse or the existence of an injunction for 
protection against domestic violence, the court shall consider evidence of domestic 
violence or child abuse as evidence of detriment to the child.”).
519. GA. CODE ANN. § 19-9-7(a) (Westlaw through the 2018 Reg. and Spec Legis. Sess.)
(“A judge may award visitation by a parent who committed domestic or family vio-
lence only if the court finds that adequate provision for the safety of the child and the 
parent who is a victim of domestic or family violence can be made.”).
520. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 571-476 (Westlaw through the end of the 2018 Second 
Spec Sess.) (“(10) A court may award visitation to a parent who has committed fami-
ly violence only if the court finds that adequate provision can be made for the physi-
cal safety and psychological well-being of the child and for the safety of the parent 
who is a victim of family violence; (11) In a visitation order, a court may” listing sev-
eral protective measures including supervised parenting time and supervised exchang-
es).
521. IND. CODE ANN. § 31-17-2-8.3 (West 2017) (“If a court finds that a noncustodial 
parent has been convicted of a crime involving domestic or family violence that was 
witnessed or heard by the noncustodial parent’s child there is created a rebuttable 
presumption that the court shall order that the noncustodial parent’s parenting time 
with the child must be supervised.”).
522. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.320(2) (West 2011) (“If domestic violence and 
abuse . . . has been alleged, the court shall, after a hearing, determine the visitation ar-
rangement, if any, which would not endanger seriously the child’s or the custodial 
parent’s physical, mental, or emotional health.”).
523. LA STAT. ANN. § 9:364(E) (Westlaw through the 2018 Third Extraordinary Sess.)
(“If the court finds that a parent has a history of perpetrating family violence, the 
court shall allow only supervised child visitation with that parent”).
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Missouri,530 Nebraska,531 Nevada,532 New Hampshire,533 New Mexico,534
North Carolina,535 North Dakota,536 Oklahoma,537 Pennsylvania,538
524. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 1653(6) (Westlaw through the 2017 Second Reg.
Sess. and Second Spec Sess. of the 128th Leg.) (“Conditions of parent-child contact 
in cases involving domestic abuse. The court shall establish conditions of parent-child 
contact in cases involving domestic abuse . . . . In an order of parental rights and re-
sponsibilities, a court may: [statute lists six specific conditions on parenting time and 
a general catch all).
525. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 9-101.1(c) (Westlaw through 2018 Sess.) (“If the 
court finds that a party has committed abuse against the other parent or the party’s
child, the party’s spouse, or any child residing within the party’s household, the court 
shall make arrangements for custody or visitation that best protect (1) the child who 
is the subject of the proceeding; and (2) the victim of the abuse.”).
526. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 208 § 31A(i) (LEXIS through Act 450 of the 2018 Leg. Sess.) 
(“Imposing any other condition that is deemed necessary to provide for the safety and 
well-being of the child and the safety of the abused parent.”).
527. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.23(k) (Westlaw through 2018 Leg. Sess.) (“Domes-
tic violence, regardless of whether the violence was directed against or witnessed by 
the child.”).
528. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.175 (Subd. 1a)(a) (Westlaw through 2018 Sess.) (“If a par-
ent requests supervised parenting time under subdivision 1 or 5 and an order for pro-
tection under chapter 518B or a similar law of another state is in effect against the 
other parent to protect the parent with whom the child resides or the child, the judge 
or judicial officer must consider the order for protection in making a decision regard-
ing parenting time.”).
529. MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-5-24(9)(d)(ii) (Westlaw through the 2018 regular and first 
extraordinary session) (“A court may award visitation by a parent who committed 
domestic or family violence only if the court finds that adequate provision for the 
safety of the child and the parent who is a victim of domestic or family violence can 
be made.”).
530. MO. ANN. STAT. § 452.410(2)(6) (Westlaw through the end of the 2018 Second 
Regular Session and First Extraordinary Session of the 99th General Assembly)
(“Custody and visitation rights shall be ordered in a manner that best protects the 
child and any other child or children for whom the parent has custodial or visitation 
rights, and the parent or other family or household member who is the victim of do-
mestic violence from any further harm.”).
531. NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 43-2934(2) (Westlaw through the end of the 2nd Regular 
Session of the 105th Legislature 2018) (“When making an order or parenting plan 
for custody, parenting time, visitation, or other access in a case in which domestic 
abuse is alleged and a restraining order, protection order, or criminal no-contact or-
der has been issued, the court shall consider whether the best interests of the child, 
based upon the circumstances of the case, require that any custody, parenting time, 
visitation, or other access arrangement be limited to situations in which a third per-
son, specified by the court, is present, or whether custody, parenting time, visitation, 
or other access should be suspended or denied.”).
532. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 125C.230(1)(b) (Westlaw through the end of the 2nd Reg-
ular Session of the 105th Legislature 2018) (“Findings that the custody or visitation 
arrangement ordered by the court adequately protects the child and the parent or 
other victim of domestic violence who resided with the child.”).
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Rhode Island,539 South Carolina,540 Texas541 Vermont,542 Washington,543
Wisconsin,544 West Virginia,545 and Wyoming.546 Providing specific stat-
533. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 461-A:6(1)(j) (Westlaw through 2018 Sess.) (“Any evidence 
of abuse, as defined in RSA 173-B:1, I or RSA 169-C:3, II, and the impact of the 
abuse on the child and on the relationship between the child and the abusing par-
ent.”).
534. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-4-9.1(B)(9) (Westlaw through the end of the Second Regular 
Session of the 53rd Legislature) (“If a determination is made that domestic abuse has 
occurred, the court shall set forth findings that the custody or visitation ordered by 
the court adequately protects the child.”).
535. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 50-13.2(b) (Westlaw through S.L. 2018-145 of the 2018 
Regular and Extra Sessions of the General Assembly) (“Any order for custody shall 
include such terms, including visitation, as will best promote the interest and welfare 
of the child. If the court finds that domestic violence has occurred, the court shall en-
ter such orders that best protect the children and party who were the victims of do-
mestic violence, in accordance with the provisions of G.S. 50B-3(a1)(1), (2), and 
(3).”).
536. N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 14-09-29(2) (Westlaw through the 2017 Regular Session 
of the 65th Legislative Assembly and results of the Nov. 6, 2018, election) (“If the 
court finds that a parent has perpetrated domestic violence and that parent does not 
have residential responsibility, and there exists one incident of domestic violence 
which resulted in serious bodily injury or involved the use of a dangerous weapon or 
there exists a pattern of domestic violence within a reasonable time proximate to the 
proceeding, the court shall allow only supervised parenting time with that parent un-
less there is a showing by clear and convincing evidence that unsupervised parenting 
time would not endanger the child’s physical or emotional health.”).
537. OKLA. STAT. tit. 43, § 111.1(3) (Westlaw through legislation of the Second Regular 
Session of the 56th Legislature 2018) (“The court may award visitation by a noncus-
todial parent who was determined to have committed domestic violence . . . if the 
court is able to provide for the safety of the child and the parent who is the victim of 
that domestic violence.”).
538. 23 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5328(a)(2) (Westlaw through 2018 Regular 
Session Act 164) (“The present and past abuse committed by a party or member of 
the party’s household, whether there is a continued risk of harm to the child or an 
abused party and which party can better provide adequate physical safeguards and 
supervision of the child.”).
539. tit. 15 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-5-16 (g)(1) (2018) (“[T]he court, when making decisions 
regarding child custody and visitation, shall consider evidence of past or present do-
mestic violence. Where domestic violence is proven, any grant of visitation shall be 
arranged so as to best protect the child and the abused parent from further harm.”).
540. S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-15-50(A) (Westlaw through 2018 Act No. 292) (“A court may 
award visitation to a person who has been found by a general sessions, magistrates, 
municipal, or family court to have committed domestic violence . . . or in cases in 
which complaints were made against both parties, to the person found by a general 
sessions, magistrates, municipal, or family court to be the primary aggressor . . . only 
if the court finds that adequate provision for the safety of the child and the victim of 
domestic violence can be made.”).
541. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.004(c) (Westlaw through 2017 Regular and First 
Called Sessions of the 85th Legislature)(“The court shall consider the commission of 
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utory support to impose protective conditions and restrictions on par-
enting time based upon domestic violence is a strong way to take do-
mestic violence into account in child custody cases. It would help em-
power domestic violence survivors to protect themselves and their 
family violence or sexual abuse in determining whether to deny, restrict, or limit the 
possession of a child by a parent who is appointed as a possessory conservator.”); TEX.
FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.004(d)-(d)(1) (Westlaw through 2017 Regular and First 
Called Sessions of the 85th Legislature)(“The court may not allow a parent to have 
access to a child for whom it is shown by a preponderance of the evidence that: (1) 
there is a history or pattern of committing family violence during the two years pre-
ceding the date of the filing of the suit or during the pendency of the suit.”); TEX.
FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.004(d-1)-(d-1)(2) (Westlaw through 2017 Regular and First 
Called Sessions of the 85th Legislature) (“Notwithstanding Subsection (d), the court 
may allow a parent to have access to a child if the court: (1) finds that awarding the 
parent access to the child would not endanger the child’s physical health or emotional 
welfare and would be in the best interest of the child; and (2) renders a possession or-
der that is designed to protect the safety and well-being of the child and any other 
person who has been a victim of family violence committed by the parent and that 
may include a requirement that”)(proceeding to list four protective measures includ-
ing supervised parenting time and supervised exchanges of the child).
542. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 665a(a) (Westlaw through all acts of the Adjourned Session 
of the 2017-2018 Vermont General Assembly and all acts of the First Spec Session of 
the Adjourned Session of the 2017-2018 Vermont General Assembly 2018) (“If 
within the prior ten years, one of the parents has been convicted of domestic assault 
or aggravated domestic assault against the other parent, or has been found to have 
committed abuse against a family or household member . . . the court may award 
parent-child contact to that parent if the court finds that adequate provision can be 
made for the safety of the child and the parent who is a victim of domestic vio-
lence.”).
543. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.10.160(2)(a) (Westlaw through Chapter 4 of the 2019 
Regular Session) (“Visitation with the child shall be limited if its found that the par-
ent seeking visitation has engaged in any of the following conduct: . . .(iii) a history 
of acts of domestic violence as defined in RCW 26.50.010(3)”).
544. WISC. STAT. ANN. § 767.41(6)(g) (Westlaw through 2017 Act 370) (“If the court 
finds . . . that a party has engaged in . . . domestic abuse . . . And the court awards pe-
riods of physical placement to both parties, the court shall provide for the safety and 
well-being of the child and for the safety of the party who was the victim of the bat-
tery or abuse. For that purpose the court . . . shall impose one or more of the follow-
ing appropriate”) (proceeding to list seven specific protective conditions on parenting 
time and an eighth catch all).
545. W. VA. CODE § 48-27-509(a) (Westlaw through legislation of the 2018 First Ex-
traordinary Session) (“A court may award visitation of a child by a parent who has 
committed domestic violence only if the court finds that adequate provision for the 
safety of the child and the petitioner can be made.”).
546. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 20-2-201(c) (Westlaw through March 15 of the 2019 General 
Session) (“The court shall consider evidence of spousal abuse or child abuse as being 
contrary to the best interest of the children. If the court finds that family violence has 
occurred, the court shall make arrangements for visitation that best protects the chil-
dren and the abused spouse from further harm.”).
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children from further harm. But as noted earlier in the context of states 
with rebuttable presumptions against custody to an abusive parent, 
some of these states narrowly define domestic violence, which can re-
duce the ability of domestic violence survivors to obtain protective con-
ditions or restrictions on parenting time.547
In addition to these 34 states, four other states’ custody laws could 
be construed to be referring to domestic violence as a basis to impose 
protective restrictions or conditions on parenting time, but the language 
in their statutes is not as clear as in the statutes of the 34 states noted 
above. These four states are: Arkansas,548 Oregon,549 New York,550 and 
Virginia.551
547. See supra notes 446-467 and accompanying text.
548. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-13-101(c)(1) (Westlaw through the 2018 Fiscal Session and 
the Second Extraordinary Session of the 91st Arkansas General Assembly) (If a party 
to an action concerning custody of or a right to visitation with a child has committed 
an act of domestic violence against the party making the allegation . . . the circuit 
court must consider the effect of such domestic violence upon the best interests of the 
child . . . together with such facts and circumstances as the circuit court deems rele-
vant in making a direction pursuant to this section.”).
549. As previously noted, Oregon creates a rebuttable presumption that it is not in the 
best interests and welfare of the child to award sole or joint custody of the child to a 
parent who committed abuse against a family or household member. OR. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 107.137(2) (Westlaw through 2018 Regular Session). In OR. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 107.101 (Westlaw through 2018 Regular Session), “It is the policy of this 
state to: . . . (5) Consider the best interests of the child and the safety of the parties in 
developing a parenting plan.” OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 107.101 (Westlaw through 
2018 Regular Session). While this language does not explicitly refer to “domestic vio-
lence” or other forms of intimate partner abuse, when it refers to the “safety of the 
parties” (which parties would typically be the parents) it seems likely it is including 
safety concerns due to domestic violence. This would then serve as the basis to condi-
tion parenting time by directing courts to consider the safety of the parents when de-
termining how parenting time should be structured.
550. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 240(1)(a) (Westlaw through L.2019) (In any action or pro-
ceeding brought . . . (3) for a divorce . . . . Where either party to an action concern-
ing custody of or a right to visitation with a child alleges . . . the other party has 
committed an act of domestic violence against the party making the allegation or a 
family or household member of either party . . . and such allegations are proven by a 
preponderance of the evidence, the court must consider the effect of such domestic 
violence upon the best interests of the child, together with such other facts and cir-
cumstances as the court deems relevant in making a direction pursuant to this section 
and state on the record how such findings, facts and circumstances factored into the 
direction.”). The statutory language does not make clear whether the direction re-
ferred to in this statute includes denial of or restriction of the right to visitation.
551. VA. CODE ANN. §20-124.3 (Westlaw through 2018 Regular Session) (“In determin-
ing best interests of a child for purposes of determining custody or visitation ar-
rangements including any pendente lite orders pursuant to §20-103, the court shall 
consider the following: . . . 9. Any history of family abuse as that term is defined in 
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The 34 states that have expressly and clearly required or authorized 
their courts to condition or restrict the parenting time of a parent who 
engages in domestic violence much better enable domestic violence sur-
vivors to protect themselves and their children from further abuse and 
harm than do the following 12 states that fail to do so in their divorce 
or parentage statutes: Connecticut,552 Delaware,553 Idaho,554 Illinois,555
Iowa,556 Kansas,557 New Jersey,558 Montana,559 Ohio,560 South Dakota,561
Tennessee,562 and Utah.563
§16.1-228 or sexual abuse.”). The reference to “visitation arrangements” could in-
clude ordering protective measures due to the family violence, which would include 
domestic violence. But the statute is not clearer.
552. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-56(a) (Westlaw through P.A. 14-3) (discussing the 
court’s ability to “award custody to either parent or a third party . . . subject to such 
conditions and limitations as it deems equitable,” without specifically referencing 
domestic violence as a basis for such conditions or limitations).
553. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 728(a) (Westlaw through 82 Laws 2019) (requiring 
courts to “permit and encourage the child to have frequent and meaningful contact 
with both parents unless the Court finds, after a hearing, that contact of the child 
with 1 parent would endanger the child’s physical health or significantly impair his or 
her emotional development,” and further stating that “[t]he court shall specifically 
state in any order denying or restricting a parent’s access to a child the facts and con-
clusions of such a denial or restriction,” without expressly referencing domestic vio-
lence as a basis for such a finding).
554. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-717E (Westlaw through First Reg. Sess. of 65th Leg.) (fail-
ing to mention domestic violence in this section where it refers to cases in which a 
court has ordered supervised parenting time or supervised exchanges or transfers of 
the children). But see IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-717B(5) (Westlaw through First Reg. 
Sess. of 65th Leg.) (mentioning a presumption that joint custody is not in the best 
interests of a minor child if one of the parents is found to be a habitual perpetrator of 
domestic violence, but not directly referencing a need for restrictions on parenting 
time based upon domestic violence).
555. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/603.10(a) (Westlaw through P.A. 99-90) (explaining 
that “[a]fter a hearing, if the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that a 
parent engaged in any conduct that seriously endangered the child’s mental, moral, or 
physical health or that significantly impaired the child’s emotional development, the 
court shall enter orders as necessary to protect the child,” and specifying a non-
exhaustive list of eight specific restriction on parenting time, plus a ninth catch-all, 
without express reference to domestic violence as the kind of conduct that would 
trigger this finding); but see id. at (a)(8) (“requiring a parent to complete a treatment 
program for perpetrators of abuse . . . or for other behavior that is the basis for re-
stricting parental responsibilities under this Section,” and thus opening the door for 
the argument that such abuse could be the basis for restricting parenting time).
556. While the Iowa Code requires courts to “consider, in the award of visitation to a par-
ent of a child, the criminal history of the parent if the parent has been convicted of a 
sex offense against a minor,” IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.41A (Westlaw through Feb. 
19, 2019), and provides that courts shall not “[a]ward visitation rights to a child’s
parent who has been convicted of murder in the first degree of the child’s other par-
ent, unless the court finds that such visitation is in the best interest of the child,”
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2. Illinois: A Case Study
Another way to evaluate the different approaches to taking domes-
tic violence into account in child custody laws is to consider two specific 
states and the ability of a domestic violence survivor in each state to pro-
IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.41B (Westlaw through Feb. 19, 2019), there was no express 
reference to domestic violence as the basis for conditions or restrictions on visitation
or parenting time under the Iowa Code.
557. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-3208 (Westlaw through 2018 Reg. Sess.) (explaining parents 
are entitled “to reasonable parenting time unless the court finds, after a hearing, that 
the exercise of parenting time would seriously endanger the child’s physical, mental, 
moral or emotional health,” without referencing domestic violence as a basis for this 
finding).
558. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:2-4.1 (Westlaw through L.2019, c. 35) (specifying sexual assault 
of a child as a basis to deny visitation rights); compare N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:2-4
(Westlaw through L.2019, c. 35) (listing domestic violence as a factor for determin-
ing custody, but not as a basis to condition or restrict parenting time).
559. MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-218 (Westlaw though chapters effective, Oct. 1, 2017 
sess.) (explaining “if the court finds that in the absence of the order the child’s physi-
cal health would be endangered or the child’s emotional development significantly 
impaired, the court may order supervised visitation by the noncustodial parent,”
without referencing domestic violence as a basis for supervised visitation).
560. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3109.051(D) (Westlaw through Files 115 to 117, 119, 
120, 122 to 154, 156, 158, 159, 162 to 165, 167, 169, 170 and 172 of the 132nd 
Gen. Assemb. 2018) (listing factors to be considered when determining whether to 
grant parenting time to a parent pursuant to this section, none of which directly refer 
to domestic violence, although one factor addresses criminal convictions involving an 
act that resulted in a child being an abused child or a neglected child).
561. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §25-4A-10 (Westlaw through 2018 Reg. and Spec Sess.) (“Su-
preme Court to promulgate guidelines for noncustodial parenting time.”). This con-
tains no reference to domestic violence in its charge to the South Dakota Supreme 
Court to promulgate guidelines to be used statewide for minimum noncustodial par-
enting time in divorce or any other custody action or proceeding. Id.
562. TENN. CODE. ANN. §36-6-301 (Westlaw through the end of the 2018 Second Reg. 
Sess, of the Tenn. Gen. Assemb.) (“If the court finds that the non-custodial parent 
has physically or emotionally abused the child, the court may require that visitation 
be supervised or prohibited until such abuse has ceased or until there is no reasonable 
likelihood that such abuse will recur.”). There is no reference to domestic violence as 
the basis for supervising or prohibiting visitation. Id.
563. UTAH CODE ANN. §30-3-34.5 (Westlaw through the 2018 Second Spec. Sess.). 
(Under the “Supervised parent-time” heading: “Considering the fundamental liberty 
interests of parents and children, it is the policy of this state that divorcing parents 
have unrestricted and unsupervised access to their children. When necessary to pro-
tect a child and no less restrictive means is reasonably available however, a court may 
order supervised parent-time if the court finds evidence that the child would be sub-
ject to physical or emotional harm or child abuse . . . from the noncustodial parent if 
left unsupervised with the noncustodial parent.”) There is no reference to domestic 
violence being the basis for ordering supervised parenting time. Id.
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tect themselves and their children from further harm. Illinois broadly 
defines what conduct constitutes domestic violence and can trigger an 
order of protection, and it provides very protective temporary orders on 
child custody under its orders of protection.564 However, the child cus-
tody laws in Illinois that apply in a divorce or paternity action are quite 
different.565 The child custody laws in Illinois that apply in a divorce or 
paternity action make it very difficult for survivors of domestic violence 
to obtain needed protections for themselves and their children.
A parent perpetrating domestic violence is just one of many factors 
that courts are required to consider when determining the best interests 
of the child for purposes of ordering custody in a divorce or parentage 
case in Illinois.566 There is no rebuttable presumption in Illinois against 
joint or sole decision-making or primary or significant parenting time to 
a parent who engages in domestic violence as there are in 21 other 
states. And, because there is evidence that courts accord much more 
weight to the “friendly parent” factor (which parent better fosters a 
564. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/103(1) (Westlaw through P.A. 100-1179 of the 2018 Reg. 
Sess.) (“‘Abuse’ means physical abuse, harassment, intimidation of a dependent, in-
terference with personal liberty or willful deprivation”); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/
214(b)(5)—(6) (Westlaw through P.A. 100-1179 of the 2018 Reg. Sess.) (each sec-
tion contains a rebuttable presumption that awarding physical care and possession of 
the minor child, or the temporary allocation of parental responsibilites and decision-
making, respectively, to a respondent in an order of protection who has engaged in 
“Abuse” would not be in the minor child’s best interest); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/
214(b)(7) (Westlaw through P.A. 100-1179 of the 2018 Reg. Sess.) (provides that: 
“the court shall restrict or deny respondent’s parenting time with a minor child if the 
court finds that respondent has done or is likely to do any of the following: (i) abuse 
or endanger the minor child during parenting time; (ii) use the parenting time as an 
opportunity to abuse or harass petitioner or petitioner’s family or household mem-
bers; . . . (iv) otherwise act in a manner that is not in the best interest of the minor 
child.”). Id.
565. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/602.5, /602.7, /603.10 (Westlaw through P.A. 100-1179 of 
the 2018 Reg. Sess.).
566. See CH. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5 / 602.5(C)(13) (Westlaw through P.A. 100-
1179 of the 2018 Reg. Sess.). § 602.5 is entitled “Allocation of parental responsibili-
ties: decision-making” and provides: “(c) Determination of child’s best interests. In 
determining the child’s best interests for purposes of allocating significant decision-
making responsibilities, the court shall consider all relevant factors, including, with-
out limitation, the following: . . . (13) the occurrence of abuse against the child or 
other member of the child’s household.” Id.; CH.750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5 /
602.7(B)(14) (Westlaw through P.A. 100-1179 of the 2018 Reg. Sess.). § 602.7 is 
entitled “Allocation of parental responsibilities: parenting time” and provides: “In de-
termining the child’s best interests for purposes of allocating parenting time, the 
court shall consider all relevant factors, including, without limitation, the follow-
ing: . . . (14) the occurrence of abuse against the child or other member of the child’s
household.” Id.
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positive relationship of the child with the other parent), than the factor 
of domestic violence,567 not having a rebuttable presumption against 
custody to a parent who has engaged in domestic violence makes it less 
likely that a court will accord appropriate weight to the domestic 
violence.568
As discussed in Section I, there is substantial evidence that judges 
place more weight on the “friendly parent” factor and claims of aliena-
tion than they do to claims of domestic violence, and even claims of di-
rect abuse of the child. Judges in a divorce or paternity case often view 
claims of domestic violence skeptically569 and wonder whether the par-
ent alleging the domestic violence is lying or exaggerating, either to gain 
an economic advantage in the divorce or parentage case or out of ani-
mus. This has been documented to lead judges to treat a protective par-
ent as an alienating parent and to order child custody in line with what 
the abusive parent has sought, rather than the abused parent.570 As ex-
plained in Section I, when a parent is a survivor of domestic violence, 
especially a pattern of coercive abuse, it is not appropriate for a court to 
require that parent to “cooperate” with the abusive parent. This is be-
cause the abusive parent often uses parenting time and decision-making 
as a means to further abuse the other parent rather than act in the best 
interests of the child. Furthermore, the contacts necessary to cooperate 
can lead to dangerous interactions and abusive communications.571
Another key problem with domestic violence being just a factor, 
versus creating a rebuttable presumption, is that judges and the profes-
sionals they rely upon fail to realize how harmful repeated and/or severe
domestic violence by one parent against the other parent is to children. 
With a rebuttable presumption, a court would have to accord significant 
weight to domestic violence in its child custody decisions.
567. See Meier & Dickson, supra note 2, at 315, 331.
568. See CH. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5 / 602.5(C)(11) (Westlaw through P.A. 100-
1179 of the 2018 Reg. Sess.) and CH. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5 / 602.7(B)(13)
(Westlaw through P.A. 100-1179 of the 2018 Reg. Sess.) (both including as a factor 
“the willingness and ability of each parent to facilitate and encourage a close and con-
tinuing relationship between the other parent and the child.”).
569. One anecdote on this is quite telling. One author of this Article, Stark, presented on 
the topic of taking domestic violence into account in child custody cases in a training 
session for child representatives. The first question she received, from a family a law 
judge also in attendance, was: How can we know when a person claiming domestic 
violence is telling the truth and not making the claim to get a better deal in the di-
vorce?
570. Meier & Dickson, supra note 2, at 328, 331.
571. See supra, Section I.D.
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In an extreme example of what can go wrong without a rebuttable 
presumption against custody to a parent who has committed domestic 
violence, an Illinois appellate court affirmed child custody to a father 
convicted of voluntary manslaughter for strangling to death the mother 
of his children.572 Upon release from prison, the father brought an ac-
tion for child custody against the maternal aunt and uncle who had 
been caring for their two nieces while the father was incarcerated.573 The 
case is also an example of what can go wrong when judges and other 
family law professionals involved in custody decisions fail to be trained 
on the nature and dynamics of domestic violence and its harmful impact 
on children.
There was ample evidence in the case described by the appellate 
court that the father, James, had been violent with the mother, Carol, 
and with their children, Dana and Tracy, in ways that were harmful to 
the children and deadly to the mother. Carol had filed a petition for dis-
solution of marriage and obtained an ex parte order of protection on 
December 21, 1984, based upon her sworn allegation that the day be-
fore, James had grabbed and thrown her in a violent manner to the floor 
and struck her.574 A neighbor of James and Carol who baby-sat for the 
children testified at the custody case that on the evening James killed 
Carol, the children ran into her house and begged her to go over to their 
house because James was choking Carol.575 Both children were crying 
and screaming.576 The neighbor further testified that when she went to 
the house James told her that there had been a fight but that everything 
was all right.577 The children then went inside the house with James.578
The witness also testified that Dana had told her about another fight be-
tween Carol and James, at which point the other daughter, Tracy, told 
Dana she should not have said anything to her.579 Another person who 
had known Carol and James for many years—and had a child of the 
same age—testified that prior to December 1984, she observed Dana 
with a black eye and both children with bruises on their buttocks.580 The 
marks were black and blue and Carol showed her a paddle that had been 
572. In re Lutgen, 532 N.E.2d 976, 987 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988).
573. Lutgen, 532 N.E.2d at 979.
574. Lutgen, 532 N.E.2d at 977.
575. Lutgen, 532 N.E.2d at 978.
576. Lutgen, 532 N.E.2d at 978.
577. Lutgen, 532 N.E.2d at 978.
578. Lutgen, 532 N.E.2d at 978.
579. Lutgen, 532 N.E.2d at 979.
580. Lutgen, 532 N.E.2d at 979.
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broken.581 This witness also testified that she observed injuries on Carol, 
but had not personally witnessed the incidents in which these injuries 
were inflicted.582 One of Carol’s brothers testified that he observed 
bruises on Carol’s arm and knee but had no personal knowledge as to 
how these were inflicted. He testified that Carol was afraid of James and 
that as a result she appeared very uneasy, scared, and nervous, and she 
also was losing weight.583
James testified at the custody case that he observed Carol and a 
man sitting in a pick-up truck hugging and kissing the night of the kill-
ing, but upon his return at home he did not say anything to her about 
what he had observed and instead telephoned his father.584 He stated 
that later Carol told him he could not take the children out for the 
evening as they had planned.585 James stated that he insisted that he was 
going to take them out as planned, while Carol again stated that he was 
not going to take them.586 James stated at the time of his arrest and testi-
fied that Carol grabbed him and began choking him; he grabbed her 
and pushed her back; she came at him again and he grabbed her neck 
and choked her and then threw her down to the floor; he told the chil-
dren to stay out in the living room because he did not want them to see 
what was happening; Carol got up again and started choking him; he 
kept choking her until she fell down a second time and began bleeding 
through the nose; he called his father who advised him to call the para-
medics; and she was pronounced death at the hospital.587
To a person trained on the nature and dynamics of domestic vio-
lence, these statements would not be credible. In light of the evidence of 
Carol’s prior injuries, and her statement to her brother of her fear of her 
husband, it was highly unlikely that she would have initiated violence 
against him. There was no reference to any evidence presented by James 
that Carol had ever attacked and injured him before. There was no evi-
dence discussed in the opinion on any wounds to James from Carol try-
ing to strangle him, or of the size and weight of each parent and how 
that impacted the likelihood that Carol could have strangled James or 
put him in reasonable fear that she could do so. And yet, notwithstand-
ing this, and voluntary manslaughter conviction,588 the court’s descrip-
581. Lutgen, 532 N.E.2d at 979.
582. Lutgen, 532 N.E.2d at 979.
583. Lutgen, 532 N.E.2d at 979.
584. Lutgen, 532 N.E.2d at 977–78.
585. Lutgen, 532 N.E.2d at 978.
586. Lutgen, 532 N.E.2d at 978.
587. Lutgen, 532 N.E.2d at 978.
588. Lutgen, 532 N.E.2d at 978.
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tion of what happened that night implied that this was a mutual 
fighting situation. For example, the court stated: “Other than the tragic 
circumstances [emphasis added by the authors] which resulted in the 
death of Carol, James has an unblemished record.”589 It is also odd that 
the court found that James had an unblemished record in light of the 
emergency order of protection granted against him the day he killed his 
wife.
In determining who should have custody of the children upon 
James’ release from prison, the trial court applied the following six best 
interests of the child factors using the standard under Illinois law:590
a. “the wishes of the child’s parent or parents as to his custody”
This case balanced the wishes of a parent who strangled and killed 
the other parent, against the wishes of the maternal aunt and uncle of 
the children with whom the children had been living in a peaceful and 
healthy home without domestic violence while the father was incarcer-
ated.
b. “the wishes of the child as to his custodian”
There was testimony that the two girls loved their father and their 
aunt and uncle, with one child stating she preferred their father and the 
other ultimately stating a preference for the aunt and uncle, but wanting 
to be with her sister no matter what.591 At first blush it might seem puz-
zling that the children expressed a desire to live with their father, with-
out describing any fear. After all, they had seen their father strangling 
their mother. They had also been punished by their father with corporal 
punishment that left bruise marks visible to others.
It appears there are several possible reasons for the children not 
expressing fear to live with their father after he returned from prison. 
Although the children had in fact seen or heard some of what happened 
on the night their father killed their mother (testimony of the neighbor 
the children ran to her crying and screaming that their father was 
choking their mother), what they were told later by their paternal 
grandmother appears to have been a sanitized/normalized version of 
589. Lutgen, 532 N.E.2d at 986.
590. 750 I.L.C.S. 5/602, IL ST ch. 750, § 5/602 (repealed by P.A. 99-90, § 5-20, eff. 
Jan. 1, 2016).
591. Lutgen, 532 N.E.2d at 982.
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what their father had done. The paternal grandmother testified that she 
told the children it was wrong that their mother would not let them go 
out as they had planned to (i.e., the mother was at fault for the fight).592
The father testified in the custody case that if his children asked him 
about what happened to their mother, he would tell them that their 
mother and he “had an argument; that there was pushing and shoving; 
and he ‘took her (Carol) to the floor.’”593 This is an unlikely story by the 
father of mutual fighting, and the father’s attempt to justify and 
normalize the deadly domestic violence he perpetrated that killed their 
mother.
c.  “the interaction and interrelationship of the child with his parent, his 
siblings and any other person who may significantly affect the child’s
best interests”
There was little testimony noted in the appellate decision that fo-
cused on this factor. James’s counsel stipulated that the aunt and uncle 
were proper custodial parents for the children. There was little discus-
sion of the father’s relationship to his children.
d. “the child’s adjustment to his home, school, and community”
There was remarkably positive evidence of how the children were 
doing after their mother was killed by their father, while living with 
their aunt and uncle. There was testimony from a child mental health 
specialist who performed a psychiatric evaluation that “[t]he children 
had benefitted from their placement with the Tranels. The Tranels han-
dled the children well.”594 The principal of the school testified that the 
children had adjusted well to the school.595
e. “the mental and physical health of all individuals involved”
There was little discussion and no evidence of any issues with the 
mental and physical health of the aunt and uncle. The child mental 
health specialist hired to evaluate the mental and physical health of the 
592. Lutgen, 532 N.E.2d at 981.
593. Lutgen, 532 N.E.2d at 982.
594. Lutgen, 532 N.E.2d at 983. (Eugene and Debra Tranel, Carol’s brother and sister-in-
law, were award custody of Tracy and Dana while James was incarcerated.)
595. Lutgen, 532 N.E.2d at 979.
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children did not find either child suffering from any diagnosable psychi-
atric illness.596 The same mental health specialist met with the father and 
reported that he was shy, anxious, and a bit of a “perfectionist.”597 It is 
unclear what testing the mental health specialist ran to determine the 
mental and physical health of the children and the father. The expert’s
observation that the father was a “perfectionist” might be more accu-
rately perceived as being coercively controlling by someone trained on 
domestic violence, depending upon what exactly was happening in the 
home when things were not done precisely in the way the father ex-
pected.
f. “the physical violence or threat of physical violence by the child’s
potential custodian, whether directed against the child or directed 
against another person but witnessed by the child”
The trial court’s ultimate ruling to provide custody to the father, 
and the appellate court’s review of this ruling, placed very little weight 
upon evidence presented that the mother had been the victim of physi-
cal violence by her husband (both the night she was strangled to death 
by her husband and the evidence of physical violence before then).598
There was also little weight placed or concern raised with the level of 
corporal punishment that the father inflicted on his children.599 This is 
the case even though the father acknowledged that he was the sole per-
son to discipline the children, and there was evidence that his discipline 
was sometimes performed in ways that left bruise marks. There was no 
exploration of the circumstances, the need to discipline the children in 
this fashion to determine, or if the corporal punishment was reasonable 
or abusive under the law.
In affirming the trial court’s decision, the appellate court noted 
that the determination of child custody rests largely within the broad 
discretion of the trial court and its decision will not be disturbed on ap-
peal unless the award is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence 
or unless the court abused its discretion.600 The key evidence that the 
appellate court focused on when affirming the trial court were: (i) the 
wishes of the “sole surviving parent” (an ironic way to describe a hus-
596. Lutgen, 532 N.E.2d at 983.
597. Lutgen, 532 N.E.2d at 983.
598. Lutgen, 532 N.E.2d at 987.
599. Lutgen, 532 N.E.2d at 986 (“The attempt to show that James was an abusive parent 
is not supported by the evidence.”).
600. Lutgen, 532 N.E.2d at 986.
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band who has strangled his wife to death) who was determined to be a 
fit parent; (ii) the wishes of the children (per the appellate court, while 
the aunt and uncle used best efforts to provide for the children, still the 
children felt they did not receive equal treatment with their cousins);
(iii) the recommendation of the child representative for custody to the 
father; and (iv) that psychological testing that did not argue against 
placing the child with the father.601
In terms of the best interest factor relating to physical violence, the 
appellate court stated: “While the court did hear testimony regarding 
the circumstances of Carol’s death, that is still only one of the fac-
tors . . . had the legislature wished to make this factor all controlling, it 
could have done so by appropriate legislation.”602 The appellate court 
stated that another court had already punished James for the wrong he 
committed in the criminal case, but this case involves a decision as to 
the custody of his children where the key focus is on what is in the best 
interests of the children.603 The appellate court, the trial court, and the 
attorney for the children failed to see how being ordered to live with a 
father who engaged in prior violence against the mother, and then dead-
ly domestic violence against her in the presence of the children, would 
not be in the best interests of the children. The appellate court seemed 
to buy into the father’s story that the killing was an accident as a result 
of mutual fighting by referring to James killing Carol as the “tragic cir-
cumstances which resulted in the death of Carol.”604 By misunderstand-
ing what likely happened here, that the father engaged in repeated vio-
lence against Carol, placing Carol in fear of James, rather than mutual 
fighting, the court failed to appreciate the likelihood that the children 
would be exposed to further violence by their father with future inti-
mate partners.605 This in turn led the court to fail to see the connection 
of James’s violence future harm to the children.
This case is a good illustration of the need for judges and child rep-
resentatives to be trained on the nature and dynamics of domestic vio-
601. Lutgen, 532 N.E.2d at 987.
602. Lutgen, 532 N.E.2d at 987.
603. Lutgen, 532 N.E.2d at 987.
604. Lutgen, 532 N.E.2d at 970.
605. As explained in Section I, those who perpetrate a pattern of coercive abuse often con-
tinue to do so after separation. This can be the case even when there is an order of 
protection in place. “Among jail inmates convicted of family violence, 45 [percent] 
had been subject to a restraining order at some point in their life.” Matthew R. Du-
rose et al., Family Violence Statistics: Including Statistics on Strangers and Acquaintanc-
es, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, 3, June 2005, https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/
pdf/fvs08.pdf.
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lence, its harmful impact on children, and best practices to protect chil-
dren and the non-abusive parent from further harm. This training 
should include how to distinguish a mutual fighting situation from a 
domestic violence situation where one person is the victim and the other 
is the primary aggressor. This case is also an example of why courts need 
a rebuttable presumption against sole or joint custody to a parent who 
has engaged in a pattern of coercive domestic violence. Creating this re-
buttable presumption against granting primary parenting time to a par-
ent who engages in domestic violence will help courts apply appropriate 
weight to this type of harmful conduct. It can also help children who 
have been exposed to domestic violence learn that such conduct is not 
acceptable for them to live with or to engage in when they grow up. It 
should also make it less likely they will be exposed to further domestic 
violence, especially if the parenting time of the parent who engages in 
domestic violence is conditioned on the ordering of protective measures 
designed to reduce the children’s exposure to further domestic violence.
As explained in Section I, even when the parent survivor of domes-
tic violence is granted primary parenting time and sole decision-making, 
evidence-based best practices would counsel the ordering of protective 
restrictions or conditions on the parenting time of the abusive parent 
tailored to the nature of the domestic violence that has occurred. But, 
under Illinois law, the burden of proof of showing harm to the child is 
on the parent seeking protective measures.606 There is no presumption of 
serious harm to children from exposure to domestic violence, as is con-
sistent with the large body of data discussed in Section I, and as articu-
lated in some states’ child custody laws.607 As noted earlier, this forces
the survivor of domestic violence to bring in an expert to testify on the 
body of data (noted in Section I) of the serious harms that children ex-
perience from exposure to domestic violence. A typical survivor of do-
mestic violence would not know how to do that or be able to afford to 
do that.
The Illinois statute fails to explicitly refer to domestic violence in 
the section establishing the standards for restricting parenting time, in 
contrast to the 35 states that do.608 This failure to even refer to domestic 
606. See In re Marriage of Fields, 283 Ill. App. 3d 894, 904–05 (1996) (holding, in a case 
involving allegations and evidence of sexual assault of a minor by her father, that the 
custodial parent carries the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence 
that visitation with the non-custodial parent would seriously endanger the child).
607. See CH.750 ILL. COMP. STAT.§ 5/603.10 (Westlaw through P.A. 100-1179 of the 
2018 Reg. Sess.) (detailing restrictions of parental responsibilities).
608. CH.750 ILL. COMP. STAT.§ 5/603.10 (Westlaw through P.A. 100-1179 of the 2018 
Reg. Sess.). However, §603.10(a)(8) refers to orders that include “requiring a parent 
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violence as a basis for ordering restrictions on parenting time makes 
arguing for such a result even more difficult. Section 603.10(a) of the 
Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act provides that the 
court shall enter orders as necessary to protect the child “if the court 
finds by a preponderance of the evidence that a parent engaged in any 
conduct that seriously endangered the child’s mental, moral, or physical 
health or that significantly impaired the child’s emotional 
development.”609 Section 602.7 states: “it is presumed both parents are 
fit and the court shall not place any restrictions on parenting time as 
defined in Section 600 and described in Section 603.10,610 unless it 
finds by a preponderance of the evidence that a parent’s exercise of 
parenting time would seriously endanger the child’s physical, mental, 
moral, or emotional health.”611
In light of these serious gaps in taking domestic violence into ac-
count in the statutory standards set for allocating parenting decision-
making and parenting time, and of requiring or even permitting re-
strictions on parenting time, it is highly unlikely that a family law judge 
would order any type of protective measures that could be construed as 
restrictions on parenting based solely upon a parent’s commission of 
domestic violence against the other parent. This is the case especially if 
the judge and the family law professionals they rely upon lack adequate 
training on domestic violence and on the danger of serious harms to 
children when it is occurring. And as noted earlier, under Illinois law, 
judges, guardian ad litem, and child representatives are not required to 
receive training on domestic violence. Instead, the Illinois Supreme 
Court Rules only recommend such training.612 Family law judges in Illi-
nois historically have not ordered significant restrictions or conditions 
on parenting time, such as supervised parenting time, based solely on 
exposure to domestic violence. However, there have been cases in which 
to complete a treatment program for perpetrators of abuse” CH.750 ILL. COMP. STAT.
§5/ 603.10(A)(8) (West 2018). By providing this as an example of an order for the 
protection of a child implies that parents who commit such abuse can be subject to 
this type of order when such abuse is considered to seriously endanger a child’s men-
tal, moral, or physical health, or significantly impair the child’s emotional develop-
ment (the standard set forth for orders as necessary to protect the child).
609. 750 ILCS 5/603.10.
610. CH. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 603.10 (Westlaw through P.A. 100-1179 of the 2018 
Reg. Sess.). It is important to note that the restrictions listed in 603.10 do not in-
clude only supervised parenting time, but also includes less invasive conditions such 
as the exchange of children through an intermediary and the restraining of a parent’s
communication with or proximity to other parents or the child.
611. 750 ILCS 5/602.7.
612. See supra notes 386 and 404.
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they might order supervised parenting time when a parent is engaged in 
direct physical abuse or sexual abuse of their child.613
3. Arizona: A Case Study
The state of Arizona falls on the other end of the spectrum in terms 
of legal protections to domestic violence survivors and their children in 
custody cases. Like Illinois, Arizona broadly defines domestic violence in 
its custody laws.614 However, unlike Illinois, Arizona is among the 21 
states whose laws create a rebuttable presumption against primary par-
enting time or joint or sole decision-making to a parent who has en-
gaged in domestic violence. Equally important, under Arizona law, once 
a court finds that domestic violence has occurred, the court places the 
burden on the parent who has committed the domestic violence to 
prove that any parenting time to them will not endanger the child or 
significantly impair their child’s emotional development.615 Indeed, even 
613. The author listed first on the heading of this piece has worked with many family law 
attorneys in Illinois. Many of these attorneys have reported to her that it is conven-
tional wisdom that judges will not order restrictions on parenting time, and in par-
ticular, supervised visitation, based solely on the children being exposed to domestic 
violence, but might due to direct abuse of the child, in particular, proven sexual abuse 
of the child.
614. The Arizona custody law expansively defines domestic violence to include any one of 
the following: “(1) Intentionally, knowingly or recklessly causes or attempts to cause 
sexual assault or serious physical injury. (2) Places a person in reasonable apprehen-
sion of imminent serious physical injury to any person. (3) Engages in a pattern of 
behavior for which a court may issue an ex parte order to protect the other parent 
who is seeking child custody or to protect the child and the child’s siblings.” A.R.S. 
§ 25-403.03D. To give a sense of how the standard for an order of protection is satis-
fied, which in turn affects the definition of domestic violence under § 25-
403.03(D)(3), see, Ralph v. Alberti, 2015 Ariz. Super. LEXIS 1643 (father regularly 
and excessively sent the mother harassing text messages and acted in a threatening 
manner to her at the time of exchanges of the children, had been arrested with large 
amounts of weapons and narcotics, had threatened her, had in the past threatened su-
icide, and vandalized her property and stalked her, leading the court to find that there 
had been significant domestic violence or child abuse pursuant to § 25-403.03 due to 
the father’s threatening, intimidating and harassing behavior under A.R.S. § 25-
403.03(D)(2) and (3), that this evidence of domestic violence is contrary to the best 
interest of the children, and that the father had not met his burden of proof to the 
court’s satisfaction that his unsupervised parenting time will not endanger the chil-
dren nor significantly impair the child’s emotional development).
615. AZ REV. STAT. § 25-403.04(F) (Westlaw through the First Spec. and Second Reg. 
Sess. of the Fifty-Third Leg. 2018). “If the court finds that a parent has committed 
an act of domestic violence, that parent has the burden of proving to the court’s satis-
faction that parenting time will not endanger the child or significantly impair the 
110 michigan  jo urn al  o f  g ender & la w [Vol. 26:1
when the parent satisfies the burden to show that some form of parent-
ing time will not endanger their child or significantly impair the child’s 
emotional development, under Arizona law, the court must then “place 
conditions on parenting time that best protect the child and the other 
parent from further harm.”616 The combination of these laws in Arizona 
should make it much easier for a survivor of domestic violence to obtain 
court orders with features designed to protect them and their children 
from further abuse through the parenting time and parenting decision-
making of the parent who has perpetrated domestic violence.
The Arizona statute lists nine conditions on parenting time that a 
court may order when a parent has engaged in domestic violence: (1) 
exchanges of the child in a protected setting; (2) supervised parenting 
time and the conditions during that parenting time; (3) order the per-
son who committed the domestic violence to attend and complete a 
program of intervention for perpetrators of domestic violence; (4) ab-
stain from alcohol or controlled substances during parenting time and 
for 24 hours before parenting time; (5) to pay a fee for the costs of par-
enting time; (6) prohibit overnight parenting time; (7) require a bond 
from the parent who committed the domestic violence for the child’s 
safe return; (8) order that the address of the child and the other parent 
remain confidential; or (9) impose any other condition that the court 
determines is necessary to protect the child, the other parent and any 
other family or household member.617 These conditions enable a court 
to tailor its order of protective measures to address the specific forms of 
abuse that have occurred already or are likely to occur in the future.
In many respects, the child custody laws in Arizona are the com-
plete opposite of the child custody laws in Illinois. And, in light of these
differences in laws, it is far more likely for a court to order one or more 
of the protective measures described above under Arizona law than un-
der Illinois law when a parent commits domestic violence. 
child’s emotional development.” Id. “If the parent meets this burden to the court’s
satisfaction, the court shall place conditions on parenting time that best protect the 
child and the other parent from further harm.” Id.
616. Id.
617. AZ REV. STAT. § 25-403.04(F) (Westlaw through the First Spec. and Second Reg. 
Sess. of the Fifty-Third Leg. 2018). “If the court finds that a parent has committed 
an act of domestic violence, that parent has the burden of proving to the court’s satis-
faction that parenting time will not endanger the child or significantly impair the 
child’s emotional development.” Id. “If the parent meets this burden to the court’s
satisfaction, the court shall place conditions on parenting time that best protect the 
child and the other parent from further harm.” Id.
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It should also be noted that in Arizona, training judges on issues re-
lated to domestic violence is required as part of New Judge Orientation 
and can only be waived under very limited, temporary-in-nature cir-
cumstances.618 Under Illinois law, such training of judges is only rec-
ommended—not required.619 Thus it is far more likely that family law 
judges are trained on domestic violence in Arizona than in Illinois. Ari-
zona law also requires attorneys and guardians ad litem to receive train-
ing that would include domestic violence, but provides that such train-
ing can be waived without clarifying the basis for a waiver.620 So, de-
depending upon the basis accepted for waiving this requirement and 
how often it is waived, it is unclear to what extent Arizona’s required 
training on domestic violence for guardians ad litem leads to more train-
ing than in Illinois where such training is recommended but not re-
quired. As discussed earlier, training on domestic violence is very im-
portant for judges, and the family law professionals they rely upon, to 
make decisions consistent with the nature, dynamics, and realities of 
domestic violence and its impact on children. But legislation that is 
based upon best practices for taking domestic violence into account 
could be another way to provide “training” to judges and other family 
law professionals. Such legislation should also help lead to better out-
comes. The best approach would be to combine required training with 
protective laws that properly take domestic violence into account.
III. Necessary Law Reforms to 
Implement Evidence-Based Best Practices
Based upon the Literature Review in Section I and the summary 
and analysis of laws among the states in Section II, we recommend the 
following law reforms:
618. See Ariz. Admin. Code of Jud. Admin. § 1-302(F)(2) (2016) (stating that “[u]pon 
request, the chief justice, the chief judge, the presiding judge of the superior court in 
each county, or their designees may grant exemptions to judges and employees of 
their court for temporary circumstances, including but not limited to: (a) Medical or 
other physical conditions preventing active participation in educational programs; (b)
Extended, approved leave of absence; (c) Military leave; (d) Extended jury duty; (e) 
Temporary medical waivers for defensive tactics courses, in accordance with ACJA 
§ 6-107.”; see also DOMESTIC VIOLENCE TRAINING FOR JUDGES, supra note 382.
619. See supra note 386, ILL. SUP. CT. R. 908(c).
620. See supra note 409, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40.1.J (Westlaw through the First Spec. 
and Second Reg. Sess. of the Fifty-Third Leg. 2018).
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1. Each state should require its family law judges, child rep-
resentatives, guardians ad litem, and custody evaluators to 
receive initial training on domestic violence and continu-
ing training each year to cover the topics in Section I and 
in the Wisconsin Guidebook and to incorporate evolving 
evidence-based best practices.
2. Each state should require its child representatives, 
guardians ad litem, and custody evaluators to screen for 
domestic violence in each of their custody cases using the 
best practices noted in Section I.
3. Each state’s child custody laws should define “domestic 
violence” broadly, as in the CDC definition, and should 
also take into account the subcategories of: (a) “situational 
couple violence,” which may include mutual violence that 
is situational in nature and far more likely to end once the 
couple is no longer living together if contacts between the
parents are minimized, and (b) a pattern of coercive 
abuse, which can include physical or sexual violence, and 
other forms of coercive abuse as described in Section I, 
which abuse is far more likely to continue or escalate after 
the separation.
4. Each state’s child custody laws should provide for a rebut-
table presumption that sole or joint decision-making and 
primary parenting time is not in the best interests of chil-
dren and should not be granted to a parent who has en-
gaged in domestic violence when it includes a pattern of 
coercive abuse against the other parent.
5. Each state’s custody laws should provide that for cases in-
volving situational couple violence, there is a rebuttable 
presumption to structure parenting time under the con-
cept of “parallel parenting” as detailed in Jaffe et al. and 
described in Section I of this article (minimal contacts be-
tween the parents), but with a stronger emphasis on the 
goal of requiring more common practices within the two 
households as necessary for the child’s physical and emo-
tional well-being (this type of parenting plan, which 
would include further parenting time details to achieve 
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this goal, could be called “structured independent parent-
ing time” to better capture this emphasis).
6. Each state should provide in its child custody laws that if 
a parent engages in a pattern of coercive abuse, that par-
ent has the burden of proving to the court’s satisfaction 
that any parenting time with that parent will not endan-
ger the child or significantly impair the child’s emotional 
development. If the parent meets this burden to the 
court’s satisfaction, the court shall place conditions on 
parenting time that best protect the child, the other par-
ent, and other members of the household, from further 
harm. The child custody law should then require the 
court to determine which conditions should be placed on 
the parenting time of the parent who has engaged in do-
mestic violence, to protect the child, other parent, and 
other members of the household, from further harm. The 
child custody law should include a list of protective fea-
tures from which the court may choose so the court can 
tailor the protections ordered to prevent further domestic 
violence and address the harms already experienced.621
7. The burden of proof in finding that domestic violence has 
occurred for purposes of child custody decisions should 
be preponderance of the evidence, as in other civil cases.
The burden of proof should be on the party alleging the 
abuse. The burden of proof to rebut the presumptions de-
scribed in suggested reforms 4 and 5 above should be on 
the party seeking to rebut those presumptions.
While not the focus of this article, the law reforms proposed should 
also cover situations of direct abuse of children, if they are not already 
621. The law reform described in paragraph six is already the approach under the child 
custody laws in Arizona. While only a few other states expressly place the burden of 
showing no endangerment or significant impairment to the child from parenting 
time on the parent who has engaged in domestic violence, a large number of the stat-
utes among the 34 states that clearly identify domestic violence as a basis to condition 
or restrict parenting time word this in a way that in fact presumes this harm and di-
rects the court to address it. For example, the statutes in Alabama, Mississippi, Geor-
gia, South Carolina, Vermont, Virginia, and West Virginia state: “A court may award 
visitation by a parent who committed domestic or family violence only if the court 
finds that adequate provision for the safety of the child and parent who is a victim of 
domestic or family violence can be made.” See supra Section II.C.
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adequately covered in the child custody laws, since there is a strong 
body of evidence that children suffer serious harm as a result of directly 
experiencing physical, sexual, and emotional abuse, committed by a par-
ent.622
The studies reviewed in Section I support the above described law 
reform proposals. The 50-state review of laws in Section II supports the 
need for these reforms to address the gaps between evidence-based best 
practices and current laws in place among the 50 states and the District 
of Columbia.
As with any law reform, legislators will be concerned about the 
costs in implementing the reforms proposed. However, the costs for the 
screening and training described can be contained by the fashion in 
which it is implemented. The screening for domestic violence by child 
representatives, guardians ad litem, and custody evaluators can be com-
pleted as discussed in Section I by adding a few important questions to 
the interviews they normally perform. The act of screening for domestic 
violence should not add any costs to the process. When allegations of 
domestic violence come up through this screening, this would lead to 
extra efforts of investigation, which will add to the time and cost of the 
process for recommending custody arrangements. But this follow-up is a 
cost to prevent harm that would be no different than following up on 
any other alleged harms or unsafe conditions for children (such as alle-
gations that a parent was intoxicated while caring for their child). And 
the cost to society in not screening for and protecting survivors of do-
mestic violence and their children would far exceed the extra costs in 
time in investigating the allegations.623 Furthermore, the domestic vio-
lence training recommended for judges, guardians ad litem, child repre-
622. PSYCHOANALYTIC PSYCHOTHERAPTY AFTER CHILD ABUSE: THE TREATMENT OF 
ADULTS AND CHILDREN WHO HAVE EXPERIENCED SEXUAL ABUSE, VIOLENCE, AND 
NEGLECT IN CHILDHOOD (Daniel McQueen et al. eds., Karnac 2008); Alexandra 
Cook et al., Complex Trauma in Children and Adolescents, 35 PSYCHIATRIC ANNALS
390 (2005); Tara Richards et al., Intimate Partner Violence and the Overlap of Perpe-
tration and Victimization: Considering the Influence of Physical, Sexual, and Emotional 
Abuse in Childhood, 67 J. CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 240 (2017); Jerusha Sanjeevi et 
al., A Review of Child Sexual Abuse: Impact, Risk, and Resilience in the Context of Cul-
ture, 27 J. CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE 622 (2018).
623. According to the CDC, the lifetime per-victim cost from intimate partner violence is 
$103,767 for women and $23,414 for men, with a lifetime economic cost to the U.S. 
population of $3.6 trillion, based on 32 million women and 12 million men who are 
victims of intimate partner violence during their lives. The $3.6 trillion in economic 
cost estimate includes: $2.1 trillion (59 percent) in medical costs, $1.3 trillion (37
percent) in lost productivity among victims and perpetrators, $73 billion (two per-
cent) in criminal justice costs, and $62 billion (two percent) in other costs, such as 
victim property or loss. Intimate Partner Violence: Consequences, supra note 27.
2019] D O M E S T I C  VI O L E N C E  I N  C H I L D  C U S T O D Y C A S E S 115
sentatives, and custody evaluators could be added to the existing annual 
training they receive. The training could be arranged by those who al-
ready organize such training conferences in collaboration with those 
who have been extensively trained on domestic violence as it relates to 
custody decision-making. Building on what already exists can reduce the 
added expenses from providing this essential training.
The recommendations on reforming child custody laws are nu-
anced and balanced. For certain situational couple violence, “parallel 
parenting” time as described in Jaffe et al. is recommended,624 but with 
the adjustments we recommended in Section I. We call this parenting 
time arrangement “structured independent parenting time.”625 For for-
mer couples who have engaged in mutual, situation based violence, but 
who have a good relationship with their children, this approach facili-
tates the goal of promoting safe and healthy parent-child relationships. 
With fewer opportunities to communicate, the former couple should 
have fewer conflicts that are harmful to their children and themselves. 
However, when there is evidence of a pattern of coercive abuse, 
which is likely to continue and even escalate after the couple separates,
heightened protections are recommended. In these situations, a series of 
law reforms should lead judges to order sole decision-making and pri-
mary parenting time to the survivor of this kind of domestic violence, 
with restrictions and conditions on parenting time for the parent en-
gaged in this kind of domestic violence, tailored to the likely further 
abuse or violence that would occur if the protections were not in place. 
Courts should be required to consider whether ordering various types of 
preventative programs for parents who commit domestic violence would 
help reduce the likelihood of further domestic violence and whether or-
dering therapeutic programs for parent survivors of domestic violence 
and their children would help address the harms from prior domestic 
violence.
Courts and other family law professionals may be concerned with 
their ability to make the distinction between situational couple violence 
and a pattern of coercive abuse. But, this underscores the need for initial 
624. The parallel parenting time we recommend would be based upon what was described 
in Jaffe et al., 2008, supra note 306, but with a greater emphasis on a parenting plan 
that provides the details necessary to create common practices in the two independent 
households as needed for the child’s emotional and physical welfare. We refer to this 
modification of parallel parenting as “structured independent parenting time.”
625. See supra Section I (discussion of structured independent parenting time that also 
emphasizes some common practices during parenting time); supra note 327 and ac-
companying text (support for this need in the context of consistent bed time rou-
tines); supra note 328 and accompanying text (uniformity in rules and explanations).
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and continuing domestic violence training to help these professionals 
make the best decisions possible for children and their parents when 
there is evidence of abuse and violence in the family. It is anticipated
that fathers’ rights organizations and their advocates will generally object 
to the proposed law reforms that take domestic violence into account in 
child custody cases and to better enable the non-abusive parent to 
protect themselves and their children from the danger of further 
domestic violence. They will likely claim that mothers often make up 
abuse allegations for financial gain and to alienate the children from 
their father, that judges already favor mothers in custody cases, and that 
children benefit from equal parenting time. However, as detailed in 
Section I, data do not support the claims that women often make up 
allegations of abuse and that courts favor women over men in custody 
cases. The data collected reflects the contrary. Judges place too much 
weight on alienation claims and fail to credit or place proper weight on 
evidence of domestic violence and child abuse. And, as detailed in 
Section I, there is substantial evidence that children are harmed from 
parenting time with a parent who engages in domestic violence.
Fathers’ rights advocates may also claim that the proposed law re-
forms violate a parent’s rights to their children. But the law reforms 
proposed are based in large part upon existing laws in many states. In 
addition, the law reforms proposed that would have the strongest im-
pact on parenting would be triggered only by a pattern of coercive 
abuse, the type most likely to continue even after the couple separates. 
For cases of mutual, situational, domestic violence, if the parents have 
good relationships with their children, the proposal provides for the mu-
tual, and less invasive protective measure of parallel parenting (using a 
structured, independent parenting time plan), to reduce the likelihood 
of future domestic violence and facilitate significant parent-child time 
with each parent. Thus, the law reforms proposed should not be con-
strued as impermissible violations of parental rights.
Conclusion
Promoting the best interests of children and protecting them from 
serious endangerment in the context of a divorce or parentage case has 
become highly politicized and gendered. There are claims by fathers’
rights groups that mothers often falsely accuse fathers of domestic vio-
lence to gain leverage in custody cases, to procure financial advantage, 
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or to alienate the fathers from their children.626 They also claim that 
children do better when fathers are equally involved in their children’s 
lives, but that judges favor mothers over fathers in custody cases.627 Fa-
thers’ rights groups have engaged in a nationwide effort to reform the 
custody laws to create a presumption of equal parenting time, with no 
exception when one of the parents has engaged in domestic violence.628
In the meantime, domestic violence survivors and their advocates claim 
that the needs of survivors of domestic violence and their children to be 
safe and free from further abuse are not being met in custody cases, that 
their claims of abuse are not being believed, and that the harm to their 
children from being exposed to domestic violence is not recognized and 
addressed by judges.629
This Article presented a literature review to assess treatment of do-
mestic violence and best practices for taking domestic violence into ac-
count in child custody cases.630 Our key findings include:
(i) domestic violence can cause serious, long-term harm to 
children, and there is a strong co-occurrence of domestic 
violence with physical injury to children, and child abuse;
(ii) judges favor fathers over mothers in custody cases (granting 
the custody in the fashion the fathers seek over what the 
mothers seek) by placing greater weight upon claims of al-
ienation by fathers over claims of domestic violence by 
mothers, especially when the judges are not trained on do-
mestic violence and hold traditional gender norms and be-
lieve the world is a just place;
(iii) the long-term harms to children from domestic violence 
can be mitigated when protective factors are present or 
pursued, which include supporting the non-abusive parents 
in their efforts to protect themselves and their children
from further domestic violence;
(iv) to effectuate this support, family law professionals must be 
thoroughly trained on both the basics of domestic violence 
and the many counter-intuitive nuances of domestic 
626. See supra Section I.
627. See supra Section I.
628. See supra Section I.
629. See supra Section I.
630. See supra Section I.
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violence, with custody evaluators, guardians ad litem, and 
child representatives needing to screen for domestic 
violence in all of their custody cases;
(v) a key component of this training is learning how to 
distinguish situational couple violence, which might be 
able to be safely addressed through “parallel parenting”
type custody orders, from situations where there has been a 
pattern of coercive abuse based upon a general goal of 
control in all matters, and which will likely continue and 
escalate after separation; and
(vi) in cases with a pattern of coercive abuse there should be a 
rebuttable presumption that courts order sole decision-
making and primary parenting to the non-abusive parent, 
and protective conditions and restrictions being placed on 
the parenting time of the coercively abusive parent.631
The review of state custody laws in the United States reflects sub-
stantial gaps between the practices and rules that evidence-based policies 
suggest, and the actual laws in place in most states.632 Only one state re-
quires custody evaluators, guardians ad litem, or child representatives to 
screen for domestic violence.633 Only 11 states clearly require without 
waiver that family law judges—and only 13 states clearly require with-
out waiver that custody evaluators, guardians ad litem, or child repre-
631. See supra Section I. This proposal focuses on the situations where the domestic vio-
lence constitutes a pattern of coercive abuse or situational couple violence as we have 
defined these terms, and seeks to supplement and enhance existing statutory protec-
tions in child custody cases in those two situations. If the act(s) of domestic violence 
do not fit within those two categories, then they should be addressed under existing 
statutory standards relating to best interests of the child, any rebuttable presumptions 
on custody based upon domestic violence as defined in those statutes, the standard 
for the ordering of restrictions or conditions on parenting time due to domestic vio-
lence (if so referenced in the statute), or under the general standard for such re-
strictions or conditions on parenting time as worded in the applicable state. Having 
said that, we recommend that state legislation that clearly empowers courts to order 
restrictions or conditions on parenting time as necessary and appropriate to promote 
the safety and well-being of the child and the safety of the parent victim of domestic 
violence should be the norm, and states with legislation, like in Illinois, that require a 
higher level of harm before a court can order restrictions or conditions on parenting 
time should be modified to conform with this norm.
632. See supra Section II.
633. See supra Section II.
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sentatives—receive training on domestic violence.634 Only 21 states and 
the District of Columbia created in their custody statutes a rebuttable 
presumption against sole or joint custody to a parent who has engaged 
in domestic violence as defined in their statutes.635 And, while 34 states 
clearly and explicitly refer to domestic violence (or domestic abuse or 
family violence against the other parent) as a basis to condition or re-
strict parenting time of a non-custodial parent,636 some of these states’
statutes that create rebuttable presumptions, or refer to domestic vio-
lence as a basis to condition or restrict parenting time, narrowly define 
domestic violence or do not require, but only permit, the court to order 
any conditions or restrictions.637 These gaps in the law, and in requiring 
domestic violence screening and training, contribute to poor custody 
decision-making by judges to the detriment of the safety and welfare of 
domestic violence survivors and their children.638 Nuanced and balanced 
law reforms would align the laws with evidence-based best practices for 
taking domestic violence into account in child custody cases.639 If enact-
ed and implemented, these law reforms should lead to safer, healthier, 
and better outcomes in child custody cases for families throughout the 
United States.
634. See supra Section II. Our searches relating to required training focused on custody 
statutes and state supreme court rules. It is possible that additional states require such 
training but from other sources of law; see also supra note 422 (Indiana requires train-
ing on child abuse and neglect but not on domestic violence).
635. See supra Section II.
636. See supra Section II.
637. See supra Section II.
638. See supra Section II.
639. See supra Section III.

